UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
LENA JOHNSON, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Action No. 11-494 (JMF)
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case was referred for all purposes. Currently pending and ready for resolution is
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment [#14]. For the reasons stated below, plaintiffs’ motion
will be granted in part and denied in part.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs in this case are 1) Lena Johnson, the parent of E.J., and 2) Brenda Smith, the
parent of B.S. [#14-1] at 2. Both children were previously diagnosed with disabilities and
awarded special education services pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities in Education
Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq.1 (“IDEA”), which guarantees all children enrolled in the District of
Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”) system a free and appropriate education (“FAPE”). Id.
Administrative proceedings were brought on behalf of both children and both prevailed. Id. They
then sought and were awarded attorney’s fees by another judge of this Court, Gladys Kessler, in
1
All references to the United States Code or the District of Columbia Code are to the
electronic versions that appear in Westlaw or Lexis.
the case of Cox v. District of Columbia, No. 09-1720 (GK). Id.
Plaintiffs now seek reimbursement of attorney’s fees incurred after the filing of the Cox
case and, to that end, have moved for summary judgment. [#14-1] at 2. The amount in
controversy, however, is not great. In the E.J. case, the defendant has paid all but $1,333.38 and
in the B.S. case, only $827.34 is sought, for a total of $2,160.73. Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment [#15] at 13.
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The defendant
does not claim that there are any genuine issues of material fact but raises two issues of law: 1)
that the rates sought for the services rendered are too high, and 2) that Elizabeth Jester, counsel
for the plaintiffs, is attempting to recover, at hourly rates for legal services, reimbursement for
clerical tasks that should be absorbed as overhead.
Specifically, the DCPS balks at paying plaintiffs’ counsel’s present hourly rate of $450 an
hour for her time after January 1, 2010 through to the present. See [#14-1] at 8. Rather, it has
indicated generally that it will pay lawyers at the rate of $300 per hour in IDEA cases.
Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue [#15-3] ¶ 1.
The defendant also refuses to pay anything at all for the following tasks: 1) reviewing a file to
prepare for an IEP meeting in one of the cases, 2) preparing a fee petition in both cases, and 3)
reviewing the fee petition in both cases. See [#15-5] at 2; Defendant’s Praecipe Clarifying its
Contentions that Plaintiffs are Not Due Reimbursement for Certain Work Performed [#19] at 2.
Additionally, the defendant refuses to pay Jester for writing a “case close letter” to her client in
2
the B.S. case. See [#15-5] at 2.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
Pursuant to the IDEA, the Court “in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees
as part of the costs . . . to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.” 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). The statute further provides that “[f]ees . . . shall be based on rates
prevailing in the community in which the action or proceedings arose for the kind and quality of
services furnished.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C). The movant must therefore demonstrate 1) that
he is the prevailing party, and 2) that the attorneys’ fees sought are reasonable.
In order to qualify as a prevailing party, there must be an “alteration in the legal
relationship of the parties” and this alteration must be the result of formal judicial action. Lopez
v. District of Columbia, 383 F. Supp. 2d 18, 21 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting Buckhannon Bd. and
Care Home, Inc., v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605-06
(2001)).
Determining the reasonable rate is not as straight forward. “The most useful starting
point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended
on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate” in order to arrive at the total or “lodestar”
amount. Hensely v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). “[A] fee applicant’s burden in
establishing a reasonable hourly rate entails a showing of at least three elements: the attorneys’
billing practices; the attorneys’ skill, experience, and reputation; and the prevailing market rates
in the relevant community.” Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
3
II. Analysis
A. Plaintiffs were Prevailing Parties
Defendant does not contest plaintiffs’ status as prevailing parties in this matter. See
generally [#15]. Thus, the only issue before the Court is whether the fees plaintiffs seek on
behalf of their counsel are reasonable.
B. Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s Fees are Reasonable
1. Jester’s Billing Practices
In the matter currently before the Court, Jester charged hourly rates that are below Laffey
rates.2 [#14] at 8. Furthermore, in Jester’s declaration, she states that it has been her practice to
charge either current or below market rates for her services and that Judges Friedman, Lamberth,
Bryant, Sullivan, and Kessler have found those rates to be reasonable in other IDEA cases. [#14-
4] at 4-5.
