Kolon Industries Incorporated v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Company

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1587

KOLON INDUSTRIES INCORPORATED,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS & COMPANY,

Defendant – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:11-cv-00622-REP)

Argued: May 17, 2013 Decided: April 3, 2014

Before SHEDD and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in
which Senior Judge Davis joined. Judge Shedd wrote a dissenting
opinion.

ARGUED: Stephen Blake Kinnaird, PAUL HASTINGS LLP, Washington,
D.C., for Appellant. Kent A. Gardiner, CROWELL & MORING, LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Daniel B. Goldman,
PAUL HASTINGS LLP, New York, New York; Jeff G. Randall, Igor V.
Timofeyev, Samer M. Musallam, PAUL HASTINGS LLP, Washington,
D.C., for Appellant. David D. Cross, Jeffrey L. Poston, CROWELL
& MORING, LLP, Washington, D.C.; Adam H. Charnes, KILPATRICK
TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
DIAZ, Circuit Judge:

In this Sherman Act case, we review the district court’s

grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee E.I. du

Pont de Nemours and Company (“DuPont”). We also consider

challenges by Plaintiff-Appellant Kolon Industries Incorporated

(“Kolon”) to certain of the district court’s discovery rulings

and its denial of Kolon’s recusal motion. Finding no reversible

error, we affirm.

I.

A.

The merits of this case concern Kolon’s claim that DuPont

attempted to wield, or did wield, monopoly power over the U.S.

para-aramid fiber market in violation of Section 2 of the

Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. 1 Para-aramid is a strong, complex

synthetic fiber used in body armor, tires, fiber optic cables,

and a variety of other industrial products. Three para-aramid

producers--DuPont, Teijin Aramid (formerly a division of the

1
We recite the relevant facts in the light most favorable
to Kolon. In so doing, we have done our best to honor the
parties’ oft-overzealous desires to keep certain purportedly
sensitive information under seal. However, to the extent the
district court has already disclosed (without objection) such
information, we treat it as public knowledge.

2
Dutch company Akzo N.V.), and Kolon--sell their para-aramid

fibers to U.S. consumers.

DuPont invented para-aramid fiber in 1965, and for a period

controlled the entire U.S. para-aramid market with its Kevlar©

fiber. Teijin introduced its competing Twaron© fiber to the

U.S. market in 1987 and has chipped away at DuPont’s share of

that market every year since 1990. According to one of Kolon’s

expert witnesses, during 2006-2009 (the relevant time period),

DuPont’s share of the U.S. para-aramid market (the relevant

geographic and product markets) fell from a high of 59% in 2006

to 55% in 2009, with most of this loss going to Teijin.

The U.S. para-aramid market is highly concentrated between

Dupont and Teijin, which together account for 99% of U.S. sales.

This extreme market concentration owes at least in part to the

industry’s high entry barriers. As Kolon showed, para-aramid

production is time-intensive and expensive, and potential

customers test and “qualify” each para-aramid product to ensure

it meets their particular needs, a process that typically takes

six months to three years. In addition to this evidence of

market concentration and high barriers to entry, Kolon adduced

evidence that DuPont, despite Teijin’s encroachment, earned

profit margins of as high as 75% between 1997 and 2005 and had

the ability to price discriminate among its customers.

3
 Kolon made its foray into the U.S. para-aramid market in

2005 with its Heracron© fiber. Kolon’s evidence showed that

DuPont considered Kolon’s market entry to be a threat.

Anticipating Kolon’s potential encroachment, DuPont began

identifying segments of the market that it viewed as hospitable

to entry, including auto short fibers (pulp for brakes and

gaskets), tires, manufactured rubber goods, and fiber optic

cables. According to Kolon, DuPont then undertook a strategy of

executing multi-year supply agreements with high-volume

customers in each identified segment, requiring these customers

to purchase most or all of their para-aramid requirements from

DuPont during the relevant time period.

These supply contracts contained restrictions, such as

volume purchase commitments and “meet and release” clauses, that

required any competing para-aramid seller to propose a bid at a

designated lower amount than DuPont’s existing price, prohibited

the customer from informing the competing seller of DuPont’s

price, and gave DuPont a right to match any competing offer. As

a result of these allegedly anticompetitive practices, Kolon

insists, it never achieved more than a de minimis market share

during the relevant time period. By contrast, Kolon was able to

penetrate other comparable para-aramid markets, such as Europe.

DuPont, for its part, attributes Kolon’s failure to

penetrate the U.S. market to Kolon’s own shortcomings.

4
According to DuPont, Kolon undertook only a “feeble effort” to

establish a U.S. foothold, using only seven sales agents,

inadequately investing in product offerings and supply capacity,

and contacting only a small percentage of potential customers as

of October 2009. Meanwhile, DuPont defends its supply

agreements as a competitive response to Teijin’s use of such

practices, and as driven by consumer demands.

DuPont also attempts to diminish the reach of its supply

agreements, noting that it entered into only twenty-five

agreements with twenty-one U.S. customers, collectively

accounting for only a small percentage of its U.S. revenue. Of

those agreements, DuPont says, only a portion obligated the

customer to purchase some amount of Kevlar, and these had

typical durations of two years or shorter. Meanwhile, none of

DuPont’s supply agreements precluded competitors from qualifying

their products with the customer while the DuPont agreement was

in effect. And of the group of “key” customers Kolon identified

as necessary to establish a foothold for effective competition,

DuPont notes that the majority had no supply agreement with

DuPont during the relevant period. Appellee’s Br. at 38. In

short, DuPont submits that myriad self-inflicted failures--not

DuPont’s supply agreements--frustrated Kolon’s U.S. market

penetration.

