11-3204
Chen v. Holder
BIA
Weisel, IJ
A089 225 046
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 New York, on the 24th day of March, two thousand fourteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
8 BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
9 RICHARD C. WESLEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 GUANGHUI CHEN,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 11-3204
17 NAC
18 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _______________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Gerald Karikari, New York, N.Y.
24
25 FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
26 General; Melissa Neiman-Kelting,
27 Senior Litigation Counsel; Anthony
28 J. Messuri, Trial Attorney, Office
29 of Immigration Litigation, United
30 States Department of Justice,
31 Washington, D.C.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
4 is DENIED.
5 Petitioner Guanghui Chen, a native and citizen of the
6 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a July 18, 2011,
7 order of the BIA, affirming the September 3, 2009, decision
8 of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Robert Weisel, denying his
9 application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
10 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re
11 Guanghui Chen, No. A089 225 046 (B.I.A. July 18, 2011),
12 aff’g No. A089 225 046 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 3, 2009).
13 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
14 and procedural history in this case.
15 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
16 both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of
17 completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.
18 2008). The applicable standards of review are well-
19 established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v.
20 Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
21 I. Asylum
22 Notwithstanding Chen’s argument to the contrary, the
23 agency did not err in finding that he failed to establish a
2
1 nexus between the harm he suffered and feared and a
2 protected ground. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); Castro
3 v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2010). Pursuant to
4 section 101(a)(3) of the REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C.
5 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), applicable in this case, “the applicant
6 must establish that [a protected ground] was or will be at
7 least one central reason for” the claimed persecution.
8 There was a reasonable basis for the agency to conclude that
9 Chen’s opposition to government corruption was a
10 self-interested means of personal redress against the
11 particular individuals who had targeted him for extortion.
12 See Castro, 597 F.3d at 100 (“Although opposition to
13 corruption for purely self-interested reasons may lack a
14 political motivation, ‘opposition to endemic corruption . .
15 . may have a political dimension when it transcends mere
16 self-protection and represents a challenge to the legitimacy
17 or authority of the ruling regime.’” (quoting Yueqing Zhang
18 v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 547-48 (2d Cir. 2005)). Indeed,
19 Chen testified that he filed his complaint because the
20 extortion made it impossible to continue to operate his
21 business and his use of the Chinese courts as the means for
22 redress does not evidence “a challenge to the legitimacy or
3
1 authority of the ruling regime.” See Castro, 597 F.3d at
2 100.
3 While Chen argues that his receipt of an anonymous
4 threatening telephone call following the filing of his
5 complaint established the corruption of the Chinese courts,
6 the agency reasonably rejected his assertion as overly
7 speculative. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 168-69
8 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that “support for a contrary
9 inference-even one more plausible or more natural-does not
10 suggest error” and this Court will accord deference to the
11 agency’s finding where it “is tethered to the evidentiary
12 record”); see also Matter of N-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 526, 532
13 (B.I.A. 2011) (indicating that “a showing of retaliatory
14 harm for exposing acts of corruption, coupled with evidence
15 that the corruption is in some way linked to a political
16 system, would appear insufficient to demonstrate that a
17 victim’s anticorruption beliefs are ‘one central reason’ for
18 retaliation against him”). Under these circumstances, the
19 agency did not err in finding that Chen failed to establish
20 a nexus between the harm he suffered and feared and a
21 protected ground. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); Yueqing
22 Zhang, 426 F.3d at 548.
4
1 II. CAT Relief
2 While Chen asserts that he established his entitlement
3 to CAT relief, the agency reasonably determined that he
4 failed to show that he would likely be tortured if returned
5 to China. As the agency noted, Chen’s business partners
6 have remained in China unharmed, cf. Melgar de Torres v.
7 Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that where
8 similarly situated family members remain unharmed in
9 petitioner’s native country, a claimed fear of future harm
10 is weakened), and he abandoned both his complaint against
11 the officials and his business, which served as the basis
12 for the extortion and threats, cf. Jian Xing Huang v. INS,
13 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (absent “solid support in
14 the record,” a fear of future harm is “speculative at
15 best”). Although Chen did testify that the commissioner of
16 the public security bureau threatened to kill him, it was
17 reasonable for the agency to conclude that this
18 individualized threat did not indicate that any governmental
19 entity had acquiesced in the commissioner’s illegal conduct.
20 See Siewe, 480 F.3d at 168-69; see also Khouzam v. Ashcroft,
21 361 F.3d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 2004) (“CAT itself requires that
22 torture be inflicted ‘by or at the instigation of or with
23 the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
24 person acting in an official capacity’”).
5
1 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
2 DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion
3 for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.
4 FOR THE COURT:
5 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
6
6