2. Jester’s Skill, Experience, and Reputation
Jester’s skill and experience in the area of special education is well documented. She
received her law degree in 1980 from Catholic University School of Law. [#14-4] at 1. She has
specialized in children’s rights issues since entering private practice in 1997 and has spoken at
numerous conferences and seminars on a variety of issues relating to children. Id. at 3. She has
also taught CLE courses relating to special education issues. Id. Additionally, she has
represented numerous clients in the field of special education both at the administrative as well
2
In 2008 and 2009, the Laffey matrix indicates that attorneys with twenty or more years
of experience are to be awarded $465 per hour. Laffey Matrix 2003-2012. The United States
Attorney’s Office, http:/www.justice.gov/usao/dc/divisions/civil_laffey_matrix_8.html (last
visited Mar. 16, 2012). From 2010 to 2011, that rate rises to $475 per hour. Id. For paralegals,
the rate in 2008 and 2009 is $130 per hour while in 2012, that rate increases to $135 per hour. Id.
4
as local and federal court levels. Id.
Finally, Jester serves on a panel of attorneys approved by the D.C. Superior Court Family
Division to accept special education attorney appointments. [#14-4] at 2. She also teaches new
special education attorneys at a training program sponsored by the D.C. Public Defender
Services. See generally [#14-4].
3. Prevailing Market Rates
Although, as defendant notes, use of the Laffey matrix to determine reasonable hourly
rates in IDEA cases is not automatic, numerous Judges in this Court have relied on it as an
appropriate starting point for determining rates of reimbursement for attorneys who challenge the
decisions of the DCPS. Thus, at least where the issues are complex, the full Laffey rate has been
awarded by some members of this Court.3 See A.S. v. District of Columbia, ___ F. Supp. 2d
___, 2012 WL 291349, at *7 (D.D.C. 2012) (awarding Laffey rates upon finding that the hearing
lasted four days, there were 105 proposed exhibits, there were ten witnesses, and the hearing
officer’s determination was 28 pages long); Bucher v. District of Columbia, 777 F. Supp. 2d 69,
74 (D.D.C. 2011) (awarding Laffey rates upon finding that the hearing lasted four days, there
were 42 proposed exhibits, and there were twenty one proposed witnesses); Jackson v. District of
Columbia, 696 F. Supp. 2d 97, 102 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting that an IDEA administrative
proceeding that requires expert testimony is sufficiently complex to warrant application of Laffey
matrix).
Where the issues are not complex, in that there are “no pre-hearing interrogatories or
discovery, no production of documents or depositions, no briefings of intricate statutory or
3
This is not to suggest that fees aren’t discounted on other grounds.
5
constitutional issues, no pre-trial briefings, no lengthy hearings, no protracted arguments, and
few, if any, motions filed,”4 some judges have concluded that use of the Laffey matrix is not
appropriate, and instead, have awarded some fraction of the Laffey rate. See Wright v. District
of Columbia, No. 11-CIV-0384, 2012 WL 79015, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2012) (awarding three-
quarters of the Laffey rate because there was no evidence that the administrative hearing
presented a novel legal issue or was in any way more complex than most hearings); Cousins v.
District of Columbia, No. 11-CIV-384, 2012 WL 79015, at *5 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2012) (awarding
three-quarters of Laffey rate because case involved a routine administrative proceeding and the
time spent preparing for hearing was nominal); Rooths v. District of Columbia, 802 F. Supp. 2d
56, 63 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Like most IDEA cases, the claim on which the plaintiff prevailed in this
action involved very simple facts, little evidence, and no novel or complicated questions of law .
. . . The Court therefore will award fees at an hourly rate equal to three-quarters of the USAO
Laffey rate . . . .”).
In Cox v. District of Columbia, the case from which this one stems, Judge Kessler
unequivocally held that the proceedings for E.J. and B.S. were both sufficiently lengthy and
complex to warrant use of plaintiffs’ proposed rates:
Moreover, Defendant’s claim that B.S. and E.J.’s hearings were
“uncomplicated” is absurd, given any reading of the
comprehensive decisions by the two Hearing Officers in these
cases demonstrates . . . . In B.S.’s case, it took nearly two
years–which included a suspension from school and a two-week
stay in a psychiatric hospital–and a hearing with sixty-five
documentary exhibits, four witnesses, and written closing
statements to obtain an order forcing DCPS to provide desperately
needed treatment and educational assistance . . . . As for E.J., it
4
Agapito v. District of Columbia, 525 F. Supp. 2d 150, 152 (D.D.C. 2007).
