UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4728
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMES THOMAS LYNWOOD JOHNSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever, III,
Chief District Judge. (5:02-cr-00036-D-2)
Submitted: March 17, 2014 Decided: April 1, 2014
Before KING, SHEDD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
First Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Yvonne Watford-McKinney,
Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
James Thomas Lynwood Johnson appeals the district
court’s judgment revoking his supervised release and imposing a
twenty-four-month prison term. Johnson challenges this
sentence, arguing that it is plainly unreasonable. We affirm.
A district court has broad discretion to impose a
sentence upon revoking a defendant’s supervised release.
United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010).
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised
release if it is within the applicable statutory maximum and not
“plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
437, 439–40 (4th Cir. 2006). In determining whether a
revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first assess the
sentence for unreasonableness, “follow[ing] generally the
procedural and substantive considerations that we employ in our
review of original sentences.” Id. at 438.
A supervised release revocation sentence is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the
Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter 7 advisory policy statements and
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors it is permitted to
consider in a supervised release revocation case. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e) (2012); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. Although a district
court need not explain the reasons for imposing a revocation
sentence in as much detail as when it imposes an original
2
sentence, it “still must provide a statement of reasons for the
sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The reasons articulated by the
district court for a given revocation sentence, however, need
not be “couched in the precise language of § 3553(a),” so long
as the “reasons can be matched to a factor appropriate for
consideration under [§ 3553(a)] and [were] clearly tied to
[the defendant’s] particular situation.” United States v.
Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 658 (4th Cir. 2007).
A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if
the district court stated a proper basis for concluding the
defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the
statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if a sentence
is found procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we
“then decide whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.”
Id. at 439. A sentence is plainly unreasonable if it is clearly
or obviously unreasonable. Id.
In this case, there is no dispute that Johnson’s
twenty-four-month prison sentence does not exceed the applicable
statutory maximum. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559(a), 3583(e)(3) (2012).
The district court considered the advisory policy statement
range of eighteen to twenty-four months’ imprisonment, see U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) §§ 7B1.1(a)(1), (b),
7B1.4(a), p.s (2012), and heard and considered argument from
3
counsel for both parties and allocution from Johnson.
On appeal, Johnson challenges the adequacy of the district
court’s explanation for the sentence. After review of the
parties’ briefs and the record, we reject Johnson’s challenge.
In rejecting defense counsel’s request for a sentence
at the low end of the policy statement range, the district court
also considered Johnson’s history and characteristics, the
nature and circumstances of his violative behavior, and the need
for the revocation sentence to sanction his breach of trust,
see 18 U.S.C. § 3353(a)(1); USSG Ch. 7, Pt. A, introductory cmt.
3(b) (“[A]t revocation the [district] court should sanction
primarily the defendant’s breach of trust.”), and explained that
these factors supported the imposition of a sentence at the top
of the policy statement range.
We conclude that the district court adequately
explained its rationale for imposing the twenty-four-month
prison sentence and relied on proper considerations in doing so.
Based on the broad discretion that a district court has to
revoke a term of supervised release and impose a prison term up
to and including the statutory maximum, Johnson’s revocation
sentence is not unreasonable. Therefore, we conclude that
Johnson’s sentence is not plainly unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
4
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
5