UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
A.S., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Action No. 10-cv-1670 (BJR)
v.
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
OPINION ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant.
This is an action under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act
(hereinafter “IDEA”) for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred during administrative proceedings in
which plaintiffs were the prevailing party.1 This matter was reassigned to this court from Judge
Walton on September 1, 2011. Before the court at this time is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [dkt. #11] (“Mot. for SJ”). Plaintiffs allege that they are entitled to additional fees
from the District of Columbia Public Schools (hereinafter “DCPS”) in the amount of $49,709.22.
Mot. for SJ at 2. Having read the parties’ pleadings, and for the reasons stated herein, plaintiffs’
motion will be granted in part.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Findings of Fact2
Plaintiff A.S., now thirteen years old, is a child residing in the District of Columbia who
1
W hile defendant disputes whether plaintiff prevailed on “certain claims,” defendant’s reimbursement of $12,776.85
of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and costs indicates that defendant does not dispute that plaintiffs were prevailing parties
to an extent sufficient to qualify to recover attorneys’ fees under the statute. Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’
Motion for Summary Judgment [dkt. #12] (hereinafter “Def.’s Opp.”). at 1
2
Unless otherwise noted, the facts set forth herein are drawn from the parties’ statements of undisputed material facts
submitted pursuant to Local Rule 7(h) and from the Hearing Officer’s Determination.
was found eligible in 2008 for special education and related services as a child with a disability
under the IDEA. Hearing Officer’s Determination [dkt. #11-3] (hereinafter “H.O. Det.”) at 4, ¶¶
1, 4. A.S. was been diagnosed at that time with a “Specific Learning Disability” and “Other
Health Impairment.” Id., ¶ 2.
A.S. struggled academically and experienced behavioral difficulties at his charter school
during the 2008-2009 school year. In light of A.S.’s continued difficulties at the charter school,
in early 2009, his parents applied for and secured placement for A.S. at Kingsbury Day School, a
private school. Id. at 5, ¶¶ 6, 8; Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [dkt. #11-1]
(“Pltfs’ SOF”) ¶ 5.
On February 10, 2009, A.S.’s multi-disciplinary team (hereinafter “MDT”) convened a
meeting at the charter school to conduct an annual review of A.S.’s individualized education
program (hereinafter “IEP”).” At that meeting, A.S.’s parents reported that his pediatrician had
recently diagnosed him with ADHD. While the MDT added the particular disability
classification to A.S.’s IEP in light of the diagnosis, “goals and objectives to address weaknesses
in attention, organization, and/or other areas affected by his ADHD were not developed at [that]
time.” Under the IEP, A.S. remained at the charter school. H.O. Det. at 6, , ¶¶ 10-11. Following
the February IEP meeting, A.S.’s parents sent a letter through counsel formally rejecting the IEP
and proposed placement, and requesting public funding for A.S.’s attendance at Kingsbury. A.S.
completed the 2008-2009 school year at the charter school, but “his behavioral difficulties
continued to impact his ability to make academic progress.” Id. at 7, ¶¶ 14, 16.
In June 2009, plaintiffs’ counsel wrote to the charter school and DCPS expressing
concerns about A.S.’s educational program at the charter school, and requesting another
MDT/IEP team meeting. Id., ¶ 17. In early July 2009, the charter school sent A.S.’s parents
2
letters of invitation for an MDT/IEP team meeting on July 14, 2009. The meeting was canceled
when A.S.’s parents provided the school with a lengthy independent evaluation report on July 13,
2009. Id. at 8, ¶ 19.
On July 20, 2009, A.S.’s parents filed a due process complaint against DCPS, and a
resolution meeting was held on July 27, 2009. DCPS agreed to conduct additional assessments
before discussing any changes in programming and placement. DCPS sent an invitation to
convene an MDT/IEP team meeting on or about July 22, 2009, but A.S.’s parents declined the
meeting. On or about August 10, 2009, A.S.’s parents wrote to the charter school and DCPS
informing them that A.S. would attend Kingsbury during the 2009-2010 school year, and
notifying DCPS of their intent to seek public funding for this placement. A.S.’s parents
responded to subsequent invitations to convene an MDT/IEP team meeting by informing the
charter school and DCPS that they wished to wait for the completion of all evaluations before
returning to such a meeting. Id., ¶¶ 20-22.