6
took more than seven months and a hearing with fifty documentary
exhibits, four witnesses, and written closing statement to obtain a
ruling that would, hopefully, provide the help that E.J.’s
[Multidisciplinary Team] made clear was needed.
Cox v. District of Columbia, No. 09-CIV-1720 (GK), Memorandum Opinion [#18] at 20-21.
This Court has no reason to conclude otherwise in this case. Indeed, it would be
irrational for me to reach a contrary conclusion in the absence of an argument by the defendant
that Judge Kessler erred in her conclusion that, in light of the complexity of the case and the
nature of the services provided, plaintiff’s counsel rate of $400 per hour was reasonable. In
addition, there is no reason to conclude, on this particular record, that Jester’s representation of
her hourly rate is untrue and does not accurately reflect what her clients would pay her if they
were able to do so. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that more is needed in these cases
than a simple Goldilocks approach–this rate is too high, this one is too low, this one is just right.
These cases all involve the same problem–balancing the burden on the public fisc and making
sure that reimbursement rates are high enough to attract competent counsel.
Fee shifting statutes create “private attorney generals” who enforce statutory rights to
accomplish a governmental goal. This Court would certainly welcome a detailed review by the
defendant, supported by statistical and economic analyses, that would lead to a principled
approach to determining a rate that would serve all the admittedly valid competing interests. The
defendant does not offer such a review but instead states that “this Court has determined that the
rate published in the DCPS Guidelines for the Payment of Attorney Fees in IDEA matters [i.e.
$300] [is] reasonable and the appropriate rate of compensation for this type of litigation.” [#15]
at 8. In support of this statement, defendant cites Agapito, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 152.
7
First, there is no such thing as “this Court” in the sense of a judicial body that issues a
decision that binds the judges of that court until the court, en banc, reverses that decision. A
District Court is comprised of individual judges who reach decisions that are not binding on any
one else. That Judge Collyer concluded in Agapito that the services provided in that case did not
justify the Laffey rates does not make her decision the opinion of “this Court.” Thus, unless the
defendant is ready to prove by statistical, economic or other evidence to include, perhaps, expert
testimony, that $300 per hour strikes a fair balance between the burden on the public fisc and the
need to attract competent counsel and that anything more is not a reflection of the actual market,
these cases will become a meaningless exercise between plaintiffs, who will cite those cases that
support use of the Laffey rate and the defendant, who will cite those that do not.
Until a more scientific approach is taken, I will not quarrel with the conclusion of Judge
Kessler, based on the representation of counsel of her hourly rate, that she be reimbursed 1) at a
rate of $400 per hour for work performed by Jester through December 31, 2009, and 2) at a rate
of $125 per hour for all paralegal staff. [#14-1] at 8. I further find, however, that the upward
adjustment from $400 to $450 for work performed in 2010 is not justified. The economic reality
underlying the Laffey matrix is that legal services, like all other goods and services, increase in
cost and that the consumer price index is a reliable indicator of how much the cost of services
increases each year. In 2010, the Laffey rate increased from $465 to $475. I will use the same
adjustment and use a rate of $410 for the services rendered in 2010.
4. Plaintiffs’ Counsel May Be Entitled to Reimbursement for the Services
Defendant Claims Are Clerical
In addition to objecting to the rate of reimbursement plaintiffs seek, defendant also
8
contends that reimbursement at the attorney’s rate is not appropriate for clerical services. With
regard to work performed on E.J.’s case, defendant argues that the following items should not be
reimbursed:
Hours Amount
2/24/10 Review file to prepare for IEP meeting .50 $225.00
5/14/10 Prepare petition for attorney’s fees and .30 $ 37.50
costs (paralegal)
Review petition for attorney’s fees .30 $135.00
TOTAL $397.505
Defendant’s Praecipe Clarifying its Contentions that Plaintiffs are Not Due Reimbursement for
Certain Work Performed [#19] at 2.
