UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1787
LUIS ALONSO DIAZ-MEJIA, a/k/a Luis Alonso Diaz,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: January 23, 2014 Decided: April 3, 2014
Before KING, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Hugo Cesar Castro, Rockville, Maryland, for Petitioner. Stuart
F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Blair T. O’Connor,
Assistant Director, John B. Holt, Office of Immigration
Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,
D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Luis Alonso Diaz-Mejia, a native and citizen of El
Salvador, petitions for review of an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“Board”) sustaining the Department of
Homeland Security’s appeal from the immigration judge’s grant of
Diaz-Mejia’s application for withholding of removal. 1 For the
reasons set forth below, we deny the petition for review.
“Withholding of removal is available under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3) if the alien shows that it is more likely than not
that h[is] life or freedom would be threatened in the country of
removal because of h[is] race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Gomis v.
Holder, 571 F.3d 353, 359 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted);
see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2012). An alien “must show a ‘clear
probability of persecution’ on account of a protected ground.”
Djadjou v. Holder, 662 F.3d 265, 272 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting
1
We dismissed Diaz-Mejia’s initial petition for review for
lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the Board’s order was
not a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (2012).
See Diaz-Mejia v. Holder, No. 12-2198 (4th Cir. Jan. 2, 2013)
(unpublished order). On remand, the immigration judge granted
voluntary departure, and Diaz-Mejia did not seek any further
relief. Because the issues stemming from the Board’s 2012 order
have now been fully exhausted and Diaz-Mejia timely filed for
review within thirty days of the immigration judge’s final
administrative decision, see Chupina v. Holder, 570 F.3d 99, 105
(2d Cir. 2009), we now have jurisdiction over Diaz-Mejia’s
challenges to the Board’s denial of his request for withholding
of removal.
2
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984)). “This is a more
stringent standard than that for asylum. . . . [and], while
asylum is discretionary, if an alien establishes eligibility for
withholding of removal, the grant is mandatory.” Gandziami-
Mickhou v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 351, 353-54 (4th Cir. 2006)
(citations omitted).
We afford “a high degree of deference” to a
determination that an alien is not eligible for withholding of
removal, and review administrative findings of fact under the
substantial evidence standard. Gomis, 571 F.3d at 359. Under
the substantial evidence test, affirmance is mandated “if the
evidence is not ‘so compelling that no reasonable factfinder
could’ agree with the [Board]’s factual conclusions.”
Gandziami-Mickhou, 445 F.3d at 354 (quoting Huaman-Cornelio v.
Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 979 F.2d 995, 999 (4th Cir. 1992)).
The Board reviews the immigration judge’s factual
findings for clear error and the legal conclusions de novo. See
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i), (iv) (2013). Factual findings
include what happened to the individual, Massis v. Mukasey, 549
F.3d 631, 636 n.6 (4th Cir. 2008), determinations regarding an
oppressor’s motivation, intentions and opinions, Crespin-
Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 127-28 (4th Cir. 2011), and
the likelihood of future mistreatment. See Turkson v. Holder,
667 F.3d 523, 529 (4th Cir. 2012).
3
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that
the Board correctly reviewed the immigration judge’s factual
findings for clear error and that substantial evidence supports
its conclusion that the judge clearly erred in finding that
Diaz-Mejia was targeted by the gangs in El Salvador on account
of his membership in the particular social group of his family.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012) (providing that an asylum
applicant must establish that the protected ground asserted “was
or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the
applicant”); Quinteros-Mendoza v. Holder, 556 F.3d 159, 164-65
(4th Cir. 2009) (finding that money and personal animosity, not
religion or political opinion, motivated initial assaults on
alien and concluding that alien “provided no evidence that his
religious or political beliefs were more than incidental or
tangential to any part of the persecution he suffered”).
We therefore deny the petition for review for the
reasons stated by the Board. See In re: Diaz-Mejia (B.I.A. Aug.
31, 2012). 2 We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
2
Diaz-Mejia also argues that the agency erred in failing to
address four additional proposed particular social groups in
assessing his claim for withholding of removal. We lack
jurisdiction over this issue on the ground that Diaz-Mejia
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before the agency.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (2012); Massis v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d
631, 638-40 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d
314, 322 (5th Cir. 2009).
4
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
PETITION DENIED
5