UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
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v. ) Crim. Action No. 13-0170-1 (ABJ)
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ENDEJA HASSAN ROBINSON, and )
RUSSELL STANLEY III, )
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Defendants. )
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the government’s Motion for Emergency Review and Appeal of a
Magistrate Judge in this court’s order authorizing defendant Endeja Robinson’s release. “If a
person is ordered released by a magistrate judge, . . . the attorney for the Government may file,
with the court having original jurisdiction over the offense, a motion for revocation of the order
or amendment of the conditions of release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a)(1). The Court reviews the
magistrate judge’s determination de novo. United States v. Beauchamp-Perez, 822 F. Supp. 2d
7, 9 (D.D.C. 2011); United States v. Burdette, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2011); United States
v. Hudspeth, 143 F. Supp. 2d 32, 36 (D.D.C. 2001).
BACKGROUND
Defendant was arrested on June 28, 2013, and he has been in custody since that date. See
Arrest Warrant Returned [Dkt. # 4]; Minute Order (June 28, 2013). The indictment charges: (1)
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of a mixture
or substance containing a detectable amount of Phencyclidine (PCP) in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846; (2) attempted unlawful possession with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of a
mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of PCP in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) and § 841(b)(1)(A)(iv), and aiding and abetting and causing an act to be done in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2; (3) unlawful use of a communication facility to facilitate the
commission of a drug felony in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b); and (4) criminal forfeiture under
21 U.S.C. § 853(a) and (p). See Indictment [Dkt. # 1]. The government moved to detain
defendant without bail pending trial. See Minute Order (July 2, 2013). On July 2, 2013, the
Magistrate Judge denied the motion, and ordered that defendant be released into the Pretrial
Services Agency’s High Intensity Supervision Program with electronic monitoring and placed on
home detention for twenty-one days. See Release to PSA’s High Intensity Supervision Program
[Dkt. # 6].
The government promptly moved to reverse the Magistrate Judge’s order denying pre-
trial detention without bail and moved for a stay of the release order pending the resolution of its
appeal. Mot. for Emergency Review and Appeal of Release Order (“Govt.’s Mot.”) [Dkt. # 5] at
1. On July 2, 2013, this Court held a hearing on the government’s motion. For the reasons
below, the Court grants the government’s motion to reverse the Magistrate Judge’s order.
Defendant shall be held without bail pending trial.
LEGAL STANDARD
A judicial officer shall order the detention of a criminal defendant before trial if, after a
detention hearing, “the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and
the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). There is a rebuttable presumption that a defendant
should be detained before trial if the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant has
committed “an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is
prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.). . . .” 18 U.S.C.
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§ 3142(e)(3)(A). In such a case, the court will “presume[] that no condition or combination of
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of the
community.” Id. § 3142(e)(3). “The defendant may rebut this presumption by offering ‘credible
evidence’ to the contrary.” Burdette, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 3, citing United States v. Alatishe, 768
F.2d 364, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
To determine whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the
appearance of the person as required and the safety of the community, the judicial officer should
consider: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence
against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the person, including the person’s past
conduct and criminal history; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or
the community that would be posed by the person’s release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
ANALYSIS
In this case, the government has proffered evidence, including video surveillance tapes,
that establishes probable cause to believe that the defendant packaged and shipped PCP from
California to the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area and arranged for it to be delivered to a
number of different addresses. See Govt.’s Mot. at 1–4. At the hearing, the defendant did not
dispute this evidence nor did he contest the allegation that there is probable cause to believe that
he has committed an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is
prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act. Therefore, the Court finds that there is probable
cause to believe that the defendant committed the offenses for which he is charged.
Accordingly, there is a rebuttable presumption that no conditions will reasonably assure the
appearance of the defendant as required and the safety of the community.
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The government informed the Court that the defendant committed the offenses charged in
the indictment in this case while he was on supervised release from another federal court for an
identical offense – possession with intent to distribute PCP. Govt.’s Mot. at 6. He also has a
pending drug charge in Maryland for which he is currently out on bond. Id. The defendant fully
acknowledged the pendency of these matters.
During the hearing, the defendant objected to the government’s references to other
uncharged misconduct that had not been previously disclosed to the defense and to its allegations
about the involvement of the defendant’s girlfriend – the occupant of the premises to which the
defendant proposed to be released – in criminal activity. He also took issue with the
government’s representation that the pending Maryland state court matter included a gun charge.
But the Court is not relying on that material as the basis for its decision. Here, the record reflects
that being released under the supervision of not one but two courts has been insufficient to
protect the community from the defendant’s continued participation in trafficking in PCP. Under
the terms of the statute, the onus is on the defendant to come forward with credible evidence to
rebut the presumption that he should be detained, and given the additional evidence on the
government’s side of the ledger, the defendant has simply failed to meet that burden.
The defendant pointed to the fact that several months had elapsed between the
commission of the instant offense and his arrest, and he argued that passage of time signaled that
the government did not view him as particularly dangerous. But the government was monitoring
his activities during that period as its investigation continued, and the fact is that the government
was well aware that the defendant spent most of that time in the hospital. The defendant also
pointed to the fact that there had not yet been any action taken to modify or revoke his
supervised release in the federal case or to change his bond status in the state case, but the lack of
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such action does not constitute credible evidence that counters the presumption – which has been
borne out by the defendant’s own behavior – that the defendant poses a risk to the community.
See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 307, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code. & Ad. News 3182,
at 3195–96 (“The Committee [on the Judiciary] intends that the concern about safety be given a
broader construction than merely danger of harm involving physical violence. . . . The
Committee also emphasizes that the risk that a defendant will continue to engage in drug
trafficking constitutes a danger to the ‘safety of any other person or the community.’”).
In sum, the Court finds that the defendant has failed to rebut the statutory presumption.
As noted at the hearing, though, the defendant is free to file a written motion to modify the
conditions of his bond in the future.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s decision to release the defendant is
REVERSED. And it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall be held without bond pending further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
AMY BERMAN JACKSON
United States District Judge
DATE: July 10, 2013
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