On or about September 2, 2009, A.S. began attending Kingsbury. Id. at 9, ¶ 25. The team
reconvened on or about November 16, 2009 to discuss A.S.’s speech and language evaluation;
the IEP team ultimately decided that A.S. did not require speech and language services. A.S.’s
parents did not agree with the outcome of that meeting. Id. at 9-10, ¶ 29.
On December 9, 2009, the team reconvened to finalize the IEP. As a result of that
meeting, the team developed a revised IEP; however, the team did not discuss school placement
options or propose a specific school placement for A.S.’s parents to consider. Instead, a DCPS
representative informed A.S.’s parents that A.S.’s IEP would be sent to a DCPS “cluster
supervisor” for a determination of placement. A.S.’s parents’ request to participate in the
placement discussion was rejected. In fact, the individuals who met to discuss A.S.’s school
3
placement subsequent to the December IEP meeting, including the Compliance Case Manager
and a DCPS “cluster supervisor,” had no personal knowledge of A.S., and had never observed
him. A.S.’s parents were unable to participate in the decisions concerning A.S.’s placement, and
they did not receive a finalized copy of the IEP for several weeks following the December 2009
meeting. Id. at 10-11, ¶¶ 30-36.
In March 2010, A.S.’s parents, after visiting the school placement that had been proposed
by DCPS, concluded that the program was not appropriate. A.S. would have been the only fifth-
grade student in a classroom of older students, and he would have received only fifteen hours per
week of specialized instruction, whereas A.S.’s IEP recommended nineteen hours. Id. at 12-13,
¶¶ 37-39.
On April 29, 2010, A.S.’s parents filed an administrative appeal on his behalf. Pltfs’ SOF
¶ 2. On May 11, 2010, the parties engaged in an unsuccessful dispute resolution meeting. A Due
Process Hearing was held before Hearing Officer Bruce Ryan. The hearing took place in four
sessions: June 17, 18, and 30, and July 2, 2010. There was testimony from three witnesses for
petitioner and seven witnesses for DCPS. H.O. Det. at 2.
At the hearing, plaintiffs claimed DCPS denied a Free and Appropriate Public Education
(hereinafter “FAPE”) to A.S. by failing to evaluate him, by failing to provide an appropriate IEP
in February 2009, by failing to propose an appropriate placement in February 2009, by failing to
find him eligible for speech and language services, by proposing an “inappropriate level of
service” and an inappropriate placement proposal following the December 2009 IEP meeting,
and by committing various procedural violations. As relief for the alleged denials of FAPE,
plaintiffs sought reimbursement for the costs of attending Kingsbury for the 2009-10 school year
and prospective placement at Kingsbury. Id. at 3-4. On July 19, 2010, Hearing Officer Ryan
4
issued his written determination.
The Hearing Officer determined that plaintiffs failed to show a denial of FAPE on the
basis of a failure to evaluate A.S., a failure to propose an appropriate placement in February
2009, or a denial of speech and language services. The hearing officer found that plaintiffs did
show a denial of FAPE in part based on the lack of appropriateness of the February 2009 IEP, as
well as for certain procedural violations and based on the inappropriate December 2009 IEP and
inappropriate placement proposal. Id. at 14. As to the relief requested, Hearing Officer Ryan
granted retroactive reimbursement for the latter half of the 2009-10 school year at Kingsbury, but
denied it for the first half. He determined that, prior to the 2009-10 school year, A.S.’s parents
had specifically requested that the parties wait for completion of all further evaluations before
returning to an IEP meeting; in the meantime, however, A.S. was already enrolled at Kingsbury.
Furthermore, Hearing Officer Ryan found that evidence suggested that A.S.’s parents may have
predetermined [A.S.’s] placement at Kingsbury as early as February 2009, long before the
evaluations were completed. The Hearing Officer agreed with DCPS that “such predetermined
course of action” was “unreasonable under the circumstances and acted to deprive DCPS of a fair
opportunity to evaluate” A.S. Id. at 26-27.