5
 B.

DuPont brought suit against Kolon alleging the theft and

misappropriation of its Kevlar trade secrets (the “trade secrets

case”). Kolon’s answer included the instant counterclaim (the

“antitrust case”), alleging that DuPont had illegally

monopolized and attempted to monopolize the U.S. para-aramid

market through its supply agreements with high-volume para-

aramid customers. DuPont moved, under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss Kolon’s counterclaim. The

district court granted that motion, with leave to amend. Kolon

filed an amended counterclaim, followed by a second amended

counterclaim, which was also dismissed for failure to state a

claim, again with leave to amend. Kolon declined to further

amend the counterclaim, opting instead to appeal the dismissal.

We reversed, holding that Kolon had adequately pleaded both its

actual and attempted monopoly claims, and remanded the matter to

the district court for further proceedings. E.I. du Pont de

Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc. (DuPont I), 637 F.3d 435

(4th Cir. 2011).

On remand, the district court tried the trade secrets claim

separately, culminating in a $919.9 million jury verdict for

DuPont on September 14, 2011. The court then formally severed

the two claims. The court also issued several rulings adverse

to Kolon in the antitrust case. First, the district court

6
denied Kolon’s motions to compel DuPont’s production of

transaction-level sales and cost data, concluding that this

discovery would significantly burden DuPont and would not be any

more useful than the aggregate sales and cost data DuPont had

already produced. The district court also denied Kolon’s

motions--filed on grounds described below--for recusal and

disqualification in both the antitrust and trade secrets cases.

The district court further denied Kolon’s request to depose a

DuPont corporate representative concerning its strategic use of

supply agreements. Finally, the district court granted summary

judgment to DuPont on both Sherman Act claims, dismissing them

with prejudice. Kolon timely noted this appeal.

II.

Before turning to the merits of the antitrust claims, we

first consider Kolon’s argument that the district court judge

was required to recuse himself in both the instant antitrust

case and the trade secrets case, which is also now before us on

appeal. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus.,

Inc., No. 12-1260 (argued May 17, 2013).

A.

Kolon’s recusal motion is based on the district court

judge’s involvement, while in private practice, in litigation

that, according to Kolon, presents a matter in controversy in

7
the instant dispute. In the 1980s, DuPont and Akzo N.V.,

Teijin’s predecessor, became embroiled in several patent

lawsuits relating to the manufacture and sale of para-aramid

fibers. In one such dispute, Akzo sued DuPont in the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for

infringement of an Akzo para-aramid patent.

In the Akzo case, DuPont was defended by the law firms

Fitzpatrick, Cella, Harper & Scinto (“Fitzpatrick Cella”) and

McGuire Woods & Battle (now “McGuireWoods”). In the 1980s and

at the time of the Akzo case, the district court judge was a

partner at McGuireWoods. As a result, he was a limited partner

in an affiliated entity, and continued to receive small payments

from McGuireWoods of rent for furnishings. Because McGuireWoods

also served as counsel to DuPont in the present litigation, in

May 2009 the clerk of court issued a notice informing the

parties of the judge’s related financial interest. The judge

noted then that he did not believe grounds for disqualification

existed, but he instructed the parties to file a motion within

20 days if they believed otherwise. Neither party filed a

motion or otherwise objected to the judge’s continued

participation in the case.

Kolon believed the Akzo matter was central to both its

defense of the trade secrets case and its maintenance of the

antitrust case. In the antitrust case, Kolon began seeking

8
discovery of the Akzo case files in August 2009. It contended

that the Akzo litigation--which also included a counterclaim

filed by DuPont, and which was ultimately resolved pursuant to a

settlement that restricted Akzo’s exports to the United States--

was relevant evidence of DuPont’s anticompetitive practices and

its intent to monopolize the U.S. para-aramid market.

In the trade secrets case, beginning in April 2010, Kolon

conducted extensive discovery into the Akzo litigation on the

theory that DuPont’s asserted trade secrets had been revealed in

the course of that litigation and therefore were no longer

secret. In August 2010, the district court ordered

McGuireWoods, DuPont, and Fitzpatrick Cella to review the Akzo

case files and to produce responsive documents. Later that

month, DuPont produced approximately thirty boxes of documents,

along with a privilege log, from Fitzpatrick Cella’s files.

One of the entries on the privilege log showed that in May

1985, Mr. Fitzpatrick of Fitzpatrick Cella had sent the district

court judge, then a partner at McGuireWoods, a letter confirming

a telephone conversation in which Fitzpatrick had asked the

judge to send him a facsimile of the complaint filed by Akzo.

The privilege log also indicated that, per Mr. Fitzpatrick’s

request, the judge had faxed him a copy of the complaint.

Nearly a year later, on July 20, 2011, Kolon filed a

memorandum opposing one of DuPont’s proposed jury instructions

9
in the trade secrets case. In that memorandum, Kolon stated

that it was “compelled to point out that there is some question

whether Your Honor should be adjudicating these matters [due to

DuPont’s production of documents] indicating a role by Your

Honor in the earliest stage of the Akzo litigation.” Kolon

Indus., Inc. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 846 F. Supp. 2d

515, 519 (E.D. Va. 2012) (quoting 3:09-cv-58, Docket No. 1247)

(emphasis omitted). In a subsequent telephone conference with

the court, Kolon’s counsel explained that the source of its

concern was the May 1985 letter from Mr. Fitzpatrick to the

district court judge.

The district court judge then ordered DuPont to produce any

documents concerning his involvement in the Akzo litigation,

which ultimately comprised only the two documents described

above: the May 1985 letter from Mr. Fitzpatrick to the judge

requesting a copy of the Akzo Complaint, and the judge’s

responsive facsimile cover sheet, with the Complaint attached.

