UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ANGEL MEDINA,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 97-594 (JMF)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On July 29, 2008, following a jury trial, a verdict was rendered in favor of plaintiff and
against the District of Columbia (“the District”) in the amount of $180,000.00 with interest,
attorney’s fees and costs. See Judgment [#132]. On July 1, 2011, the court of appeals ordered
this Court to require plaintiff to either accept a $90,000 remittitur or a new trial. Medina v.
District of Columbia, 643 F.3d 323, 330 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Plaintiff accepted the remittitur on
July 8, 2011. Praecipe [#170]. The only issue remaining before this Court is Plaintiff’s Motion
for Attorney’s Fees [#173].
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff is Entitled to an Award of Attorney’s Fees
Attorney’s fees may be awarded to a plaintiff who prevails in an action brought under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).1 “The purpose of this
provision is to encourage private litigants to act as ‘private attorneys general’ on behalf of
1
All references to the United States Code or the Code of Federal Regulations are to the
electronic versions that appear in Westlaw or Lexis.
enforcement of civil rights laws.” Palmer v. Rice, No. 76-CIV-1439, 2005 WL 1662130, at *9
(D.D.C. July 11, 2005) (quoting Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1984))
(internal quotations omitted). Furthermore, to safeguard “‘effective access to the judicial
process’ for persons with civil rights grievances . . . a prevailing plaintiff ‘should ordinarily
recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.’”
Turner v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections and Ethics, 354 F.3d 890, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
At a hearing held on January 31, 2012, the defendant conceded that plaintiff is entitled to
an award of fees based on the 2011 Laffey2 rates. Thus, the only question presented is whether
the defendant’s claim that plaintiff is seeking compensation for unsuccessful efforts should
modify the award of those fees.
II. Plaintiff is Not Entitled to Compensation for Efforts Unrelated to His Success
A. Controlling Authority as to Unsuccessful Claims
The Supreme Court recently considered the issues presented by a plaintiff who ultimately
prevailed yet nevertheless asserted claims that were unsuccessful:
[I]n the real world, litigation is more complex, involving multiple
claims for relief that implicate a mix of legal theories and have
different merits. Some claims succeed; others fail. Some charges
are frivolous; others (even if not successful) have a reasonable
basis. In short, litigation is messy, and courts must deal with this
untidiness in awarding fees.
Fox v. Vice, 131 S.Ct. 2205, 2214 (2011).
2
The Laffey matrix provides a fee schedule for attorneys based on their years of
experience, adjusted upward by changes in the Consumer Price Index. The Laffey rates have
been awarded in Title VII cases. E.g., Hansson v. Norton, 411 F.3d 231, 236 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
2
The Court then indicated that the prevailing party must be compensated for all the time
her attorney spent in achieving the result obtained, even if that party failed to prevail on “every
contention.” Id. Furthermore, work on the unsuccessful claim must relate to the work on the
successful claim, in order to merit such compensation. “The fee award, of course, should not
reimburse the plaintiff for work performed on claims that bore no relation to the grant of relief.
Such work ‘cannot be deemed to have been expended in pursuit of the result achieved.’” Id.
(quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983). As the Supreme Court stated in
Hensley:
In some cases a plaintiff may present in one lawsuit distinctly
different claims for relief that are based on different facts and legal
theories. In such a suit, even where the claims are brought against
the same defendants–often an institution and its officers, as in this
case–counsel’s work on one claim will be unrelated to his work on
another claim. Accordingly, work on an unsuccessful claim cannot
be deemed to have been “expended in pursuit of the ultimate result
achieved.” Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 E.P.D. ¶ 9444, at
5049 (CD Cal. 1974). The congressional intent to limit awards to
prevailing parties requires that these unrelated claims be treated as
if they had been raised in separate lawsuits, and therefore no fee
may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful claims.
Id. at 434-35.