As for prospective placement, the Hearing Officer concluded that plaintiffs had not
demonstrated in the hearing “that a full-time, out of general education placement at the Private
School, going forward, is necessary and appropriately tailored to meet the specific needs of the
Student.” He also determined that “relative equities” suggested that DCPS should have a further
opportunity to convene an IEP team meeting, including A.S.’s parents, to discuss an appropriate
placement for the 2010-11 school year. However, in the event that DCPS did not complete the
process prior to the beginning of the next school year, DCPS would be obligated to fund A.S.’s
5
attendance at Kingsbury until his educational placement changed. Id. at 27-28.3
On July 27, 2010, plaintiffs sent a letter and supporting documentation to DCPS
requesting $62,486.07 for attorneys’ fees and costs sustained during the administrative action.
Pltfs’ SOF at ¶ 7. DCPS responded on August 24, 2010 by authorizing a check for
reimbursement for attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $12,776.85. Id. at ¶ 8.
B. Procedural History
On September 30, 2010, plaintiffs filed their Complaint [dkt. #1], which alleged that
DCPS had not reimbursed any of the attorneys’ fees and costs to which plaintiffs were entitled.
Complaint ¶ 11. On October 7, 2010, plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint [dkt. #3], which
supplemented the claims with the information that DCPS had issued a check for reimbursement
on September 30, 2010, in the amount of $12,776.85; however, plaintiffs claimed, a balance of
$49,709.22 remained. Amended Complaint ¶ 11.4 On July 13, 2011, plaintiffs filed their motion
for summary judgment.5
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Section 1415(i)(3)(B) of the IDEA, federal district courts have the authority to
“award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs to a prevailing party who is the parent of a
child with a disability.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(I). The court must initially determine whether
3
An IEP meeting was convened prior to the 2010-11 school year; A.S. was formally placed at Kingsbury as a result
of the meeting. Mot. for SJ at 8 n.3. That determination has no bearing on this court’s decision.
4
On November 16, 2010, then-defendant Adrian Fenty filed a Motion to Dismiss [dkt. #4]. Judge W alton granted
the motion, to which plaintiffs filed no opposition, on April 27, 2011. Order [dkt. #7].
5
On September 7, 2011, the same day plaintiffs filed their reply brief [dkt. #15] (hereinafter “Reply”), defendant
filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority [dkt. #16], drawing the court’s attention to two recent cases. As plaintiffs
note in their reply to the Notice [dkt. #17], the document appears to be more a supplemental memorandum of law
than a “notice.” Id. at 1-2. Defendant did not request permission to file a surreply, which is what this document
appears to be. W hile the court may address the cases noted by defendant, it will not consider the parties’ arguments
in the Notice and reply in its decision.
6
the party seeking attorney’s fees is the prevailing party. Jackson v. District of Columbia, 696 F.
Supp. 2d 97, 101 (D.D.C. 2010).6 If a party has prevailed to some degree, it is eligible for
attorneys’ fees; however, the court may determine that a reduction in fees is appropriate if a party
is only partially successful. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983).
Once the court has made its determination as to whether a party has prevailed and the
extent to which it has prevailed, it must determine whether the attorneys’ fees being sought are
reasonable. Jackson, 696 F. Supp. at 101. “The most useful starting point for determining the
amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation
multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.
A plaintiff bears the burden of showing that both the number of hours expended on
particular tasks and the hourly rate are reasonable. Bucher v. District of Columbia, 777 F. Supp.
2d 69, 73 (D.D.C. 2011). In demonstrating the reasonableness of the hours spent on particular
tasks, the plaintiff may satisfy its burden “by submitting an invoice that is sufficiently detailed to
permit the District Court to make an independent determination whether or not the hours claimed
are justified.” Bucher, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 73 (quoting Holbrook v. District of Columbia, 305 F.
Supp. 2d 41, 45 (D.D.C. 2004) (internal citations omitted)). In establishing that the hourly rate is
reasonable, plaintiffs must submit evidence concerning the attorneys’ skill, experience, and
reputation; the attorneys’ billing rates in similar cases; and the prevailing market rates in the
relevant community. Jackson, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 101; see also Covington v. District of
Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
6
As set forth supra at footnote 1, there is no issue as to whether plaintiffs prevailed at all, rendering them eligible for
attorneys’ fees. The issue in this case is the degree to which plaintiffs were successful.