Following further inquiry into the matter, Kolon’s counsel

represented that they had reviewed all the non-privileged

documents from the Fitzpatrick Cella files and that none of

those documents contained the judge’s name; DuPont’s counsel

made similar representations with respect to the files’

privileged documents.

10
 After reviewing the two relevant documents, the district

court judge determined that he had no recollection of the

communication with Fitzpatrick or of any involvement in the Akzo

litigation. Kolon said nothing more then about the issue.

During these inquiries, the trade secrets trial began as

scheduled, and the jury returned a $920 million dollar verdict

for DuPont after a seven-week trial. Meanwhile, discovery in

the antitrust case was underway following our March 2011

reversal of the district court’s initial dismissal. As in the

trade secrets case, the parties came to a head over Kolon’s

proposed discovery of the Akzo litigation files, and in

September and October of 2011 filed reciprocal motions

respectively seeking to compel and protect that information.

Then, on November 30, 2011, two months after the jury

verdict in the trade secrets case, and two days before motions

for summary judgment were due in the antitrust case, Kolon filed

its recusal motion, which the district court denied. 2

2
In its motion and supporting memorandum, Kolon also
suggested that the district court “revisit its refusal to
recuse” from the trade secrets case, apparently referring to the
discussion of recusal in July. Docket No. 247, at 2; Docket No.
248, at 31. Kolon filed no separate motion for recusal in the
trade secrets case at that time, but did briefly reference
recusal in several subsequent filings. On December 9, 2011,
Kolon filed a reply in support of its motion for a judgment as a
matter of law; in a footnote, it reminded the court of its
position that the judge should not have ruled regarding the
adverse jury instructions. See Docket No. 1738, at 13. On
(Continued)
11
 B.

28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2), the provision on which Kolon relies,

provides that any judge of the United States shall disqualify

himself

[w]here in private practice he served as a lawyer in
the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he
previously practiced law served during such
association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the
judge or such lawyer has been a material witness
concerning it.

28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which also has some relevance to our

inquiry, provides that “[any judge] of the United States shall

disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality

might reasonably be questioned.” 3

December 23, Kolon asked the court to consider recusal in its
memorandum supporting its motion to stay the injunction
proceedings. See Docket No. 1813, at 19. And in its reply
regarding that motion, on January 11, Kolon insisted that a
formal motion for recusal was unnecessary. See Docket No. 1843,
at 19 (responding to Docket No. 1830, at 26-27). During a
January 2012 hearing on Kolon’s motion for a new trial and
judgment as a matter of law in the trade secrets case, counsel
for Kolon again requested that the district court judge recuse
himself. The judge refused to do so, explaining that he did not
have a recusal motion before him in that case. Three days
later, on January 27, 2012, Kolon filed its motion for recusal
and disqualification in the trade secrets case. The district
court denied the recusal motions in both cases on February 21.
3
A separate recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 144, provides
parties with one opportunity per case to file an affidavit that
the presiding judge has a personal bias or prejudice regarding a
party. If the affidavit is sufficient, accompanied by a
certificate of good faith, and timely filed, another judge will
(Continued)
12
 The district court reasoned that although § 455 is itself

silent on whether a party seeking recusal must timely file a

motion with the court, and despite the mandatory text of

§ 455(b) (“[Any judge] . . . shall disqualify himself . . . .”),

the majority of circuits, including this one, have found that

§ 455 includes a timeliness requirement. Kolon Indus., 846 F.

Supp. 2d at 522 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Owens, 902

F.2d 1154, 1155 (4th Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, because Kolon

had delayed in filing its recusal motion for almost a year after

it learned of the alleged conflict, the district court denied

Kolon’s motion as untimely.

Ruling in the alternative on the merits, the district court

concluded that even ignoring the untimeliness of Kolon’s motion,

recusal was unnecessary under § 455(b)(2) since the Akzo

litigation was not “sufficiently related” to the instant action

to “constitute parts of the same matter in controversy.” 4 Id. at

528 (quoting United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 286 (4th

Cir. 1998)).

be assigned to the proceeding. Kolon did not seek recusal on
this ground in the district court.
4
Additionally, the district court held that recusal was
unnecessary under § 455(a). Since Kolon does not appeal that
ruling, we do not address it.

13
 C.

We review a judge’s recusal decision for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Mitchell, 886 F.2d 667, 671 (4th

Cir. 1989).

We first consider Kolon’s challenge to the district court’s

holding that § 455(b)(2) includes a timely-filing requirement

that Kolon failed to satisfy. Kolon maintains that the district

court erred by relying on Owens, in which we said that

“[t]imeliness is an essential element of a recusal motion,” and

that notwithstanding the absence of an explicit timely-filing

requirement in § 455, such a requirement is “judicially

implied.” 902 F.2d at 1155.

This language, Kolon submits, does not control here because

it speaks only “broadly about section 455 and did not specify

whether this requirement should apply to both subsections (a)

and (b) or solely to [sub]section 455(a).” Appellant’s Br. at

58. In Kolon’s view, Owens “more likely” involved a situation

under § 455(a) in which the judge’s “impartiality might [have]

reasonably be[en] questioned,” not a § 455(b)(1) scenario

implicating “personal bias or prejudice.” 5 Id. at 59.

5
28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) requires a judge to recuse himself
“[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,
or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning
[a] proceeding.”

14
Accordingly, Kolon believes Owens merely resolved that a timely

motion is required when recusal is implicated under § 455(a),

leaving open that question with respect to § 455(b).

