UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
CLIFFORD JACKSON, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 12-1414 (RJL)
)
CAROLYN CROSS, et al., )
)
Respondents. )
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
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April _ _ _ _ _ ,2013
This matter is before the Court on Clifford Jackson's petition for a writ of habeas corpus
and the government's response thereto. For the reasons discussed below, the petition will be
denied and this action will be dismissed. 1
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner was released on parole on July 27, 2007. United States' Opp'n to Pet'r's Pro
Se Pet. for a Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Gov't Opp'n"), Ex. 2 (Certificate of Parole dated July 27
2007) at 1. He was arrested in the District of Columbia on February 12, 2011, and was charged
with reckless driving and possession of cocaine. ld., Ex. 3 (Alleged Violation(s) Report dated
Marcy 1, 2011) at 2. The United States Parole Commission ("USPC") charged petitioner with
two violations of the conditions of his parole: a Law Violation (Allegation #1) as evidenced by
1 Petitioner's "Motion to Request the Court to Stop Remaining Silent" [ECF No. 15] will be granted.
the police report of his arrest, and Drug Use (Allegation #2) as evidenced by positive test results
for cocaine on eleven occasions. See generally id, Ex. 3 (Alleged Violation(s) Report; Notice of
Offender Arrest; and Metropolitan Police Department Arrest/Prosecution Report ). The USPC
issued a warrant for petitioner's arrest, see id, Ex. 5 (Warrant), and petitioner was returned to
custody on March 17, 2011. Id, Ex. 6 (Warrant for Return of Prisoner Released to Supervision).
After a hearing on March 22, 2011, a hearing examiner found probable cause to find that
petitioner committed the offenses charged. See generally id, Ex. 7 (D.C. Probable Case Hearing
Digest). A parole revocation hearing was scheduled for May 26, 2011, and the matter was
continued at the request of petitioner's counsel. Id, Ex. 8 (email exchange between Colleen
McCrystal and Thaddeus Hicks). Petitioner's counsel was to have submitted alternate dates for
the hearing, yet, according to the USPC, as of June 12, 2012, there was "no evidence that anyone
has contacted the [US PC] to reschedule this revocation hearing." !d., Ex. 9 (email to Colleen
McCrystal from Steve Husk). The USPC's warrant had been lodged as a detainer, and petitioner
remained in custody notwithstanding the issuance of a release order by the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia on June 6, 2012 upon the dismissal of the underlying criminal charges. See
id., Ex. 10 (Letter to USPC from Anthony Hinton, Community Supervision Officer, Court
Services and Offender Supervision Agency, dated June 21, 2012).
Petitioner's parole revocation hearing occurred on August 15, 2012. Id, Ex. 11 (Hearing
Summary) at 1. Petitioner admitted to the use of drugs, and the hearing examiner found that he
violated a condition ofhis parole release by using dangerous and habit-forming drugs. Id, Ex.
11 at 2. Based principally on the testimony of the arresting officer, the hearing examiner found
that plaintiff had committed two law violations: possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine
and reckless driving. Id, Ex. 11 at 2-3. The USPC adopted the hearing examiner's
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recommendation, see id, Ex. 11 at 4, to revoke parole. Id, Ex. 12 (Notice of Action dated
August 31, 2012) at 1. Petition was to remain in custody until March 9, 2015, after service of 48
months' imprisonment. Id
II. DISCUSSION
Petitioner had been in custody since March 17, 2011. When he filed this action in August
2012, his parole revocation hearing had not yet occurred. He alleged that the USPC "violated
[its] own policies and procedures ... in reference to unreasonable delay in this matter." Pet. at 6.
He claimed that he was "being illegally detained and imprisoned," and demanded his immediate
release. Id
Under regulations applicable to District of Columbia Code offenders, ordinarily"[a] local
revocation hearing shall be held not later than sixty-five days from the retaking of the parolee on
the parole violation warrant." 28 C.F.R. § 2.102(£). However, "[i]fthe parolee requests and
receives any postponement, or consents to any postponement, or by his actions otherwise
precludes the prompt completion of revocation proceedings in his case, the [65-day period] shall
be correspondingly extended." Id Although the USPC did not schedule the revocation hearing
before the 65-day period expired, the hearing originally set for May 26, 2011, was continued at
the request of petitioner's counsel. In this case, the delay was due in part to petitioner's own
request for a continuance.
A delay in the revocation hearing "is not itself a valid ground for immediate release," and
instead a parolee's "remedy ... is an action to compel a hearing." Hill v. Johnston, 750 F. Supp.
2d 103, 105-06 (D.D.C. 2010); see Sutherlandv. McCall, 709 F.2d 730,732 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(finding that the appropriate remedy for a delayed parole revocation hearing "is a writ of
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mandamus to compel the [USPC's] compliance ... not a writ of habeas corpus to compel release
... or to extinguish the remainder of the sentence" (emphasis in original)). The record
demonstrates that petitioner's final parole revocation hearing has taken place, and therefore he is
not entitled to mandamus relief. Habeas relief would be available "only ... where a petitioner
establishes that the [US PC' s] delay in holding a revocation hearing was both unreasonable and
prejudicial." Sutherland, 709 F.2d at 732. Petitioner's unsupported assertions of"grievous
loss," Pet. at 1, and "irreparable collateral damage to [his] life," id. at 4, do not suffice.
Now that petitioner has received the only relief available to him, the Court will deny the
habeas petition. See Rogers v. US. Parole Comm 'n, 816 F. Supp. 2d 7, 10 (D.D.C. 2011);
Simmons v. O'Brien, No. 7:07-cv-00193, 2007 WL 2669896, at *2 (W.D. Va. Sept. 6, 2007)
("While the delay in the instant case may have been unreasonable as the government concedes
that the hearing should have been conducted soon after [the petitioner] returned to federal
custody, [the court] find[s] that [his] claim was rendered moot by the ... rescission hearing"
which already had taken place). An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
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United States District Judge
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