Filed 3/17/14 In re Andre B. CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re ANDRE B., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
D063509
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. JCM227937)
v.
ANDRE B.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a true finding of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Carlos O. Armour, Judge. Reversed.
Elizabeth Garfinkle, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and Sabrina Y.
Lane-Erwin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging
that Andre B. (the Minor) was in violation of a previous grant of probation following a
true finding that the Minor had committed a violation of Penal Code section 288,
subdivision (a).
Following an adjudication hearing the court found the allegation of probation
violation to be true. The court thereafter removed the Minor from the custody of his
parents and placed him under the care, custody and control of the probation department.
The Minor filed a timely notice of appeal.
The Minor appeals contending the trial court erred in admitting a portion of a
previous probation report in order to prove prior acts of sexual misconduct pursuant to
Evidence Code sections 1101 and 1108. The People have responded claiming the issue
was waived by failure to object. However, the People make no effort to defend the trial
court's decision on the merits. Based on our review of the record we are satisfied defense
counsel adequately raised hearsay and confrontation clause objections to the proposed
evidence and that the trial court erroneously overruled such objections. Accordingly, we
will find the Minor's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated and therefore
reverse the true finding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Minor's summary of the facts presented at trial is concise and accurate and we
adopt it here.
Sandy V. and her family lived in the same apartment complex, next door to the
Minor, who would play with her four-year-old daughter, A. On October 5, 2012, the
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Minor was playing with A. and her two-year-old brother, while the two children were
inside the child gate in the doorway of the apartment, and the Minor was outside the gate.
A. was wearing a shirt and underpants. Playing peek-a-boo with a little bunny doll in his
hand, the Minor would hide and then say "boo" and make the kids laugh. Ms. V. stepped
out from her room into the hallway and noticed the Minor, who was on the outside of the
gate from the children and about 15 feet away from Ms. V., had his hand momentarily on
the crotch area on the outside of her daughter's underpants. Ms. V. then explained that
she did not actually see the Minor's hand touching her daughter, whose back was to her.
She did not know if his fingers or his palm touched her, or how or where the Minor
touched her, but she did see him pull his hand away from her daughter, and she was
"pretty certain" he touched her.
Ms. V. screamed and said, "A.," closed the front door and told A. to go to her
room. A. was upset about not playing anymore and began to cry. After speaking to her
husband, Ms. V. called the police.
DISCUSSION
At the adjudication hearing the prosecution sought to introduce the Minor's prior
adjudications under Penal Code sections 288, subdivision (a) and 647.6 as evidence of
sexual propensity under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 1108. The Minor objected to
the admission of the details of such adjudications based on prejudice (Evid. Code, § 352)
and on the grounds the contents of the previous social study were hearsay and violated
the Minor's confrontation rights. The trial court overruled the objections based upon its
conclusion that since the Minor had confronted witnesses at the previous adjudication,
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confrontation was satisfied. The court also observed that while the rules of evidence
apply to juvenile proceedings the court had more latitude to admit a broader range of
evidence.
After its ruling the court adjourned to review the file for the purposes of making
its Evidence Code section 352 analysis. Following an unrecorded conference with
counsel, the parties agreed the portion of the previous social study that would be admitted
was: "As far as the PC 288(a) conviction is concerned, the facts presented to the court
were that Andre was convicted of digitally penetrating a two-year-old victim's vagina,
which caused a laceration."
A. Hearsay and Confrontation
As a general proposition, out-of-court statements offered by its proponent to prove
what it states is hearsay and, unless subject to some exception "should be excluded upon
timely and proper objection." (In re Miranda (2008) 43 Cal.4th 541, 574.) The trial
court did not offer any analysis of the hearsay objection. The prosecution offered only a
reference to a case cited as "Westin" without any record citation. Perhaps the prosecution
was referring to People v. Wesson (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 959 (Wesson), which deals
with proof of prior conviction by means of the abstract of judgment to prove not only the
fact of the conviction but the commission of the underlying offense. (Id. at p. 968.)
Wesson, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th 959 does not address the issue presented here. In
this case, the court determined it would take material out of a previous social study to
establish not only that the Minor had a true finding for the offense, but also the details of
the offense. The social study contains the probation officer's statements about what had
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been proved. It was not prior recorded testimony or an abstract of judgment. As such it
was hearsay, and no established exception has been presented by the prosecution, the
court or the People on appeal. Although the trial court could take judicial notice of the
existence of the social study, it could not take judicial notice of the truth of the statements
of the probation officer who wrote the study. (In re Tanya F. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d
436, 440.)
Regarding confrontation, the court simply observed: "I understand. He already
had a right to confront those witnesses in those cases already, so the confrontation issue
has been satisfied. And, I think that the court can employ alternative means to get the
same information. I don't think we have to call, the court has to hear from those victims
again."