In Kolon’s view, the § 455(a) and (b) provisions are

different enough to explain the presence of a timeliness

requirement in the former despite the absence of such in the

latter. Unlike § 455(a), § 455(b) may not be waived by the

parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) (“No [judge] shall accept from

the parties to the proceeding a waiver of any ground for

disqualification enumerated in subsection (b). Where the ground

for disqualification arises only under subsection (a), waiver

may be accepted . . . .”). From Kolon’s perspective,

subsections 455(b) and (e) create a “jurisdictional limitation

on the authority of a judge to participate in a given case,”

leaving the judge with a sua sponte obligation to recuse himself

or herself when he or she knows the predicate facts implicating

§ 455(b). Appellant’s Br. at 60 (quoting United States v.

Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323, 1325 (10th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation

marks omitted)). Thus, Kolon continues, “requiring a timely

party motion as a condition precedent to enforcing section

455(b) runs contrary to statutory design, effectively relieving

the judge of his personal statutory duty.” Id.

15
 D.

While Kolon’s arguments do not entirely lack merit, we

conclude that § 455(b), like § 455(a), includes a timely-filing

requirement under Owens and that Kolon failed to comply with it.

As the parties and the district court have acknowledged,

the party seeking recusal in Owens did not specify which

provision of § 455 required it, and we did not cabin our holding

to any specific provision of that section. In Owens, the

defendant, after publicly accusing the then-Governor of West

Virginia of bribery, filed a motion for recusal based on the

presiding judge’s “long association” with the Governor, who was

responsible for the judge’s appointment to various offices. 902

F.2d at 1155.

In our view, these facts could plausibly fit under either

of two subsections, 455(a) or 455(b)(1). On the one hand, the

scenario in Owens could certainly speak to § 455(a)’s concern

with situations where a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be

questioned. But on the other, as the district court here

determined, the judge’s perceived allegiance to the West

Virginia Governor could reasonably have concerned “a personal

bias or prejudice concerning” the defendant--the Governor’s

accuser--thus implicating § 455(b)(1). Given this ambiguity, we

are left only with Owens’s unqualified announcement that

“[t]imeliness is an essential element of a recusal motion” which

16
is “judicially implied in § 455.” 902 F.2d at 1155. Given that

blanket prescription, we decline to read Owens’s timeliness

requirement so narrowly as to exclude § 455(b).

Our dissenting colleague correctly observes that Owens

cites a case discussing § 455(a) alone, and that our later cases

in that line have yet to address § 455(b). 6 The limitations of

past cases, however, are not controlling, particularly because

the policy rationale underlying Owens’s timeliness requirement

applies just as forcefully to § 455(b) as to any other recusal

scenario.

Here--just as with a § 455(a) recusal, for example--the

requirement of timeliness “prohibits knowing concealment of an

ethical issue for strategic purposes,” United States v. York,

888 F.2d 1050, 1055 (5th Cir. 1989), and “is vital . . . to

prevent waste and delay,” Owens, 902 F.2d at 1156. Meanwhile,

the non-waivability of a § 455(b) recusal does not excuse a

6
The dissent says that our decision in United States v.
Lindsey, 556 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2009), cuts against imposing a
timeliness requirement under § 455(b). With all respect, we do
not share that view. In Lindsey, the presiding district court
judge had participated in defendant Lonnie Robinson’s case
twelve years earlier as an Assistant United States Attorney.
Though the judge did not recall his participation in the earlier
case, nor was he made aware of it, we vacated his order. But in
that case, Robinson did not learn of the judge’s prior
involvement until after filing his appeal. See id. at 246–47.
Thus, no timeliness issue ever arose: the case is wholly
inapposite here.

17
party’s delay in filing. As the Fifth Circuit explained,

“waiver and timeliness are distinct issues.” York, 888 F.2d at

1055. Whereas “section 455(e) prohibits the judge and the

parties from agreeing among themselves to abrogate section

455(b),” a “timeliness requirement forces the parties to raise

the disqualification issue at a reasonable time in the

litigation.” Id. And even if the mandatory text of § 455 does

imply a quasi-jurisdictional limitation on a judge’s authority

to hear a case, in our view, that limitation must be balanced

against the interests of fairness and efficiency served by the

timeliness requirement we announced in Owens.

The dissent criticizes our reading of Owens as finding no

support in the statutory text of § 455(b). We note that textual

support for a § 455(a) timeliness requirement is similarly

lacking, and that the language under that provision is similarly

mandatory, yet under our precedent that requirement is beyond

dispute. In any event, while we certainly agree that our

analysis must begin with the statute’s plain language, the

absence of a timeliness provision does not foreclose further

inquiry here. Even the plain meaning of a statute is not

conclusive “in the rare cases [in which] the literal application

of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the

intentions of its drafters.” United States v. Ron Pair Enters.,

Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (alteration in original)

18
(internal quotation marks omitted). Section 455 “serves to

‘promote public confidence in the integrity of the judicial

process.’ ” Dissent at 50 (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Servs.

Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858 n.7 (1988)). In our view,

failing to insist on a timeliness requirement for seeking

recusal under § 455(b) directly undermines that legislative

goal. 7

In keeping with that end, our sister circuits have

overwhelmingly found a timely filing requirement to be implied

despite the text’s silence. See, e.g., Am. Prairie Constr. Co.

v. Hoich, 560 F.3d 780, 789-91 (8th Cir. 2009) (§ 455(a) and

(b)); Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Omega, S.A., 432 F.3d 437, 447-48 (2d

Cir. 2005) (§ 455(b)); Stone Hedge Props. v. Phoenix Capital

Corp., 71 F. App’x 138, 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (unpublished)

(§ 455(b)); United States v. Rogers, 119 F.3d 1377, 1380-83 (9th

7
Section 455’s legislative history is murky at best. See
Delesdernier v. Porterie, 666 F.2d 116, 119–121 (5th Cir. 1982).
When Congress revised the statute in 1974, the Justice
Department did suggest adding an explicit timeliness requirement
like that found in § 144. Id. at 120. Congress declined to do
so, and our friend in dissent believes that decision “end[s] our
inquiry.” Dissent at 48. But the Justice Department’s
suggestion is hardly the only piece of relevant legislative
history. Rather, “prior to the 1974 amendment[,] courts had
generally held that a timely objection under the old § 455 was
necessary.” Delesdernier, 666 F.2d at 121. “Thus[,]
Congress’[s] failure to act could as easily have been the result
of a belief that the judicial gloss on old section 455 would
survive.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

19
Cir. 1997) (§ 455(a) and (b)); Summers v. Singletary, 119 F.3d

917, 920-21 (11th Cir. 1997) (§ 455(b)); York, 888 F.2d at 1053-

55 (5th Cir. 1989) (§ 455(a) and (b)).