7
III. ANALYSIS
A. Extent of plaintiffs’ success
While defendant does not dispute that plaintiff prevailed in part, defendant argues that
plaintiffs’ full fee request is not reasonable based on the limited number of issues on which
plaintiff prevailed. Def.’s Opp. at 1. Defendants allege that the administrative litigation
concerned six “claims,” of which plaintiffs prevailed on fewer than half. Id. at 6-7. Plaintiffs
argue that they achieved “substantial success” with their lawsuit, to the extent that they are
entitled to full payment of attorneys’ fees. Mot. for SJ at 6. As to those issues for which the
Hearing Officer did not find for the plaintiffs, plaintiffs allege that the fees should be awarded in
full because the issues presented at the hearing are interconnected such that hours worked on
different issues cannot be segregated from one another. Id. at 8.
The court rejects plaintiffs’ argument that, because the issues in this case are
interconnected, that entitles them to an attorneys’ fee award for all of the hours reasonably spent
on the litigation as a whole.
The case governing awards of attorneys’ fees to partially successful plaintiffs is Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983). The Supreme Court acknowledged in Hensley that, if a
plaintiff has achieved only partial success, “the product of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive amount.” Id. at 436.
“There is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations.” Id. A court “may attempt
to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account
for the limited success.” Id. at 436-37. That is, if a plaintiff prevails on interconnected claims,
“did the plaintiff achieve a level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a
satisfactory basis for making a fee award?” Id. at 434. The court “should focus on the
8
significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably
expended on litigation.” Id. Therefore, it is the degree of the plaintiff’s success that is the critical
factor to the determination of the size of a reasonable fee. Texas State Teachers Assoc. v.
Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 876 (1989).
The court finds that plaintiffs were not “substantially successful” to an extent that would
justify attorneys’ fees equal to the “product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a
whole times a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436. The relief plaintiffs requested
was for retroactive payment of the tuition at Kingsbury for the 2009-10 school year, and
prospective payment of tuition at Kingsbury for the forthcoming school year; plaintiffs succeeded
only in obtaining tuition for the latter half of the 2009-10 school year. Thus, it appears to the
court that plaintiffs attained only half of the relief they sought. Therefore, this court will impose
a reduction of 50 percent on the final award of attorneys’ fees.
B. Hours expended
Defendant objects to plaintiffs’ claims for fees that it argues are “too remote in time or
unrelated to the proceeding.” Def.’s Opp. at 15. Plaintiffs filed their due process complaint on
April 29, 2010, but billing records date back as far as January 29, 2009. Mot. for SJ, Exh. B. at 2.
Defendant argues that actions dating back that far are not directly related to the administrative
proceeding, and the charges should be denied. Def.’s Opp. at 16.
Having reviewed plaintiffs’ claimed charges, the court finds that there are two issues that
need to be considered: whether certain charges are available under the statute, and whether the
remaining charges are too remote from the hearing.
1. Charges related to IEP meetings
While attorneys’ fees are available under Section 1415(i)(3)(B) of the IDEA, Section
9
1415(i)(3)(D) places prohibitions on recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs for certain services. 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D). Relevant to this case is Section 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii), which disallows fees
“relating to any meeting of the IEP Team unless such meeting is convened as a result of an
administrative proceeding or judicial action.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii).
Plaintiffs’ billing includes charges which are clearly related to IEP meetings that took
place in 2009. One charge is for the work of Corey Craun on October 14, 2009, for thirty
minutes. Mot. for SJ, Exh. B at 1. A charge by Paula Rosenstock on July 27, 2009, charges one
hour to “Pre-hearing conference, follow up scheduling, draft letter to school system re:
upcoming IEP meeting.” Id., Exh. B at 6. On November 16, 2009, Ms. Rosenstock charged six
hours for “IEP meeting, travel;” on December 9, 2009, she charged five hours to “Attend IEP
meeting, travel.” Id., Exh. B at 8. All of these charges will be disallowed.