With regard to work performed on B.S.’s case, defendant identifies the following items as
non-reimburseable:
Hours Amount
3/26/10 Prepare petition for attorney’s fees and .50 $ 62.50
costs (paralegal)
Review petition for attorney’s fees .30 $135.00
Case close letter to B. Smith and K. Smith .40 $180.00
TOTAL $377.50
[#15-5] at 2.
This Court previously addressed this issue in Lopez v. District of Columbia, 383 F. Supp.
2d 18 (D.D.C. 2005), noting that “[t]his Circuit has addressed the question of whether clerical
5
Originally, defendants erroneously claimed that the total amount of disputed clerical
costs was $495. See [#15-4] at 2. The correct total amount claimed is $397.50. See [#19] at 2.
9
work is compensable and has concluded that Congress never intended for clerical billings to be
included in attorneys’ fees and that such services are ‘generally considered within the overhead
component of a lawyer’s fee.’” Id. at 25 (quoting In re Olson, 884 F. 2d 1415, 1426-27 (D.C. Cir.
1989)). In Lopez, however, the issue was whether it was appropriate to reimburse plaintiff’s
counsel for time spent filing documents on the Court’s electronic case filing system or “ECF,” a
task which is clearly clerical. Lopez, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 25. Accord Baker v. District of
Columbia Public Schools, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2011 WL 4507251, at *4 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding
that preparing, tabbing, updating, and filing documents were clerical tasks).
Reviewing a file in preparation for an IEP meeting may or may not be clerical. If it
involves a lawyer’s substantive review of the issues in preparation for the hearing, it obviously is
not. If the review simply entails making sure that all the necessary files are organized and ready
for the hearing, the task is clerical and the kind of thing that does not require a lawyer’s skill or
judgment.
Similarly, reviewing the fee petition may mean either reviewing the petition to make sure
that entries are accurate (clerical) or it may mean determining whether to exercising any billing
discretion (non-clerical). Just about anyone could do the former but the latter requires a lawyer’s
judgment or skill.
With regard to the drafting of case close letters, communicating with one’s client is an
important part of a lawyer’s responsibility, fulfilling the ethical responsibility a lawyer has to
keep her client informed. See D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.4.
According to Jester, “[w]ith the exception of the limited engagement of Mery Williams
for the preparation of attorney fee petitions as set forth above, I have no support staff, secretary
10
or paralegal. . . . I am the only one who performs work on my cases on behalf of my clients.”
[#14-4] at 6-7. While that is so, it does not follow that everything that Jester does is ipso facto to
be compensated at her hourly rate for actions that could and should have been done by non-
lawyers were she at a larger firm. It is illogical to make the legitimacy of the rate charged to be a
function of whether the lawyer is a solo practitioner or in a large firm with secretaries and
paralegals, when the nature of the work is the same no matter who does it.
Unfortunately, it is impossible on this record to resolve whether the tasks were the kind of
tasks that required a lawyer’s skill or the kind that are ordinarily delegated to clerks. I will
therefore give Jester an opportunity to tell me, in a brief supplemental submission, due by March
30, 2012, what specifically Jester was doing in the disputed entries and whether the work
required a lawyer’s skill and judgment or whether those duties would have been delegated to
clerks had she practiced in a firm that employed clerks or secretaries.
5. Plaintiffs’ Counsel Should be Reimbursed for other Non-Professional
Services
Second, defendant argues that plaintiffs should not be reimbursed in full for “routine
costs and expenses that are part of counsel’s overhead.” [#15] at 12. In this category, defendant
places costs such as travel time and photocopying. Id. For tasks performed on E.J.’s case,
defendant argues that the following items should be reimbursed not at the rate shown below, but
at a discounted rate:
Quantity Amount
5/14/10 Copies (0.25 per page) 1376 $ 34.25
6
In both plaintiffs’ motion and defendant’s praecipe, the total number of copies is first
identified as “37 pages @ 0.25 per page” and then as “137.” See [#14-11] at 2; [#19] at 2.