Meanwhile, only two circuits have refused to read in a

timeliness requirement. The Seventh Circuit did so first, in

SCA Services v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110, 117 (7th Cir. 1977), but

has since called that decision into question on more than one

occasion, see Schurz Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1057, 1060

(7th Cir. 1992) (“SCA Services is a weak precedent[.]”) (Posner,

J., in chambers); United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1539

(7th Cir. 1985) (observing that “our decision [in SCA Services]

stands alone”). The Federal Circuit has also declined to impose

a formal § 455 filing requirement, but in doing so created what

amounts to a de facto filing obligation under principles of

equity. See Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 867 F.2d 1415,

1421 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding no strict timeliness requirement

but denying Kodak’s requested relief due to its unreasonably

tardy § 455 objection).

We recognize the countervailing interest in removing any

judge who bears even the slightest appearance of partiality.

But we should not ignore the harm that would ensue if litigants

were permitted to treat motions for recusal as little more than

a stratagem. As the Fifth Circuit observed, “it might

legitimately be asked whether the spectacle of an attorney

20
dragging his opponent through a long and costly proceeding, only

to conclude by moving for disqualification of the judge, is not

equally detrimental to public impressions of the judicial

system” as is a potentially biased judge. Delesdernier, 666

F.2d at 121 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Congress did

not enact § 455(a) to allow counsel to make a game of the

federal judiciary’s ethical obligations . . . .” Id. We should

not subvert that legislative intent merely because a party

instead seeks recusal under § 455(b).

Nor are we moved by the fact that parties may not waive

recusal under § 455(b). In that context, everyone (the judge

and the parties) has acknowledged a conflict, but seeks

nonetheless to ignore it. Thus, waiver cannot be said to

prejudice one party in particular, and will not produce the

gamesmanship we condemn here.

The same must be said of § 455(f). That provision permits

a judge with a financial conflict of interest under § 455(b)(4)

to remain on the case if he has devoted substantial time to the

matter and divests himself of the interest 8. The dissent reads

the limitation of this provision to financial conflicts alone as

8
The district judge’s May 2009 disclosure of a financial
interest does not present an issue under § 455(f), as
§ 455(b)(4) requires recusal only where a financial interest not
immediately in controversy “could be substantially affected by
the outcome of the proceeding.”

21
a legislative determination that “timeliness and efficiency are

less important than ensuring that the impartiality of the

judiciary is upheld.” Dissent at 50. As with the waiver

provision, however, § 455(f) presents a clean trade-off between

efficiency and impartiality. It does not address the concerns

about tactical sandbagging present in this case.

The dissent also contends that our decision today “pivots

responsibility [for recusal] from the judges to the litigants.”

Dissent at 52. That is not entirely correct. We agree with our

friend that when a judge “is aware of grounds for recusal under

section 455, that judge has a duty to recuse himself or

herself.” Dissent at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The scenario we address here arises only when a judge

independently determines, even if wrongly, that he need not

recuse and a party does not affirmatively seek recusal--that is,

until an adverse decision has been handed down. Both efficiency

and integrity require that we not reward a party’s tactics in

these circumstances.

E.

Having held that Owens’s timely-filing requirement applies

to recusal motions under § 455(a) and (b) alike, we next

consider whether Kolon complied with that requirement by

“rais[ing] the disqualification . . . [of the judge] at the

earliest moment after [its] knowledge of the facts.” Owens, 902

22
F.2d at 1156 (quoting Satterfield v. Edenton-Chowan Bd. of

Educ., 530 F.2d 567, 574-75 (4th Cir. 1975)). It did not.

The fact that the district court judge had been a partner

at McGuireWoods at the time of the Akzo litigation was public

knowledge when Kolon first sought discovery of the Akzo case

materials in the antitrust case in August 2009. Given Kolon’s

scouring of the Akzo litigation court records, it further seems

clear that Kolon had long known that McGuireWoods represented

DuPont in the Akzo case. Kolon was also formally alerted to the

potential conflict in May 2009, when the clerk of court issued

its notice to the parties informing them of the judge’s

financial interest in an entity affiliated with McGuireWoods.

Finally, Kolon became aware of the judge’s direct (if

negligible) involvement in the Akzo litigation in August 2010,

when DuPont produced the Akzo files and privilege log.

