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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-13747
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 9:13-cr-80061-JIC-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TAMIKA LYNETTE BELLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(April 2, 2014)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Tamika Belle appeals her sentence of 27 months’ imprisonment followed by
three years’ supervised release, imposed after she pleaded guilty to making a false
statement to a federally licensed firearms dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(a)(6) and 924(a)(2). Belle challenges the substantive reasonableness of her
sentence, which fell at the bottom of her calculated guidelines range of 27 to 33
months. Specifically, she argues that the sentence did not take into account the
circumstances of her offense and her cooperation with law enforcement after her
arrest.
We “review all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly
outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591 (2007). Here, Belle
only challenges the substantive reasonableness of her sentence.
Substantive reasonableness review seeks to “evaluate whether the sentence
imposed by the district court fails to achieve the purposes of sentencing as stated in
section 3553(a).” United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam). The court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes” listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), including
the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law,
provide just punishment for the offense, deter criminal conduct, and protect the
public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
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In imposing a particular sentence, the court must also consider the nature and
circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the
kinds of sentences available, the applicable guideline range, pertinent policy
statements, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to
provide restitution to victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7).
District courts do not have to conduct an accounting of every factor or
explain the role each factor played in the sentencing decision. United States v.
Robles, 408 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). We will reverse a
sentence for being substantively unreasonable only when we are “left with a
definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of
judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies
outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United
States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
It was well within the district court’s considerable discretion to sentence
Belle to a term of 27 months’ imprisonment. First, Belle’s sentence was at the low
end of the Guidelines. While we have not adopted a presumption of
reasonableness for sentences within the guidelines range, United States v.
Campbell, 491 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007), we have stated that “when the
district court imposes a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range, we
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ordinarily will expect that choice to be a reasonable one.” Talley, 431 F.3d at 788.
Moreover, the reasonableness of a sentence may also be indicated where the
sentence imposed is well below the statutory maximum sentence. See United
States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) . Here,
Belle’s conviction carries a statutory maximum of ten years of imprisonment. 18
U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). Belle was sentenced to 27 months’ imprisonment, well below
the statutory maximum.
Next, the record shows that the district court properly weighed the § 3553
factors when it decided Belle’s sentence. The court noted the fact that Belle
committed her offense while on probation, thus demonstrating that she was
unaware of the “consequences of violating the rules.” The district court’s
observations implicated a number of the statutory factors, such as the history and
characteristics of the defendant, the need to promote respect for the law, and the
need to deter other criminal conduct. See § 3553(a)(2)–(3). The court also
mentioned that it would have considered a downward variance had Belle not been
on probation, thus demonstrating that the court considered the kinds of sentences
available. See § 3553(a)(4). It was not necessary for the court to discuss each of
the § 3553(a) factors individually. Robles, 408 F.3d at 1328.
A district court has substantial discretion to weigh the various relevant
factors and to give weight to certain factors over others. See United States v.
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Williams, 456 F.3d 1353, 1363 (11th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007). Thus, the district
court was also permitted to give more weight to the fact that Belle committed the
current offense while on probation for a prior offense over the fact that Belle
cooperated with the government in turning over the gun. See United States v.
Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 638 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 229 (Oct. 7,
2013) (“Although the district court must evaluate all § 3553(a) factors in imposing
a sentence, it is permitted to attach great weight to one factor over others.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Given the deference afforded district court decisions under abuse of
discretion review, there was no error as to the substantive reasonableness of Belle’s
sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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