IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-40465
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KENNETH LYONS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:00-CR-96-1
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January 4, 2002
Before DeMOSS, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Kenneth Lyons appeals his conviction after a jury trial of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846; possession with intent
to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1); and being a felon in possession of a firearm (enhanced
as an Armed Career Offender) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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He argues that the district court erred in shifting the burden of
proof to him, instead of the Government, during the suppression
hearing; that the evidence was sufficient to support his
convictions; that the district court erred in increasing his
offense level for possession of a dangerous weapon; and that the
district court erred in determining the conversion and purity rates
used to calculate the amount of drugs attributable to him under the
Sentencing Guidelines.
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, this court
reviews the district court's conclusions of law de novo and its
factual findings for clear error. United States v. Jordan, 232
F.3d 447, 448 (5th Cir. 2000). When filing a suppression motion,
the defendant must “first discharge his initial burden of producing
some evidence on specific factual allegations sufficient to make a
prima facie showing of illegality.” United States v. De La Fuente,
548 F.2d 528, 534 (5th Cir. 1977). As Lyons did not satisfy this
initial burden, the district court did not err in placing the
burden of proof on him during the suppression hearing. Even if
Lyons did satisfy this burden, however, and the burden of proof
shifted to the Government to prove the legality of the searches, we
conclude that this burden was satisfied by the Government at the
suppression hearing. See United States v. Chavis, 48 F.3d 871, 872
(5th Cir. 1995).
We review the sufficiency of evidence to determine whether any
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reasonable jury could have found that the evidence established
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979); United States v. Martinez, 975 F.2d 159, 160-61
(5th Cir. 1992). After reviewing the trial transcripts, we are
satisfied that Lyons’ convictions were supported by sufficient
evidence. See United States v. Gonzales, 79 F.3d 413, 423 (5th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1157 (5th Cir.
1993); United States v. DeLeon, 170 F.3d 494, 496 (5th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Fields, 72 F.3d 1200, 1212 (5th Cir. 1996). We
also conclude that there was no clear error in the district court’s
decision to enhance Lyons’ offense level for possession of a
firearm under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1,
comment. (n.3); United States v. Vasquez, 161 F.3d 909, 912 (5th
Cir. 1998).
Finally, as the district court’s use of a 55% conversion rate
and a 90% purity rate in calculating the drugs attributable to
Lyons under the Sentencing Guidelines was within the ranges stated
by one or both of the experts who testified at the sentencing
hearing, there was no clear error in this regard. United States v.
Torres, 114 F.3d 520, 527 (5th Cir. 1997).
AFFIRMED.
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