After adding together the total charges related to IEP meetings, the court has determined
that a reduction of one-half hour of Mr. Craun’s time and 12 hours of Ms. Rosenstock’s time is
appropriate in light of the statutory prohibition.
2. Whether certain charges are too remote in time
Where it is alleged that services were performed too remote in time to be eligible for
reimbursement, plaintiffs’ counsel must provide sufficient explanation to tie the charges to the
eventual administrative hearing. Czarniewy v. District of Columbia, Case No. 02-CV-1496, U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5161, at *12 (D.D.C. Mar. 25, 2005).
Having reviewed plaintiffs’ billing records, minus the charges related to IEP meetings
discussed above, the court is satisfied that the charges are related to the resulting due process
hearing. As noted in Lax, given sufficient documentation a year or more is “an entirely
reasonable window of time to be engaging in productive work that will result in a favorable
10
administrative decision.” Lax v. District of Columbia, Case No. 04-CV-1940, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 46888, at *17 (D.D.C. July 12, 2006) (citation omitted). The plaintiffs have submitted an
invoice that is sufficiently detailed to permit this court to determine that the hours claimed were
related to the administrative hearing. It is clear that plaintiffs’ counsel were building their case
concerning A.S. for some time prior to the due process hearing, particularly considering
plaintiffs’ early dissatisfaction with the decisions made by DCPS with regard to A.S. The court
will not disallow any charges on the basis of their being “remote in time.”
C. Hourly rates
1. The Laffey Matrix is appropriate
Plaintiffs seek fees for counsel Michael Eig at an hourly rate of $425; they seek fees for
counsel Paula Rosenstock at an hourly rate of $325. Mot. for SJ, Exh. B [dkt. #11-4] at 3-11.
Plaintiffs rely on the fact that these rates are consistent with (and, in some cases, below) the rates
in the Laffey Matrix, as updated and maintained by the Civil Division of the United States
Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 746 F.2d 4, 12-14
(D.D.C. 1994).7 The Matrix “sets out compensable billing rates for attorneys in the District of
Columbia and has been adopted by the judges of this District in many cases.” Bucher, 777 F.
Supp. 2d at 74.
Defendant objects that Laffey is inappropriate in IDEA cases, because the Laffey Matrix
represents prevailing attorneys’ hourly rates for complex federal litigation. Defendant argues that
plaintiffs must offer greater justification for claiming the Laffey rates, noting that, “when IDEA
hearings are uncomplicated, courts have held the Matrix inapplicable.” Def.’s Opp. at 13 (citing
Agapito v. District of Columbia, 525 F. Supp. 2d 150, 152 (D.D.C. 2007)). Instead, defendant
7
The current Laffey Matrix may be viewed at http://www.justice.gov/usao/dc/divisions/civil.html (last visited Jan.
30, 2012).
11
claims, the appropriate measure for Plaintiffs’ counsel’s hourly rate for IDEA litigation is the rate
established by DCPS Attorney Fee Guidelines.
The cases have been mixed on this issue. This court finds that the determination must be
made in a case by case analysis. The cases that apply DCPS rates tend to involve uncomplicated
proceedings. In McClam v. District of Columbia, Case. No. 11-CV-381, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
99518 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2011), the court determined that “the type of straightforward preparation
ordinarily required for an IDEA due process hearing” did not merit reimbursement at the Laffey
level. Id., at *9. However, not all IDEA administrative hearings are uncomplicated. In Bucher v.
District of Columbia, Judge Kessler applied the Laffey Matrix and distinguished Agapito from
the case before her, where the hearing “lasted twenty-seven hours over four days,” and where the
“Hearing Officer considered forty-two proposed exhibits.” Bucher, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 74.
The case before this court was not “uncomplicated.” Like Bucher, the hearing took place
over four days, involved 105 proposed exhibits, and the testimony of ten witnesses (seven of
whom were offered by DCPS). H.O. Det. at 2. The Hearing Officer’s Determination itself is
twenty-eight pages long. This was not a “straightforward” due process hearing, but clearly
involved complex issues concerning A.S.’s disability and placement. Therefore, the court finds
that using the Laffey Matrix is appropriate.
