FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 19 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PHILLIP REED, an individual, No. 11-56429
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:10-cv-05766-JHN-JC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LEE BACA, individually and in his
official capacity; COUNTY OF LOS
ANGELES; LOS ANGELES COUNTY
SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Jacqueline H. Nguyen, District Judge, Presiding
Argued August 8, 2013
Submitted March 19, 2014
Pasadena, California
Before: TALLMAN, CLIFTON, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Deputies for the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) arrested
plaintiff Phillip Reed when his name, address, driver’s license number, vehicle
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
plate number, and physical description matched the information shown in a
misdemeanor warrant. He was booked, fingerprinted, and then jailed for less than
twenty-four hours before a prosecutor determined that the warrant was actually for
Reed’s brother, who had stolen Reed’s identity. Reed filed an action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the LASD, Los Angeles County, and Sheriff Lee Baca, in
which he alleged that they violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. We review a grant
of summary judgment de novo, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924,
927 (9th Cir. 2009), and we affirm.
Reed argues that the defendants violated the Fourth Amendment when they
arrested him. There is no question, even when viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to Reed, that the police had probable cause to arrest the true subject of
the warrant, and “the arresting officers had a good faith, reasonable belief that the
arrestee was the subject of the warrant.” Rivera v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. 11-
57037, 2014 WL 957388, at *3 (9th Cir. Mar. 12, 2014). The Fourth Amendment
required no more.
Nor did Reed suffer a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Like
the Supreme Court in Baker v. McCollan, we are “quite certain” that Reed has not
proven that a Fourteenth Amendment violation arose out of his twenty-four-hour
2
confinement. 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979). Reed has not presented any evidence that
would allow a reasonable juror to believe that any LASD employee confined him
with the knowledge that he was not the true subject of the warrant. See Rivera,
2014 WL at *5. Nor did the warrant information itself indicate that further
investigation into Reed’s identity was required. Id. Even assuming Reed’s
mentions of mistaken identity constitute “repeated protests of innocence,” the Due
Process Clause was not violated since Reed’s case was dismissed the next day on
the prosecutor’s motion. Id. at *6 (quotation omitted).
The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
3