In sum, Kolon knew every fact that eventually predicated

its recusal motion almost a year before it first suggested

recusal might be appropriate, in July 2011, and over a year

before it finally filed its first recusal motion, in November

2011. On this record, Kolon quite clearly failed to “raise the

23
disqualification . . . [of the judge] at the earliest moment

after [its] knowledge of the facts.” Id. 9

Nor, in our view, is Kolon’s untimeliness excused by the

fact that DuPont knew first of the district court judge’s

involvement in the Akzo case and failed to alert the court of

that fact until it eventually produced its privilege log in

August 2010. For one, the judge’s direct involvement in the

Akzo case was not the only (or even necessarily the strongest)

basis for Kolon’s eventual § 455(b)(2) recusal motion: if, as

Kolon believed, the Akzo litigation was actually a matter in

controversy, the mere involvement of the judge’s former law

partners--of which Kolon was clearly aware--would have required

his recusal. For another, DuPont’s initial withholding of the

relevant communications does not explain why, after its eventual

9
We recognize that Kolon filed its motion to recuse in this
case before the district court’s issuance of an adverse ruling
on summary judgment. But its actions here should not be viewed
in a vacuum. Recall that Kolon’s antitrust claims arose as a
counterclaim to DuPont’s trade secrets action, which proceeded
more quickly than the antitrust case, before the same district
judge. In that case, the judge issued a series of rulings
universally adverse to Kolon, and a jury rendered a $920 million
verdict for DuPont. This had all transpired by the time Kolon
filed its recusal motion in the antitrust case. So while
Kolon’s sandbagging may not be obvious in the isolated context
of the antitrust case, a global view of the relevant events
makes clear that Kolon held its fire on recusal until after
suffering a defeat in the trade secrets case.

24
disclosure, Kolon failed to raise the disqualification issue for

nearly a year.

Our dissenting colleague warns that our decision as to

recusal will only diminish public respect for our profession.

"At the end of the day," he writes, our "determination that

Kolon's recusal requests were untimely means that a district

judge who . . . is no longer permitted to conduct further

proceedings involving the trade secrets claims[] presided over a

trial that ended in a one billion dollar verdict and a twenty-

year worldwide production shutdown injunction." Dissent at 57

(emphasis omitted). The district judge did preside over such a

trial, and our decision here cannot rewrite the past. We have

concluded separately, however, that the trade secrets verdict

must be vacated based on the judge’s evidentiary rulings. In

our view, a single verdict--however large--that no longer exists

can hardly impair public confidence more than would a rule

transforming recusal under § 455 into an “additional arrow in

the quiver of advocates in the face of [anticipated] adverse

rulings.” In re Kan. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 85 F.3d 1353, 1360

(8th Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (internal quotation

marks omitted). We therefore hold that the district court acted

25
within its discretion in denying Kolon’s recusal motion on

timeliness grounds. 10

III.

We next consider Kolon’s challenges to certain of the

district court’s discovery rulings. We review such rulings for

abuse of discretion, which may be found where “denial of

discovery has caused substantial prejudice.” Nicholas v.

Wyndham Int’l, Inc., 373 F.3d 537, 543 (4th Cir. 2004).

A.

Throughout discovery, to enable its experts to perform

their analysis, Kolon sought access to DuPont’s transaction-

level and market-segment sales, pricing, and margin data. The

district court denied Kolon’s initial requests for this

information as overly broad and unduly burdensome, but gave

Kolon leave to reformulate its request. Conceding that its

initial requests had been overbroad, Kolon eventually requested

production of a spreadsheet with data fields relevant to certain

contested issues. The request indicated that the responsive

document should be in native format from “any existing

database.” Appellee’s Br. at 43 (emphasis omitted).

10
In light of our holding, we do not address the district
court’s alternative ruling that, on the merits, recusal was not
required.

26
 The district court again denied Kolon’s request, concluding

that (1) DuPont had already produced extensive documentation on

the pertinent topics, such that the requested data would not be

any more relevant than the information DuPont had already

provided; (2) the request remained “sweeping and extensive”; (3)

DuPont had shown that production of the requested documents

would be “significantly burdensome”; and (4) the request had

been filed very late in the discovery period, without adequate

explanation for the delay by Kolon. J.A. 1020-22.

While we do not necessarily share the district court’s view

that Kolon’s requested transaction-level data would have been no

more relevant than the aggregate data DuPont had theretofore

provided, we nevertheless find that the discovery denial was

sufficiently justified by the court’s determination that the

production would have been unduly burdensome. Kolon insists

that the burden to DuPont was minimal because it requested only

a “single spreadsheet” which it said could be “readily compiled

from any existing database,” Appellant’s Br. at 43 (emphasis

omitted), and because an affidavit from DuPont’s Global

Financing Director indicated that DuPont already had an existing

spreadsheet containing some of the requested transaction-level

data. But this ignores the sweeping nature of the information

requested, which included all transaction-level details

regarding customers, geographic location, dates, products,

27
amounts, price, cost, margins, and profits. And even if DuPont

did have this information in “existing database[s],” that does

not mean it would not have been very burdensome to compile the

information into a “single spreadsheet.” Id.

Particularly considering the district court’s “wide

latitude in controlling discovery,” Rowland v. Am. Gen. Fin.,

Inc., 340 F.3d 187, 195 (4th Cir. 2003), we decline to disturb

its ruling.

B.

Kolon also appeals the district court’s grant of a

protective order barring a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of DuPont on

its strategic use of supply agreements. Justifying that order,

the district court explained that Kolon had violated Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(1) and Rule 30(H) of the Local

Rules for the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia by “failing to give reasonable written

notice . . . for [a] replacement deposition notice that it

served on October 21, 2011,” and had wasted the time the court

had extended it for completion of its depositions. J.A. 2715.

Again, we see no cause to disturb the district court’s

discretionary ruling. While Kolon attempts to pin blame for the

discovery delays on DuPont, it concedes that it gave only five

days’ notice for the replacement deposition notice it served on

October 21, 2011. As the district court determined, this

28
violated Local Civil Rule 30(H), which generally requires eleven

days’ advance notice of a deposition, and Federal Rule Civil

Procedure 30(b)(1), which requires “reasonable” notice.

Although Kolon maintains that the five-days’ notice was

reasonable under the circumstances, the district court acted

within its discretion in concluding otherwise.

