UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
LORI MCLAUGHLIN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 11-1868 (RWR)
)
ERIC HOLDER, JR., )
)
Defendant. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiff Lori McLaughlin brought employment discrimination
and retaliation claims against defendant Attorney General Eric
Holder, Jr., in his official capacity, under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.1 A May 25,
2012 memorandum opinion and order found that venue in the
District of Columbia is not proper under Title VII’s special
venue provision and granted the Attorney General’s motion for
transfer of venue to the Middle District of Florida. McLaughlin
has moved for reconsideration, arguing that this case should be
consolidated with a separate, purportedly related case filed
four years ago in this district, and that the Attorney General’s
failure to explain why he did not object to venue in that case
demonstrates that he is engaged in forum shopping. The judge to
1
The background of this case is more fully set out in
McLaughlin v. Holder, Civil Action No. 11-1868 (RWR), 2012 WL
1893627, at *1-2 (D.D.C. May 25, 2012).
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whom the earlier purportedly related case was assigned denied
McLaughlin’s motion to consolidate the two cases, see McLaughlin
v. Holder, Civil Action No. 08-1256 (RMC) (filed July 22, 2008),
June 7, 2012 Order Denying Mot. to Consolidate, and McLaughlin’s
identical motion to consolidate was accordingly denied in this
case. See Local Civil Rule 40.5(d). The issue of consolidation
is now moot, and McLaughlin’s remaining arguments for
reconsideration do not warrant revisiting the May 25th order
transferring this case.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), a court may
reconsider an interlocutory order “as justice requires.”
Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, Inc. v. Guest Services, Inc., 630
F.3d 217, 227 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Greene v. Union Mut. Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 764 F.2d 19, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1985)). Justice
may require reconsideration where the court “has patently
misunderstood a party, has made a decision outside the
adversarial issues presented to the court by the parties, has
made an error not of reasoning, but of apprehension, or where a
controlling or significant change in the law or facts has
occurred since the submission of the issue to the court.”
Ficken v. Golden, 696 F. Supp. 2d 21, 35 (D.D.C. 2010) (internal
citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). A court
may properly exercise its discretion by denying a motion for
reconsideration that “raise[s] . . . arguments for
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reconsideration the court ha[s] . . . already rejected on the
merits.” Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, Inc., 630 F.3d at 227.
McLaughlin does not assert that the May 25th order reflects
a patent misunderstanding of the issues or an error of
apprehension, that the order decided an issue not presented by
the parties, or that a fundamental change in the law or facts
has occurred. McLaughlin identifies as “subsequent
developments” the fact that the trial scheduled in the case
purportedly related to the instant one was recently cancelled,
providing “an opportunity for the instant action to catch up”
with the other. (Pl.’s Mot. for Reconsideration at 1, 4.) Even
though her request for consolidation of the two cases was
denied, McLaughlin maintains that, given the procedural posture
of the two cases, “Defendant’s effort to transfer this case
. . . undeniably constitutes an exercise in extreme judicial
waste.” (Pl.’s Reply at 2.) McLaughlin’s contentions are
unavailing, however, because the reasoning of the May 25th
opinion did not turn on the procedural posture of the two cases,
or on considerations of judicial economy. Developments that do
not bear on the reasoning behind an order that a party asks a
court to reconsider are not “significant change[s],” Ficken, 696
F. Supp. 2d at 35 (D.D.C. 2010), in the facts of a case.
Moreover, McLaughlin cites no authority, let alone any legal
authority arising “since the submission of the issue to the
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court,” id., supporting the position that considering the status
of related cases or judicial economy is an appropriate exercise
when determining whether a plaintiff has satisfied Title VII’s
special venue provision.2
In addition, McLaughlin asserts that the defendant is
engaged in forum shopping and that this warrants reconsidering
transfer. (See Pl.’s Reply at 1 (“Defendant does not explain
why he has chosen two separate venues for cases involving the
2
Rather than presenting any significant new authority or
factual developments, McLaughlin contests the relevance of
Hamilton v. Paulson, Civil Action No. 07-1365 (RBW), 2008 WL
4531781 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 2008), a case that the defendant cited
in support of his motion to dismiss and that the May 25th opinion
relied upon in part to support a finding that the existence of a
purportedly related case in this district was not relevant to
the Title VII venue inquiry. (Pl.’s Mot. for Reconsideration at
3; Pl.’s Reply at 1-2.) A motion for reconsideration is not a
vehicle for rearguing issues that already have been fully aired.
Moreover, McLaughlin’s renewed attempt to distinguish Hamilton
is not persuasive. She suggests that Hamilton’s rejection of
the “contention that the Court should deny the defendant’s
[12(b)(3)] motion because [the plaintiff] has a related case
pending in this Court,” id. at *3, was in error because it
relied upon a case addressing the exercise of pendant
jurisdiction over state law claims rather than venue over
purportedly related federal cases. The reasoning in Hamilton,
however, relied on other authority that McLaughlin fails to
address. See id. (citing Jyachosky v. Winter, Civil Action No.
04–01733 (HHK), Civil Action No. 04–01734 (HHK), Civil Action
No. 05–00239 (HHK), Civil Action No. 05–00271 (HHK), Civil
Action No. 05–02251 (HHK), 2006 WL 1805607, at *4 n.3 (D.D.C.
June 29, 2006)). The reasoning also relied on the plain text of
Title VII’s special venue provision, which provides that “‘[i]f
the plaintiff brings suit in a jurisdiction that does not
satisfy one of the venue requirements listed in [§ 2000e–
5(f)(3)], venue is improper.’” Id. at *2 (quoting James v.
Booz–Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d 16, 20 (D.D.C.
2002)). Justice does not require reconsidering the May 25th
opinion’s reliance on this case.
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same parties, the same attorneys, the same witnesses, and
similar allegations.”); id. at 3 (“Ms. McLaughlin asks this
Court to reconsider its decision, which ultimately permits
Defendant to engage in the most shameless form of forum
shopping, with absolute impunity.”) These arguments were
considered and found not to be dispositive in the first
instance. See McLaughlin v. Holder, Civil Action No. 11-1868
(RWR), 2012 WL 1893627, at *4 (D.D.C. May 25, 2012). Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h) provides that the defense of
improper venue is waived if not asserted in an initial
responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h). Defendant’s
failure to challenge venue in the purportedly related case does
not render venue proper in the present case, regardless of the
rationale behind defendant’s different litigation strategies in
the two cases. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion [13] for
reconsideration with respect to the defendant’s motion to
dismiss, or in the alternative to transfer be, and hereby is,
DENIED.
SIGNED this 3rd day of July, 2012.
__________/s/_______________
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge