13‐1350
Liu v. Mount Sinai School of Medicine
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC
DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE
A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse,
40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 26th day of March, two
thousand fourteen.
PRESENT:
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
Circuit Judges.
_________________________________________
WEN LIU,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v. 13‐1350
MOUNT SINAI SCHOOL OF MEDICINE AND
AGENTS, JEFF COHEN, MOUNT SINAI MEDICAL,
JUAN WISNIVESKY, KAREN JOHNSON, MOUNT
SINAI MEDICAL CENTER ‐ LABOR RELATIONS,
JACQUELINE ARCINIEGA, PRIMARY CARE
BUILDING ‐ THE DIVISION OF GENERAL
INTERNAL MEDICINE ‐ MOUNT SINAI HOSPITAL,
VAISHALI PATEL, MOUNT SINAI DEPARTMENT
OF EMERGENCY MEDICINE, ABIOLA A. FASINA,
MOUNT SINAI SCHOOL OF MEDICINE ‐ MOUNT
SINAI DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY MEDICINE,
Defendants‐Appellees.
_________________________________________
FOR APPELLANT: Wen Liu, pro se, New York, NY.
FOR APPELLEES: Rory J. McEvoy, Esq., Edwards Wildman
Palmer LLP, New York, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (Sullivan, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Appellant Wen Liu, proceeding pro se, appeals from the judgment of
the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees Mount
Sinai School of Medicine and its employees, as to Appellant’s claims of
negligence, medical malpractice, and employment discrimination. We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history
of the case, and issues on appeal.
2
We review de novo a district court decision dismissing a complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Jaghory v. New York State Depʹt of Educ., 131
F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir. 1997). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A district court’s decision to deny
equitable tolling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Fernandez v. Chertoff,
471 F.3d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 2006).
Appellant has abandoned any argument that the district court erred in
dismissing her negligence claims. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d
56, 115 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[This Court] will not consider an argument raised for
the first time in a reply brief.”). We affirm the dismissal of her malpractice
claims and employment law claims, substantially for the reasons stated by
the district court. We have considered Appellant’s remaining arguments
and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment
of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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