IV.

Finally, we consider Kolon’s challenge to the district

court’s grant of summary judgment on its two antitrust claims--a

ruling we review de novo, viewing all facts and reasonable

inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Kolon, the

nonmoving party. See Pueschel v. Peters, 577 F.3d 558, 563 (4th

Cir. 2009).

In general, summary judgment is appropriate where there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when there is

sufficient evidence on which a reasonable jury could return a

verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We have explained that

summary judgment is “an important tool for dealing with

antitrust cases,” Oksanen v. Page Mem’l Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 708

(4th Cir. 1991) (en banc), and that antitrust cases are

“particularly well-suited for Rule 56 utilization” due to the

29
“unusual entanglement of legal and factual issues” they often

present, Thompson Everett, Inc. v. Nat’l Cable Adver., L.P., 57

F.3d 1317, 1322 (4th Cir. 1995).

A.

We first review the district court’s grant of summary

judgment on Kolon’s monopolization claim.

Under § 2 of the Sherman Act, a defendant is liable for a

monopolization claim when that defendant (1) possesses monopoly

power and (2) willfully acquires or maintains that power.

DuPont I, 637 F.3d at 441. In granting summary judgment to

DuPont, the district court held that Kolon failed to create a

genuine issue of material fact on either prong, concluding that

DuPont neither possessed monopoly power nor engaged in willful

maintenance of such power. We address each element in turn.

1.

“Monopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude

competition.” United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,

351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). A defendant possesses monopoly power

in the relevant market if it is “truly predominant in the

market.” White Bag Co. v. Int’l Paper Co., 579 F.2d 1384, 1387

(4th Cir. 1974). Although there is no fixed percentage market

share that conclusively resolves whether monopoly power exists,

the Supreme Court has never found a party with less than 75%

market share to have monopoly power. Antitrust Laws & Trade

30
Regulation: Desk Ed. § 3.02[2][c][ii]. And we have observed

that “when monopolization has been found the defendant

controlled seventy to one hundred percent of the relevant

market.” DuPont I, 637 F.3d at 450 (quoting White Bag, 579 F.2d

at 1387).

Beyond percentage market share, “some courts have also

focused on the durability of the defendant’s market power,

particularly with an eye toward other firms’ (in)ability to

enter the market.” Id. at 451 (citing cases).

Applying these standards, the district court held that

DuPont lacked monopoly power. Whereas (according to our ruling

in DuPont I) Kolon had adequately pleaded the monopoly power

element by alleging that DuPont had controlled over 70% of the

relevant market, at the summary judgment stage the district

court found that DuPont actually possessed significantly less

than the alleged 70% of that market. Kolon Indus., Inc., v.

E.I. du Pont Nemours & Co., No. 3:11-cv-622, 2012 WL 1155218, at

*12 (E.D. Va. Apr. 5, 2012). “In fact,” the court observed,

“Kolon’s own expert takes the view that DuPont had a maximum

market share of 59 percent during the relevant time period, and

that DuPont’s market share decreased to 55 percent during that

three year period rather than increased.” Id.

This decline in DuPont’s market share, combined with

Teijin’s corresponding ascendance and the fact that DuPont was

31
charging lower prices in the United States than in Europe (which

Kolon identified as a comparable market), led the court to its

conclusion. “[T]he fact that there are significant entry

barriers,” the district court continued, “is insufficient to

fill the factual gaps in Kolon’s monopolization claim.” Id.

“DuPont clearly lacks the power to control prices and exclude

competition,” the court summarized, “otherwise, it would have

been able to prevent the decrease in its market share and the

rise of one of its major competitors.” Id.

Even viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to

Kolon, we agree with the district court that DuPont did not

possess monopoly power in the U.S. para-aramid market during the

relevant period between 2006 and 2009. First, although Kolon is

correct that DuPont’s market share of less than 60% during the

relevant period does not necessarily foreclose a finding of

monopoly power, it does weigh heavily against such a finding.

Quite simply, this percentage falls significantly short of where

we have previously drawn the line for monopoly power. See

DuPont I, 637 F.3d at 450 (identifying 70% market share as the

bottom of the range for a finding of monopoly power).

Meanwhile, although Kolon is also correct that certain

other factors do demonstrate DuPont’s strength in the market

(e.g., high barriers to entry, ability to price discriminate,

high profit margins), a showing of DuPont’s “market power” is

32
not itself sufficient to prove that DuPont possesses “monopoly

power.” See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc.,

504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992) (“Monopoly power under § 2 requires, of

course, something greater than market power under § 1.”).

Furthermore, this evidence falls short of showing DuPont’s

durability in the market. As the district court observed,

uncontested facts demonstrate that DuPont has experienced a

steady, decades-long loss in significant market share to Teijin.

Ultimately, in light of DuPont’s reduced market share and

lack of durable market power, the evidence cannot sustain a jury

finding that DuPont had the “power to control prices or exclude

competition,” United States v. DuPont, 351 U.S. at 391, or was

“truly predominant in the market” during the relevant period,

White Bag, 579 F.2d at 1387.

2.

Even if Kolon had presented a triable issue on the

monopoly-power element, Kolon also needed to show that DuPont

willfully maintained that power. To violate this prong, a

defendant must engage in conduct “to foreclose competition, to

gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor.”

Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 482-83. On this element, Kolon’s

theory was--and is--that DuPont maintained its alleged monopoly

power through the use of long-term, multi-year, exclusive supply

agreements with certain U.S. para-aramid customers.