Basic to the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is the literal ability to
confront and cross-examine the witness at the time the witness is giving his or her
testimony. That is an essential part of the process of testing the reliability of the
witnesses' testimony and cannot be foreclosed for convenience. (Lilly v. Virginia (1999)
527 U.S. 116, 123-124; California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149, 157.)
The problem with the trial court's analysis is that the prior recorded testimony of
the witnesses was not offered under some exception to the hearsay rule. In such case it is
possible that the court could rely on the Minor's previous opportunity to cross-examine
those witnesses. That is not what was to be admitted here. Rather, the court determined
it could use a probation officer's summary of the facts of the previous true finding for the
truth of the officer's statement. Plainly, the Minor did not have the opportunity to cross-
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examine the officer, nor was there a valid exception to the hearsay rule offered to or
considered by the court. On this record, the juvenile court should not have admitted the
contents of the officer's statements. Further, it is clear the court relied heavily on the
"facts" of the previous adjudication to show propensity to commit the current offense.
We are satisfied the error was not harmless. The evidence of the current conduct
was weak, in that the victim's mother was unable to observe exactly what the Minor was
doing, and the victim was too young to testify. In the court's decision it relied heavily on
the facts of the prior adjudication, such that we cannot say the error was harmless.
B. Waiver
The People's only response to the appeal is that the issues of hearsay and
confrontation have been waived. Although the record plainly shows defense counsel
objected to the evidence on the grounds of relevance, prejudice, hearsay and
confrontation, all of which were overruled, the People contend the issues were waived
when counsel agreed to the content of the statement to be introduced. Respectfully there
is no basis for application of the waiver or forfeiture doctrine in this record.
First, defense counsel objected stating:
"Your Honor, if I may, I would object to that. I believe that that's
violative of my client's constitutional rights to confrontation. I think
it's hearsay. [¶] I think if the people wanted to bring the facts in that
case there's other ways to do it such as bringing in the prior victim to
testify, which I think is proper; but I don't think that getting into the
facts is appropriate. I think it would be violative of the confrontation
clause and hearsay. [¶] I mean, 1101 would potentially allow them
to bring in that evidence, but I don't think we can get around the
hearsay or confrontation clause about juries (sic) by using that."
The juvenile court acknowledged the objection and overruled it, stating:
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"I understand. He had a right to confront those witnesses in those
cases already, so the confrontation issue has been satisfied. And, I
think that the court can employ alternative means to get the same
information. I don't think we have to call, the court has to hear from
those victims again. [¶] I think the fact that there is a true finding or
a conviction is sufficient for the court to accept the validity of the
elements of those offenses. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Now, I can look at the file
myself, which I think I have a right to do now, and see what
information is there and just cull out the information that I think is
appropriate and disregard the information in the prior record which I
think isn't appropriate for me to consider.
Trial counsel then renewed her objection:
"I disagree. . . . I don't think the court can look -- it would be just as
if we were giving a file to the jury that's reviewing it, 'Well, okay,
here, look at whatever you want to look at to make your
determination.' [¶] I still think we're bound by the rules of evidence
and I think we're bound by the prosecution presenting that evidence
to the court in somewhat of a fashion that doesn't violate the
confrontation clause. And I don't think the prosecution synopsis of
what happened is enough. We would never do that in a jury trial.
So, I think whatever needs to be done, it's not that."
The juvenile court then indicated that it was overruling trial counsel's objection as
to the admissibility of the evidence stating:
"The offer was made that the minor prior record does exist in the
court file. And what I indicated was that I can take judicial notice of
that record. [¶] I think its admissibility has been shown and
demonstrated. The only issue is the 352 exercise that I have to go
through, and I can't go through that exercise in the blind. I have to
see what, what there is. And then I'll come on the record and state
what I'm considering on the basis of what I've read and what I'm not
going to consider." (Italics added.)
After the trial court made clear the material would be admitted over objection, it
appears some effort was made by counsel to agree on what portion would be admitted
after the court's Evidence Code section 352 analysis had been completed. We are
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satisfied the defense never gave up its objections, rather simply agreed that if the hearsay
statements in the social study were to be admitted, that the proposed statements from the
study would suffice.
The case before us is quite different than those where the defense should have
offered its objection "at the time the evidence is introduced" (People v. Demetrulias
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 22), or where the objection was not timely made (People v. Alvarez
(1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 186). Here the defense timely and vigorously objected on specific
grounds, all of which were overruled by the court. However, the court was still pursuing
the least prejudicial means of admitting the evidence. Counsel realistically had no choice
but to continue to minimize the impact of the trial court's error. No forfeiture can be
implied by defense counsel's action.
DISPOSITION
The true finding on the petition is reversed.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
McDONALD, J.
McINTYRE, J.
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In re Andre B. CA4/1
Combined Opinion