UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-7798
KEVIN JACKSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPT.; LAMAIRE BYFIELD, Detective;
GARY GALING; NICOLE HUNTER, Detective,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:13-cv-02933-RDB)
Submitted: March 28, 2014 Decided: April 1, 2014
Before KING, SHEDD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Kevin Jackson, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kevin Jackson appeals the district court’s order
denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint. He
argues that the district court improperly dismissed his
complaint on the basis that his claims would necessarily imply
the invalidity of an anticipated future conviction, relying on
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). We review de novo this
dismissal for failure to state a claim, assuming that all well-
pleaded nonconclusory factual allegations in the complaint are
true and drawing all reasonable factual inferences in Jackson’s
favor. Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 391 (4th Cir.
2011). After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm in
part, vacate in part, and remand the case for further
proceedings.
We agree with Jackson that the favorable termination
rule announced in Heck did not bar his action while criminal
proceedings in the state court remained pending. Wallace v.
Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007) (noting that Heck does not bar a
§ 1983 action where it “would impugn an anticipated future
conviction” (emphasis omitted)). Jackson, however, has now been
convicted of assault, one of the state court charges underlying
his claim.
As the district court noted, Heck bars a § 1983 action
if it is clear that success would necessarily imply the
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invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction. This determination
requires a close factual examination of the record related to
the underlying conviction. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7
(noting that an unreasonable search claim may be permitted to
proceed, even if the evidence was introduced at trial);
Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842, 846-47 (4th Cir. 2003)
(conducting thorough factual inquiry into evidence against
plaintiff to conclude that success on unreasonable search claim
would necessarily imply invalidity of his underlying
conviction). The record is unclear as to whether Jackson’s
illegal search and seizure claim is barred by Heck’s favorable
termination rule. 1 Because this determination should be made in
the first instance by the district court, we vacate and remand
the district court’s dismissal of this claim. 2
We conclude, however, that Jackson’s suppression of
evidence allegation is now subject to dismissal under Heck, and
we decline to remand it. Moreover, it is clear from Jackson’s
1
Jackson has abandoned his claim that police violated his
rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), by failing
to brief it in this Court. 4th Cir. R. 34(b) (limiting review
to issues raised in brief); see Edwards v. City of Goldsboro,
178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that failure to
raise issue in opening brief constitutes abandonment of that
issue).
2
By this disposition, we indicate no view as to the
appropriate resolution of this inquiry.
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own allegations and exhibits that police had probable cause to
arrest him on the original charges. We therefore affirm as
modified the district court’s dismissal of these claims. See MM
ex rel. DM v. School Dist. of Greenville Cnty., 303 F.3d 523,
536 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e are entitled to affirm the court’s
judgment on alternate grounds, if such grounds are apparent from
the record.”).
We therefore affirm in part, vacate in part, and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We
deny Jackson’s motion to appoint counsel. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the material before this court and argument will
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
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