This Circuit has therefore concluded that, when separate legal claims are asserted but are
based on the same facts, lack of success on one does not mean that the time spent on other
unsuccessful claims should be disallowed. Williams v. First Gov’t Mortg. & Investors Corp., 225
F.3d 738, 746 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (award of fees for work on all claims affirmed when claims were
not distinctly different); Goos v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, 997 F.2d 1565, 1569-70 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (claims of breach of contract and violation of Human Rights Act based on the same
3
retaliatory discharge were not distinct); Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1065-67
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (all claims were related because all were based on District’s deliberate
indifference to a prisoner’s safety). See also Judicial Watch v. DOC, 470 F.3d 363 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (compensation for all discovery efforts, while unsuccessful, permitted when all related to
Freedom of Information Act claim); Amer. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 72 F.3d 907, 911-12 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (although plaintiffs argued five grounds for the invalidity of the regulation, they
asserted a single indivisible claim–the invalidity of the regulation). It is only when the
unsuccessful claim is based on a different set of facts and a different legal theory that Hensley
requires that the fees pertaining to the unsuccessful claim be disallowed. Trout v. Sec. of the
Navy, 540 F.3d 442, 447 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (unsuccessful claim for pre-judgment interest distinct
from successful sexual discrimination claim); George Hyman Const. Co. v. Brooks, 963 F.2d
1532, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (total and partial disability claims were based on different factual
theories).
The following chart lists the claims made in plaintiff’s second amended complaint, which
was filed on October 29, 2002, and their ultimate outcomes.
Count I Denial of due Failing to enforce the September Dismissed on June
process 1995 Summary Determination and 6, 2007
Order by the District of Columbia
Office of Human Rights (OHR),
which concluded that MPD had
discriminated against plaintiff on
the basis of his national origin
Count II Denial of due Failing to hold a hearing on Dismissed on June
process plaintiff’s second OHR complaint 6, 2007
before making a finding of no
probable cause
4
Count III Violation of Title Transferring plaintiff from the Jury verdict for the
VII and 42 U.S.C. § Office of Internal Affairs (OIA) to District
1981 street duty after his 1994
promotion
Count IV Violation of Title Denial of plaintiff’s request to be Jury verdict for the
VII and 42 U.S.C. § transferred back to OIA District
1981
Count V Retaliation in Failure to transfer plaintiff back to Jury verdict for
violation of 42 OIA plaintiff in the
U.S.C. § 1981 and amount of $180,000
D.C. Human Rights
Act Plaintiff accepted
court-ordered
remittitur of
$90,000
Count VI Denial of due Failing to enforce November 1, Dismissed on June
process 1995 OHR Letter of 6, 2007
Determination, which found
probable cause that plaintiff was
subjected to unlawful
discriminatory and retaliatory
employment practices
Count VII Retaliation in Repeated denials of plaintiff’s Dismissed on June
violation of 42 request to be transferred back to 6, 2007
U.S.C. § 1981 OIA
Count VIII Denial of due Failing to reinstate plaintiff within Dismissed on June
process 30 days of his acquittal on 6, 2007
criminal charges
Count IX Retaliation in Refusal to return plaintiff to full Jury verdict for the
violation of 42 duty and pay within 30 days of his District
U.S.C. § 1981 acquittal on criminal charges
5
Count X Discrimination and Denials of plaintiff’s requests to Partially dismissed
retaliation in participate in the Take Home on June 6, 2007
violation of 42 Cruiser Program and a break in to (solely that portion
U.S.C. § 1981 plaintiff’s office alleging a retaliatory
office break in)
Discrimination and
retaliation claims
respecting Take
Home Cruiser
Program and office
break in withdrawn
by Joint Motion to
Amend the Pretrial
Statement [#119] at
1.
Defendant District of Columbia’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees [#174] at
3-4.
I conclude that the District is correct insofar as it asserts that time spent on Counts I, II,
VI, and VIII were premised on an independent violation of due process and were based on the
District’s failure to 1) enforce an OHR finding; 2) hold a hearing before dismissing plaintiff’s
second OHR complaint; 3) enforce an OHR letter of determination; and 4) reinstate plaintiff
within 30 days of his acquittal. These claims, and the facts upon which they were based, are
entirely different from the retaliation and discrimination claims that were submitted to the jury.
