UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1856
GREGORY JEROME MILLER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CAROLINAS HEALTHCARE SYSTEM,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., District Judge. (3:12-cv-00314-RJC-DSC)
Submitted: November 27, 2013 Decided: March 13, 2014
Before GREGORY, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Gregory Jerome Miller, Appellant Pro Se. Kevin V. Parsons,
SMITH, PARSONS & VICKSTROM, PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Gregory Jerome Miller appeals the district court’s
order, accepting in part the magistrate judge’s recommendation,
and dismissing, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Miller’s
action alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, as amended (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to
2000e–17 (West 2003 & Supp. 2013). Miller, an African-American
male, alleged that his employer, Carolinas HealthCare System
(“CHS”), discriminated and retaliated against him in violation
of Title VII. Specifically, Miller asserted (1) discrimination
based on sex, age, race, and color; (2) blacklisting, invasion
of privacy, and violation of North Carolina Recording Law; (3)
failure to promote based on race; (4) hostile work environment;
and (5) retaliation. The magistrate judge recommended
dismissing all but Miller’s Title VII claims of disparate
treatment based on race, failure to promote, and retaliation.
In granting CHS’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted on all claims, the district
court held that Miller’s allegations were insufficient to
support a prima facie case under Title VII. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
This court reviews de novo a district court’s order
dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim, assuming
that all well-pleaded nonconclusory factual allegations in the
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complaint are true. Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 391
(4th Cir. 2011). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the legal
sufficiency of the complaint. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d
186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009).
“To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), plaintiff’s ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level,’ thereby
‘nudg[ing] their claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.’” Aziz, 658 F.3d at 391 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a court must accept
the material facts alleged in the complaint as true, Edwards v.
City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999), statements
of bare legal conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of
truth” and are insufficient to state a claim. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); see also Giacomelli, 588 F.3d
at 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[N]aked assertions of wrongdoing
necessitate some factual enhancement within the complaint to
cross the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Although the Supreme Court has . . . made clear that
the factual allegations in a complaint must make entitlement to
relief plausible and not merely possible, what Rule 12(b)(6)
does not countenance are dismissals based on a judge’s disbelief
of a complaint’s factual allegations.” McLean v. United States,
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566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks,
alteration, and citations omitted). “Moreover, claims lacking
merit may be dealt with through summary judgment under Rule 56.”
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). Finally,
a pro se complaint “is to be liberally construed, . . . and
. . . must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Miller’s complaint must include only “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). As the Supreme Court has
recognized, specific facts are not necessary in a pleading, and
a plaintiff need only “give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Indeed, the Supreme Court has cautioned that a Title
VII plaintiff is not required to plead facts that constitute a
prima facie case. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510-15.
However, this court has recognized that Swierkiewicz “left
untouched the burden of a plaintiff to allege facts sufficient
to state all the elements of her claim.” Jordan v. Alternative
Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 346 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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Under this analysis, we conclude that the district
court properly granted CHS’s motion to dismiss all claims except
Miller’s claims of discrimination based on race, failure to
promote, and retaliation. In analyzing Miller’s discrimination
and retaliation claims under the burden-shifting framework
adopted by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973), the district court
essentially required Miller to allege a prima facie case as to
these claims. With respect to Miller’s claim of race
discrimination, the district court determined that dismissal was
appropriate because Miller offered no facts to support that he
was performing his job in a satisfactory manner. The district
court also dismissed Miller’s failure to promote claim on the
ground that Miller failed to plead facts sufficient to address
the second element of his prima facie case which requires
identification of a specific position. * As to Miller’s
retaliation claim, the district court concluded Miller failed to
sufficiently allege that CHS had knowledge that he engaged in
*
In his amended complaint, Miller stated that CHS
discriminated against him when it failed to promote him to a
supervisor’s position. Miller offered no other details with
respect to the position. We conclude Miller provided CHS “fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
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protected behavior of the type that would invoke legal
protections of Title VII.
In the employment discrimination context, however, a
plaintiff need not establish a prima facie case under McDonnell
Douglas in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Swierkiewicz,
534 U.S. at 510–11 (concluding that “the prima facie case . . .
is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.”).
Complaints in such cases therefore “must satisfy only the simple
requirements of Rule 8(a).” Id. at 513.
Taking the allegations in Miller’s amended complaint
as true, we conclude that the district court erred in finding
Miller insufficiently pleaded a claim of race discrimination,
failure to promote, and retaliation. We conclude Miller’s
amended complaint as to these three claims was sufficient to
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, particularly in light of
Miller’s pro se status.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district
court's dismissal of Miller’s claims of hostile work
environment, discrimination based on sex, age, and color; and
blacklisting, invasion of privacy, and violation of North
Carolina Recording Law. However, we hold that Miller’s claims
under Title VII for discrimination based on race, retaliation,
and failure to promote are sufficient to withstand Rule 12(b)(6)
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dismissal. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment dismissing those
claims and remand for further proceedings.
In holding that these claims survive a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), we express no opinion on the
ultimate merits of these claims. On remand and after discovery,
the district court must determine whether issues of triable fact
exist on the elements of Miller’s claims. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
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