11
Postage 1 $ 1.03
Mileage (0.558 per mile) 42 $ 23.44
9/09-12/09 Fax (0.25 per page) 3 $ .75
Photocopies (0.25 per page) 457 $114.25
Postage 1 $ 3.25
Mileage (0.558 per mile) 122 $ 71.37
TOTAL $248.34
[#19] at 2-3.
For tasks performed on B.S.’s case, defendant argues that the following items for the
period from September 3, 2009 through March 26, 2010 should be reimbursed at a lesser rate
than that claimed by plaintiffs below:
Quantity Amount
Postage 1 $ 2.27
Photocopies (0.25 per page) 717 $ 17.75
Mileage (0.558 per mile) 76 $ 42.41
TOTAL $ 62.43
With regard to reimbursement for faxing and photocopying costs incurred by plaintiffs’
counsel, judges of this Court have concluded that the defendant must pay them. See McClam v.
District of Columbia, ___ F. Supp. 2d. ___, 2011 WL 3891809, at *5 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Costs for
Based on the total amount claimed, it appears as though the proper number of copies was 137.
7
In both plaintiffs’ motion and defendant’s praecipe, the total number of copies is first
identified as “67 pages @ 0.25 per page” and then as “71.” See [#14-17] at 6; [#19] at 4. Based
on the total amount claimed, it appears as though the proper number of copies was 71.
12
copying, faxing, and postage are customarily included in fee awards in IDEA litigation”);
Holbrook v. District of Columbia, 305 F. Supp. 2d 41, 46 (D.D.C. 2004) (“The costs Plaintiffs
claimed, e.g., copying, faxing, and postage, are traditionally considered part of a reasonable
attorney’s fee.”). There is no justification, however, for the rate sought. Just last September,
Judge Collyer concluded that $0.15 per page rate for photocopies, the same rate defendant
allowed in another IDEA case, was reasonable. As there is no indication that Jester paid $0.25
per page to a vendor for copying, the $0.15 rate will suffice for both faxes and photocopies.
With regard to reimbursement of mileage charges, judges of this Court have concluded
they may be reimbursed if routinely billed by the attorney. McClam, 2011 WL 3891809, at *5
(citing New York v. Microsoft Corp., 297 F. Supp. 2d 15, 47-48 (D.D.C. 2003)). Time spent
traveling is time that is not spent doing billable work and, in my experience, lawyers traditionally
charge their clients for travel when they are doing so for their client’s business.8 Moreover,
everyone, including lawyers, has to buy Metro tickets or pay for gas and parking when they
travel. Jester does not seek her hourly rate but the mileage permitted by the federal government
when, for example, a federal employee, uses his own car to drive to a destination for work. See
Plaintiffs’ Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment [#16] at
9. Furthermore, according to Jester, she was reimbursed by Judge Kessler for her mileage
charges. Id. at 8. This Court will do the same.
6. Whether Plaintiffs Should be Awarded Prejudgment Interest Requires
Further Briefing
8
Legend has it that a hard charging associate at a Washington, D.C. firm flew cross
country west to east and became the only lawyer in history who ever billed 28 hours in a single
day.
13
If the law of the District of Columbia applies to the issue of the award of pre-judgment
interest on attorney’s fees under the IDEA, whether pre-judgment interest should be awarded is
controlled by the application of D.C. Code § 15-109, rather than D.C. Code § 15-108. The latter
statute applies only when the debt is liquidated. Here, the parties differed on the appropriate rate
and whether certain charges are appropriate. Thus, the amount at issue is unliquidated, or not
easily ascertainable, and thereby falls under § 15-109. Aon Risk Servs., Inc. v. Estate of Coyne,
915 A.2d 370, 379 (D.C. 2007) (citing Athridge v. Iglesias, 382 F. Supp. 2d 42, 49 (D.D.C.
2005)). See also Fudali v. Pivotal Corp., No. 03-CIV-1460, 2009 WL 1617096, at *5-6 (D.D.C.
June 9, 2009). Section 15-109 provides:
In an action to recover damages for breach of contract the
judgment shall allow interest on the amount for which it is
rendered from the date of the judgment only. This section does not
preclude the jury, or the court, if the trial be by the court, from
including interest as an element in the damages awarded, if
necessary to fully compensate the plaintiff.
D.C. Code § 15-109.