On the other hand, counsel’s work on Counts III, IV, IX and X (before it was withdrawn) was
premised on what plaintiff claimed were a pattern of discriminatory and retaliatory acts against
him based on his national origin, and his complaints of discrimination.
Specifically, plaintiff’s first motion for partial summary judgment sought a determination
that plaintiff’s due process rights were violated by OHR when it determined, without holding a
hearing, that he was not retaliated against for filing a discrimination claim. Memorandum in
6
Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [#8-1] at 1. That motion was
denied without prejudice to filing a renewed motion, so that precise references to deposition
testimony could be provided. See Order [#23] at 1.
Plaintiff’s second motion for partial summary judgment proffered the same argument as
the first, that plaintiff was denied a property right when the OHR made a decision without first
holding a hearing. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment [#24-1] at 1. This motion was denied, not on the merits of plaintiff’s due process
claim, but rather, on the grounds that plaintiff’s claim was based on disputed facts. Memorandum
Opinion and Order [#30] at 11.
In plaintiff’s third motion for partial summary judgment, plaintiff argued that his due
process rights were violated when the District failed to comply with the OHR’s September 19,
1995 decision awarding plaintiff back pay and overtime compensation and mandating that the
District promise not to retaliate against him. Plaintiff’s [Third] Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment [#91] at 17-18. As with plaintiff’s earlier motions for partial summary judgment, this
motion was also denied.
With respect to Count I, the Court concluded that plaintiff’s claim was not a substantive
due process claim but rather a claim that a D.C. agency failed to follow D.C. law and, as such,
should have been brought before the local D.C. courts. Opinion [#101] at 17.
Finally, plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction was filed for the purpose of
enjoining the District from “taking any further adverse action against the plaintiff while the
instant case [was] pending.” Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction [#71] at 1.
Specifically, plaintiff sought to prevent the District from proceeding with a termination hearing
7
based on two criminal indictments while the current suit, which alleges discrimination and
retaliation, was pending. Memorandum Opinion and Order [#83] at 1-5. The Court denied the
motion on the ground that plaintiff failed to establish that he would suffer irreparable harm if an
injunction were not granted. The Court noted that because “the [OHR had] yet to make and may
never make, a final decision to terminate him, and [because] the harms alleged are almost
exclusively financial,” there was insufficient support for a preliminary injunction at this stage of
the proceedings. Id. at 13.
As is clear from the above review, the work performed on the motions just specified and
explained, did not advance in any way his success before the jury. In finding for plaintiff as to
Count V, the jury found that plaintiff established by a preponderance of the evidence that 1) “the
denial of his application to return to the Office of Internal Affairs in 1998 and the selection of a
white officer denied him equal protection of the laws by retaliating against him for having filed
complaints complaining of discrimination on the basis of his national origin”; 2) “the denial of
his application to return to the Office of Internal Affairs in 1998 and the selection of a white
officer was based on a custom or practice of retaliation against persons who complain of
discrimination based on national origin”; 3) “a reasonable employee would have found the
MPD’s denial of his application to return to the Office of Internal Affairs in 1998 and the
selection of a white officer a materially adverse action”; and 4) “the MPD’s denial of his
application to return to the Office of Internal Affairs in 1998 and the selection of a white officer
was done in retaliation for his making complaints of discrimination.” Verdict Form [#131] at 3-4.
Count V of plaintiff’s second amended complaint was focused on the District’s response
to plaintiff’s application to transfer back to OIA following plaintiff’s claim that he was
8
discriminated against on the basis of his national origin (Puerto Rico). The focus of plaintiff’s
motions for partial summary judgment, on the other hand, was on the District’s alleged failure to
comply with an OHR determination. Thus, even though the OHR determination was itself based
on a finding that plaintiff had been discriminated against because of his race (Hispanic),
plaintiff’s summary judgment motions were based on an entirely different legal theory–that
plaintiff had a property interest in the right to have the OHR’s order followed by the District and
that the District denied his substantive due process rights by failing to comply with that order.
See [#91] at 14-15.