2. Inadequately supported billing rates
In their Opposition, defendant points out that plaintiffs failed to provide any supporting
documentation for four of the individuals who appear in their billing records: Corey Craun,
Janene Jackson, Anjali Prakash, and Megan Gorzynski. Defendant argues that the court “cannot
properly conclude that any rate is proper for these individuals.” Def.’s Opp. at 8-9 (emphasis in
original). Plaintiffs fail to respond to the argument concerning these individuals in their reply.
12
As defendant notes, case law demonstrates that, in cases where plaintiffs fail to provide
any information regarding the level of experience or education of paralegals, the court reduces
the rate by twenty-five percent. Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 970 (D.C.Cir.
2004). Furthermore, where plaintiffs fail to provide any information regarding the level of
experience, reputation, or education of an attorney, this court has reduced that rate to the lowest
level—that of a paralegal or law clerk—and then further reduced the rate by twenty-five percent.
Jackson, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 105.
Plaintiffs’ billing statements show that the billing rate for Craun, Gorzynski, and Jackson
was $180 per hour. Mot. for SJ, Exh. B at 1-3. As for Prakash, her billing rate was $325 per
hour, and her name appeared on the letterhead, so she was undoubtedly an attorney. Given the
complete lack of supporting documentation for her background, it is appropriate to assign the
lowest billing rate to her work.
Turning to the Laffey Matrix, the rate for paralegals and law clerks was $130 per hour
from June 1, 2008 to May 31, 2010,8 and $135 per hour from June 1, 2010 to May 31, 2011.
Laffey Matrix, 2003-2012, http://www.justice.gov/usao/dc/divisions/civil.html (last visited Jan.
30, 2012). A twenty-five percent reduction in these rates results in a rate of $97.50 per hour
during the earlier period, and $101.25 per hour during the later period. While this reduction may
seem drastic, the court reminds plaintiffs that they had the burden of substantiating all charges,
and they failed to meet that burden. The court will adjust the fees accordingly.
D. Costs
Defendant argues that a reduction in the costs requested by plaintiffs is appropriate. First,
defendant claims that charges remote in time from the filing of the due process claim should be
8
The rates did not change from the 2008-2009 matrix to the 2009-2010 Matrix.
13
disallowed. Def.’s Opp. at 17. In addition, defendant argues that charges for faxing and
overnighting services should be disallowed, “pursuant to DCPS’ guidelines.” Id. Finally,
defendant reduced plaintiffs’ photocopying costs from $0.35 to $0.15 per page, without further
explanation. Id.
This court has rejected defendant’s arguments as to the remoteness in time of certain
charges as to attorneys’s fees, and it will reject them on the basis of costs. Likewise, the court
will reject defendant’s use of DCPS’ guidelines, as this court has declined to adopt those
guidelines. As defendant offers no explanation for the reduction in photocopying costs, the court
will not consider the reduction. However, the court will reduce costs by 50 percent, in line with
the reduction made to attorneys’ fees based on plaintiffs’ level of success.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is, hereby,
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part.
The court will discount plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees for the following: (1) unsupported fees
for Corey Craun, Janene Jackson, Anjali Prakash, and Megan Gorzynski; and (2) fees charged in
connection with preparing for or attending IEP meetings. The court will also make an overall
percentage reduction to fees and costs based on the degree to which plaintiffs were not successful
in their claims for relief. The total fee award and deductions break down as follows:
ATTORNEY/PARALEGAL Total Billed Total Awarded
Anjali Prakash $1,495.00 $448.50
Corey Craun $3,060.00 $1,635.00
Janene Jackson $36.00 $19.50
Megan Gorzynski $432.00 $235.50
Michael Eig $6,417.50 $6,417.50
Paula Rosenstock $48,815.00 $44,915.00
14
COSTS $2,230.57 $2,230.57
SUBTOTAL $62,486.07 $55,901.57
50% REDUCTION -$27,950.79
DCPS Payment -$12,776.85
TOTAL AWARD $15,173.94
It is further, hereby,
ORDERED that defendant shall pay the sum of $15,173.94 no later than sixty (60) days
from the issuance of this Order.
SO ORDERED.
February 1, 2012
BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
15