To date, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has allowed pre-judgment interest,
under D.C. Code § 15-109, in both contract and conversion actions, but it is unclear whether it
will be permitted in a negligence action. See Athridge, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 53. There is no
specific statutory authority that would permit the award of pre-judgment interest against the
District of Columbia on an amount due pursuant to a fee-shifting statute, where the money comes
from a public treasury.
14
By the same token, two 2011 opinions of the D.C. Court of Appeals9 indicate that, under
the common law, courts may award pre-judgment interest. However, there is no indication yet
whether this power may be exercised against a sovereign to reach funds not appropriated for that
purpose. See G. v. Fort Bragg Indep. Sch., 324 F.3d 240, 256 (4th Cir. 2003). Awarding pre-
judgment interest may significantly increase the burden on the District of Columbia without a
concomitant increase in the appropriation to pay the final judgments in these IDEA cases.10
Ultimately, I find that the briefing by both parties is inadequate. Accordingly, if plaintiffs
wants to press their claim for pre-judgment interest, then they must submit a supplemental brief
that addresses the following issues:
1. Does District of Columbia law, whether D.C. Code § 15-109 or the common law
power to award pre-judgment interest, apply to IDEA cases where the court’s
jurisdiction is based on cases involving federal questions?
2. Assuming District of Columbia law applies, does it apply with equal force to the
District of Columbia as defendant or does the concept of sovereign immunity
apply to bar an award of pre-judgment interest against it?
9
Wash. Inv. Partners v. Sec. House, 28 A.3d 566, 581 (D.C. 2011); Burke v. Groover,
Chrisie & Merritt, 26 A.3d 292, 306 (D.C. 2011).
10
Judge Kessler awarded pre-judgment interest to Jester in Holbrook v. District of
Columbia, 305 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2004), as have District Court judges in the Seventh
Circuit. E.g. C.W. v. Bd. of Educ., No. 11-CIV-2349, 2012 WL 355360 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2012);
Brenton H. v. Bd. of Educ., No. 10-CIV-1360, 2011 WL 4501408 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 28, 2011); J.F.
v. Bd. of Educ., No. 10-CIV-614, 2011 WL 3839660; Bd. of Educ. v. Walker, 800 F. Supp. 2d
917 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2011); Judah M. v. Bd. of Educ., 798 F. Supp. 2d 942 (N.D. Ill. 2011). In
none of these cases, however, did the courts consider the sovereign immunity question. See also
Kaseman v. District of Columbia, 329 F. Supp. 2d 20, 28 (D.D.C. 2004) (allowed pre-judgment
interest when District stonewalled request for payment of fees and presented reasons for rejecting
requests that “bordered on the absurd.”).
15
3. If District of Columbia law does not apply, is there any provision in the IDEA that
justifies the award of pre-judgment interest against the District?
4. Whatever the source of authority, how should the court determine the date on
which pre-judgement interest begins to accrue?
I appreciate that, given the amounts at issue, plaintiffs may conclude that spending
additional time and effort on securing pre-judgment interest is not worth it. In fairness, I must
indicate that I will not award attorney’s fees for the work done answering my questions if
plaintiffs fail to convince me of their entitlement to pre-judgment interest. Thus, plaintiffs will
either have to file the supplemental submission I am requiring by March 30, 2012 or advise me in
writing by March 23, 2012, that they will not be pursuing pre-judgment interest. In the
meanwhile, I will enter judgment in the amount of $244.70 with the understanding that I may
enter a supplemental judgment if necessary. If plaintiffs file a supplemental submission,
defendant must file their response by April 13, 2012, and plaintiff shall have until April 20, 2012
to reply thereto.