Finally, although the motion for a preliminary injunction focused, as it had to, on the
standard governing the imposition of a preliminary injunction, which includes an analysis of
whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits, plaintiff states only that “the best evidence
of this likelihood [of success] is the irrefutable fact that on two occasions Medina has already
prevailed, proving that he was the victim of discrimination at the hands of the Defendant.” [#71]
at 10. But that he was ultimately successful before the jury does not somehow make the work on
the preliminary injunction, based on different facts and legal theories, compensable.
I therefore conclude that all of the time spent on the following motions, which totals 106
hours, must be disallowed:3
June 16, 1997 - “Draft and review of Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial 25 hours
June 20, 1997 Summary Judgment.”
June 23, 1997 Plaintiff filed Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial n/a
Summary Judgment [#8].
3
The descriptions of the work performed by plaintiff’s counsel are taken from his time
sheets. See [#173-5].
9
October 20, 1997 “Received and reviewed Defendant’s Opposition 2 hours
to Plaintiff’s MSJ.”
October 21, 1997 - “Research regarding reply.” 10 hours
October 28, 1997
October 30, 1997 “Drafted reply.” 3.5 hours
February 19, 1998 - “Drafted, prepared filed plaintitf’s [sic] motion to 4 hours
February 20, 1998 supplement the record.”
March 19, 1998 Judge Sullivan denied [#8] at Order [#23]. n/a
March 23, 1998 “Reviewed court’s order/denied plaintiff’s MSJ 0.5 hours
and get new dates.”
April 20, 1998 - “Research, prepared renewed Motions [sic] for 25 hours
April 24, 1998 Summary Judgment.”
April 30, 1998 Plaintiff filed Plaintiff’s [Second] Motion for n/a
Partial Summary Judgment [#24].
May 22, 1998 “Received and reviewed Defendant’s Opposition.” 3 hours
March 31, 1999 Judge Sullivan denied [#24] at Memorandum n/a
Opinion and Order [#30].
April 2, 1999 “Received and reviewed court’s order/memo 2.5 hours
denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgement
[sic], communicated with client.”
February 29, 2003 - “Research, draft plaintiff’s motion for preliminary 12.5 hours
March 3, 2003 injunction.”
March 3, 2003 Plaintiff filed Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary n/a
Injunction [#71].
March 20, 2003 “[R]eview of DC opposition to Plaintiffs [sic] 3 hours
motion for preliminary injunction.”
June 2, 2003 - June “Research, draft of reply to DC’s opposition to 15 hours
6, 2003 Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction.”
July 29, 2003 Judge Sullivan denied [#71] at Memorandum n/a
Opinion and Order [#83].
January 18, 2005 Plaintiff filed Plaintiff’s [Third] Motion for Partial n/a
Summary Judgment [#91].
10
June 6, 2007 Judge Sullivan denied [#91] at Opinion [#101]. n/a
C. Document Review
The District contends that plaintiff’s request for reimbursement of $46,158.75 for 93.25
hours of “Document-review-Summation” is excessive, and should be reduced by 60%. [#174] at
16. Thus, the District contends that plaintiff should be awarded $18,463.50 rather than
$46,158.75. Id. In support of its argument, the District claims that plaintiff’s billing records are
too vague in that they identify a particular task as “Document review-Summation,” “Review
Document-Summation,” or “Review Summation documents,” without providing any further
detail. Id. at 16-17. Plaintiff’s counsel argues that he used “Summation” and “Trial Director,”
the latest trial software, in reviewing the documentary evidence, thereby “saving hundred of
hours of attorney and paralegal time” for this task. [#175] at 7.
In its discretion, the Court will not arbitrarily reduce the number of hours spent on
document review but will reduce the rate at which that work will be reimbursed. Rather than
reimbursing that work at the hourly rate for an attorney, the Court will use the Laffey rate set for
paralegals and law clerks for 2011-2012. Thus, for 93.25 hours of document review, plaintiff
will be reimbursed at a rate of $140 per hour, for a total of $13,055.00.
