13‐1398‐cv
Pierre v. Chase Investment Services Corp.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER
JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER
THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
Square, in the City of New York, on the 3rd day of April, two thousand fourteen.
PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges,
RICHARD K. EATON,
Judge.*
______________________
GERTRUDE JEAN PIERRE,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
‐v.‐ No. 13‐1398‐cv
CHASE INVESTMENT SERVICES
CORPORATION,
Defendant‐Appellee,
*
The Honorable Judge Richard K. Eaton, of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
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FOR APPELLANT: Stewart Lee Karlin, Law Offices of Stewart Lee Karlin,
P.C., New York, NY.
FOR APPELLEE: Frederic L. Lieberman, JPMorgan Chase Legal
Department, New York, NY.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Shira A. Scheindlin, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff Gertrude Jean Pierre appeals from a February 25, 2013 Opinion
and Order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York (Shira A. Scheindlin, Judge) granting Defendant Chase Investment Services
Corporation’s motion to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement. The
settlement agreement dismissed Plaintiff’s employment discrimination action
against Defendant, brought pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the district court’s order, and argues that the district
court erred in granting Defendant’s motion to enforce the settlement agreed
upon by both parties in open court. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues for review.1
1
The district court’s approval of the settlement agreement is reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re September 11
Property Damage Litig., 650 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2011).
2
It is well established that oral settlement agreements entered into by
parties on the record in open court are valid and enforceable. See Powell v.
Omnicom, 497 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2007); Ciaramella v. Readerʹs Digest Assʹn, Inc.,
131 F.3d 320, 326 (2d Cir. 1997). Announcing the terms of a settlement agreement
on the record in open court memorializes critical litigation events, and serves a
“cautionary function” ensuring the parties’ acceptance is deliberate. Powell, 497
F.3d at 131. A mere intention to later commit an oral agreement to writing has
no effect on the validity of the contract, even when the agreement is never
reduced to writing. Winston v. Mediafare Entm’t Corp., 777 F.2d 78, 80 (2d Cir.
1985).
Everything in the record below and briefs before us indicates that the
settlement was agreed to in open court on July 16, 2012 before Magistrate Judge
James L. Cott in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, and is therefore valid and enforceable. The fact that Plaintiff had a change
of heart between the time the oral agreement was made and when it was reduced
to writing has no effect on the validity of the oral settlement. See Powell, 497 F.3d
at 129. We need not reconsider the remaining Winston factors addressed by the
3
district court, as there was no abuse of discretion. Similarly, Plaintiff’s argument
that she was fraudulently induced into entering the oral settlement is unavailing.
We have considered all of Plaintiff’s remaining arguments and find them
to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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