In the meanwhile I will direct the Clerk to enter judgment for plaintiffs, calculated as
follows:
Client / Category Dates work Hours Rate Amount Rate Amount
Invoice performed Sought Sought Awarded Awarded
# by Court by Court
E.J. / Jester’s 7/20/2009- 20.6 $400/hr $8,240 $400/hr $8,240.00
#11108 Attorney’s 12/24/2009
Fees
16
Client / Category Dates work Hours Rate Amount Rate Amount
Invoice performed Sought Sought Awarded Awarded
# by Court by Court
Preparation 12/29/2009 0.5 $125/hr $62.5011 TBD12 TBD
of Fee
Petition
Review of 12/29/2009 0.4 $400/hr $160.00 TBD TBD
Fee
Petition
Faxes (3) n/a n/a $0.25/pg 0.75 $0.15/ 0.45
pg
Copies n/a n/a $0.25/pg 114.25 $0.15/ $68.55
(457) pg
Mileage 9/1/2009 n/a $0.585/ $71.37 $0.55/ $67.10
(122) 11/16/2009 mile13 mile
12/1/2009
E.J. / Jester’s 1/5/2010 - 11 $450/hr $4,950.0 $410/hr $4,510.00
#10008 Attorney’s 3/30/2010 0
Fees
Preparation 2/24/2010 0.5 $450/hr $225.00 TBD TBD
for IEP
Meeting
11
Although defendant objected to the rate billed by plaintiffs’ counsel for some of the
work performed by her paralegal, defendant neglected to make that argument as to Invoice
#11108. Nevertheless, the Court will reserve its ruling as to this category until after plaintiffs’
counsel has filed her statement clarifying the nature of the work performed.
12
To be determined.
13
In plaintiffs’ counsel’s declaration, she states that she uses the federal government rate
for seeking reimbursement for mileage. [#14-4] at 6. In the declaration, she identifies that rate as
0.585 per mile. Id. That rate, however, fluctuates. According to the archived privately owned
automobile rates maintained by the U.S. General Services Administration (“GSA”), the approved
rate from January 1, 2009 through December 31, 2009 was 0.55 per mile. GSA,
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/103969 (last visited Mar. 16, 2012). In 2010, the rate went
down to 0.50 per mile. Id. The Court will use the GSA rates as published.
17
Client / Category Dates work Hours Rate Amount Rate Amount
Invoice performed Sought Sought Awarded Awarded
# by Court by Court
Preparation 5/14/2010 0.3 $125/hr $37.50 TBD TBD
of Fee
Petition
Review of 5/14/2010 0.3 $450/hr $135.00 TBD TBD
Fee
Petition
Copies n/a n/a $0.25/pg $34.25 $0.15/ $20.55
(137) pg
Mileage 2/23/2010 n/a $0.558/ $23.44 $0.5/ $21.00
(42) mile mile
B.S. / Jester’s 9/3/2009 - 6.4 $400/hr $2,560 $400/hr $2,560
#11148 Attorney’s 12/15/2009
Fees
(same) 1/5/2010 - 9.8 $450/hr $4,410 $410/hr $4,018.00
3/26/2010
Preparation 3/26/2010 0.5 $125/hr $62.50 TBD TBD
of Fee
Petition
Review of 3/26/2010 0.3 $450/hr $135.00 TBD TBD
Fee
Petition
Case Close 3/26/2010 0.4 $450/hr $180.00 TBD TBD
Letter
Copies n/a n/a 0.25/pg $17.75 0.15/pg $10.65
(71)
Mileage 1/6/2010, n/a 0.558/ $42.41 0.5/ $38.00
(76) 3/16/2010 mile mile
Total $19,554.30
The following summary is based on the above calculations:
18
Total Amount Awarded by Court $19,554.30
Less Total Amount Already Paid by DCPS $19,309.60
Date Check No. Invoice Client Amount
No.
4/19/2010 150 11108 E.J. $6,251.80
005040736
5/12/2010 150 11148 B.S. $4,932.32
005053426
8/10/2010 150 10008 E.J. $3,306.58
005100010
2/4/2011 150 11108 E.J. $2,060.00
005205887
(same) 150 10008 E.J. $1,106.58
005205887
(same) 150 11148 B.S. $1,652.32
005205887
Total $19,309.60
Total Amount Due Plaintiffs $244.70
An Order, which directs the Clerk to enter judgment in the amount of $244.70,
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Digitally signed by John M.
Facciola
DN: c=US, st=DC, ou=District
of Columbia,
email=John_M._Facciola@dcd.
uscourts.gov, o=U.S. District
Court, District of Columbia,
cn=John M. Facciola
Date: 2012.03.20 16:43:42
-04'00'
______________________________
JOHN M. FACCIOLA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
19