D. Reduction in Award of Attorney’s Fees
In its motion, plaintiff seeks a total of $493,746.00 in attorney’s fees. [#173-1] at 4. The
District counters that plaintiff is only entitled to an award of $206,790.00 in attorney’s fees.
[#174] at 1. Pursuant to the above analysis and the Court’s independent calculation of attorney’s
fees, provided in Attachment A, the Court has initially arrived at a figure of $406,991.00.
11
As the Supreme Court recently emphasized, determining the proper fee in a case where a party
makes related unsuccessful and successful claims is not a lapidary judgment. Instead, it requires
the careful exercise of discretion by the judge who has lived with the case on a daily basis. Fox,
131 S.Ct. at 2216 ( “The essential goal in shifting fee . . . is to do rough justice, not to achieving
auditing perfection. So trial courts may take into account their overall sense of a suit, and may
use estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney’s time.”). The result achieved is a crucial
consideration. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (Results obtained is particularly crucial when plaintiff
prevails only on some of her claims for relief.).
On the one hand, this was an extraordinary case. There are (thankfully) few cases in
which one’s client is indicted in the middle of the case. While everything worked out ultimately
to plaintiff’s benefit, his counsel is certainly to be commended and fairly compensated for his
loyalty to his client and to his persistence on plaintiff’s behalf under extremely unfavorable
circumstances.
Additionally, this case was well tried by both counsel. In my view, the evidence
supporting plaintiff’s case was not strong and it took that kind of excellent advocacy to achieve
the verdict plaintiff received. Plaintiff’s “problem” (a nice problem to have) was that he has
risen rapidly and successfully to the very upper echelons of the Police Department. The District
argued compellingly that it was inconceivable that plaintiff could have advanced as fast and as
far as he did if he was the victim of discrimination. The jury seems to have accepted that
contention, finding for plaintiff only on his retaliation claim, and awarding what has to be
considered a relatively minor amount of damages. Achieving that in the face of plaintiff’s rapid
rise in the Police Department and the general weakness of his case was a substantial
12
achievement.
On the other hand, the result achieved was not very great. While I viewed the violations
of Title VII and the D.C. Human Rights Act as two distinct claims, the court of appeals reversed
me and found only one. Thus, plaintiff prevailed on a single count of retaliation, which is only
one of the ten counts he pressed. He was not entitled to back pay and, as I have just noted, the
jury award was small.
Weighing, on the one hand, the excellence of plaintiff’s counsel’s advocacy, his loyalty to
his client over more than a decade of litigation, and his success in securing a favorable verdict
against his failure with respect to nine of the ten counts presented as well as the limited relief
plaintiff secured, I believe that an unadjusted award of $406,991.00 is simply too great. It is
more than four times the jury award, and I cannot see any justification for such a disproportion
between result and fee. I therefore will, in my discretion, award $300,00.00, an amount that, in
my view, is generous to plaintiff’s counsel and will continue to attract equally competent counsel
to future Title VII cases.
Finally, I note that I am motivated to reduce plaintiff's counsel's fee because of the
likelihood that prior to June 6, 2007, the date when Judge Sullivan dismissed plaintiff's due
process claims, plaintiff's counsel spent time working on those unsuccessful claims, even though
that time is not reflected in his billing entries. While I have already deducted compensation for
entries that specifically relate to work on these due process claims, I certainly cannot conclude
that every other minute prior to June 6, 2007 was spent solely on plaintiff's discrimination and
retaliation claims. Ultimately, however, plaintiff’s counsel bears the burden of proving his
entitlement to fees by submitting detailed entries that would permit the court to identify the total
13
amount of time spent on each claim. See Nat'l Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec'y of Def., 675
F.2d 1319, 1326-27 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Here, the entries do not permit such a distinction.
Therefore, I will reduce plaintiff’s counsel's fee to an amount that I consider fair, given the time
spent by counsel on the case and the results he achieved.
E. Costs
Finally, the District argues that plaintiff should not be reimbursed for certain costs
associated with the service of subpoenas, witness fees, and deposition transcripts.4 [#174] at 20.
Specifically, the District claims that plaintiff is not entitled to reimbursement for $2,188.00 in
costs associated with the following individuals, because none of them were called to testify at
trial. Id. at 20-21:
Witness Date Subpoena Fee Witness Fee Total
1. Patricia Alexander 7/18/08 114.00 40.00 154.00
2. Luperico Rivera 6/23/08 40.00 40.00 80.00
3. Guy Middleton 7/2/08 104.00 40.00 144.00
4. Tony Giles 60.00 40.00 100.00
5. John Simmons 60.00 40.00 100.00
6. Frank Santiago 60.00 40.00 100.00
7. Joshua Ederhelmer 6/26/08 100.00 40.00 140.00
8. Martha L. Herzing 6/26/08 63.00 40.00 103.00
9. Julie Anderson 60.00 40.00 100.00
4
Although the District initially claims that it is seeking a reduction in costs associated
with deposition transcripts, it makes no further mention of deposition transcripts in its opposition
and does not identify any deposition transcript fees in its chart, identified as “Attachment 4.” See
[#174-1] at 5.
14
10. Danny Clark Gregg 6/26/08 100.00 40.00 140.00
11. Raymond Corey 7/9/08 75.00 40.00 115.00
12. Hiram Rosario 7/11/08 239.00 40.00 279.00
13. Kim Gregory 7/1/08 140.00 40.00 180.00
14. Christopher Cummings 7/14/08 104.00 40.00 144.00
15. William Bailey 7/16/08 210.00 40.00 250.00
16. Ralph Harmon 19.00 40.00 59.00
1,548.00 640.00 2,188.00
Pursuant to Rule 54 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 1920 of Title 28 of
the United States Code, included in the list of taxable costs are the cost of serving a subpoena on
an individual who testifies at a deposition, hearing, or trial, as well as witness costs. See LCvR
54.1(d((11); 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (3). According to plaintiff’s fee petition, each of the sixteen
individuals listed above were served with a “Subpoena for Trial.”5 [#173-8] at 1. Although
neither the Local Rules nor the United States Code mandates that the subpoenaed witnesses
specifically testify at trial in order to justify reimbursement, when the subpoena is issued
specifically for trial and the witness does not testify, the Court is within its authority6 to deny
such recovery. See Long v. Howard Univ., 561 F. Supp. 2d 85, 98 (D.D.C. 2008) (denying
recovery for service of a subpoena duces tecum on an individual who did not testify at a
deposition, hearing, or trial).
5
Plaintiff identifies the dates of service of the subpoenas as ranging between June 23,
2008 and July 16, 2008. [#173-8] at 1. Trial in this case began on July 21, 2008 and concluded
on July 28, 2008.
6
The apportionment of costs is within the “sound discretion” of the court. Moore v. Nat’l
Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 762 F.2d 1093, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
15
Like subpoenas, witness fees are also expressly authorized. See LCvR 54.1(d)(10); 28
U.S.C. § 1920 (3); Youseff v. FBI, 762 F. Supp. 2d 76, 88-89 (D.D.C. 2011). Witness fees are
usually limited, however, to the days the witness “necessarily and reasonably attended” the trial
as a witness. Belfiore v. U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., No. 84-CIV-3877, 1987 WL 10234, at *2
(D.D.C. 1987). See Kakeh v. United Planning Org., 657 F. Supp. 2d 15, 18 (D.D.C. 2009).
Because plaintiff did not, in either his motion for attorney’s fees or his reply, indicate whether
and under what circumstances the individuals listed above attended the trial, the Court will
disallow both the claimed subpoena and witness fees.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of $300,000.00 in attorney’s fees and $3,243.00 in costs.
An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion and the Clerk is directed to enter judgment in
accordance with this Memorandum Opinion.
Digitally signed by John M.
Facciola
DN: c=US, st=DC,
ou=District of Columbia,
email=John_M._Facciola@d
cd.uscourts.gov, o=U.S.
District Court, District of
Columbia, cn=John M.
Facciola
Date: 2012.04.23 11:06:34
-04'00'
______________________________
JOHN M. FACCIOLA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
16