33
 Although exclusive dealing agreements are not per se

illegal, they “may be an improper means of acquiring or

maintaining a monopoly.” DuPont I, 637 F.3d at 451 (citing

United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 (1966). The

Supreme Court has held that an exclusive dealing arrangement

does not violate antitrust laws unless its probable effect is to

“foreclose competition in a substantial share of the line of

commerce affected.” Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365

U.S. 320, 327 (1961). The Court explained:

To determine substantiality in a given case, it is
necessary to weigh the probable effect of the contract
on the relevant area of effective competition, taking
into account the relative strength of the parties, the
proportionate volume of commerce involved in relation
to the total volume of commerce in the relevant market
area, and the probable immediate and future effects
which pre-emption of that share of the market might
have on effective competition therein.

Id. at 329.

Along these lines, we have observed that “[t]he market

share foreclosed is important because, for the contract to

adversely affect competition, ‘the opportunities for other

traders to enter into or remain in that market must be

significantly limited[.]’” DuPont I, 637 F.3d at 451 (quoting

Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 328). Once a plaintiff has

demonstrated substantial foreclosure, it must then also

demonstrate that the conduct had “a negative impact on

34
competition in the market as a whole.” Chuck’s Feed & Seed Co.

v. Ralston Purina Co., 810 F.2d 1289, 1295 (4th Cir. 1987).

The district court held there was no genuine issue that

DuPont’s supply agreements had not foreclosed a substantial

portion of the market. In its view, Kolon had not sufficiently

attempted to quantify foreclosure of the entire relevant market,

and instead had focused only on DuPont’s alleged foreclosure of

particular market segments. Kolon’s evidence of the degree of

foreclosure in those segments, which the court characterized as

“scant at best,” did “nothing to reveal the amount of

foreclosure in the [para-aramid] market as a whole.” Kolon,

2012 WL 1155218, at *14. The court concluded that since DuPont

had supply agreements--many of which were non-exclusive--with

only twenty-one of approximately 1,000 potential commercial U.S.

para-aramid customers, the percentage of foreclosure could not,

“as a matter of law, constitute sufficient grounds for a finding

of substantial foreclosure.” Id. at *15.

The court also concluded that Kolon had “put forth no

evidence” that DuPont’s supply agreements had a negative effect

on overall competition, noting that Teijin’s “relentless

ascendance” fatally undercut that claim. Id. Finally, the

court rejected Kolon’s argument that DuPont’s twenty-one supply

arrangements substantially foreclosed the entire relevant market

35
by blocking Kolon from crossing a “critical bridge” to “high

volume” customers. Id. at *16-18.

On appeal, Kolon again stresses its “critical bridge”

theory. While it does not deny that DuPont had supply

agreements with only twenty-one of the roughly 1,000 potential

U.S. commercial para-aramid customers, Kolon contends that the

district court’s emphasis on those figures--and its disregard of

the “probable effect of the contract[s] on the relevant area of

effective competition,” Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 329--was

shortsighted. Pointing to evidence that DuPont perceived

Kolon’s market entry as a threat, Kolon argues that DuPont

“strategically entered into supply agreements with high-volume

customers in the key commercially sustainable entry

segments . . . that Kolon sought to enter.” Appellant’s Br. at

7, 27-28. Kolon submits that despite the relatively low number

and short duration of DuPont’s supply agreements, these

agreements “choked off the ‘critical bridge’ to Kolon’s entry

into the U.S. market” because they foreclosed Kolon’s access to

the most important high-volume customers. Id. at 32.

Kolon points to two cases from the Third Circuit which, in

its view, embrace this “critical bridge” approach. See United

States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005)

(reversing summary judgment, holding that Dentsply’s exclusivity

agreements with key product distributors could deny efficient

36
scale to competitors); LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 160

(3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (reversing summary judgment, holding

that 3M’s bundled rebate agreements with superstores like K-Mart

and Wal-Mart could have cut LePage’s off from “key retail

pipelines necessary to permit it to compete profitably”).

While we acknowledge that a singular emphasis on the

percentage of customers foreclosed cannot resolve the inquiry

(as foreclosure of a few important customers could substantially

foreclose access to a market), we agree with the district court

that Kolon failed to show what “proportionate volume of

commerce” in the entire relevant market was foreclosed by

DuPont’s supply agreements. Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 329; see

also DuPont I, 637 F.3d at 451 (discussing the importance of

market share foreclosed). Likewise, although Kolon’s “critical

bridge” theory is certainly plausible, the evidence does not

support its application here.

Unlike the plaintiffs in Dentsply and LePage’s, Kolon

offered no evidence that access to the foreclosed customers (or

even to the identified market segments) was necessary to achieve

scale in the broader U.S. para-aramid market. And even if we

assume the significance of those customers and market segments,

Kolon does not dispute that DuPont had supply agreements with

fewer than half of its identified “key” customers within those

segments.

37
 Meanwhile, DuPont persuasively distinguishes Dentsply and

LePage’s based on the fact that the defendants in those

“critical bridge” cases foreclosed the plaintiffs’ access to

distribution networks rather than end-customers. We are not

convinced that, as Kolon contends, this is “a distinction

without a difference.” Reply Br. at 15. As the district court

observed, unlike with Dentsply’s and 3M’s agreements that

foreclosed access to distribution networks shown to be necessary

to reach many end-customers, “the record presents no reason to

think that Kolon could not sell to other customers occupying the

same segment of the para-aramid market . . . as customers that

have supply agreements with DuPont.” Kolon, 2012 WL 1155218, at

*18.

In sum, we conclude that neither the probable nor the

actual effect of DuPont’s supply agreements was to “foreclose

competition in a substantial share of the line of commerce

affected.” Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 327. Accordingly, those

agreements do not violate the willful maintenance prong of our

§ 2 monopolization inquiry. Because Kolon failed to raise a

genuine issue of material fact as to either prong, summary

judgment was appropriate on its monopolization claim.

B.

We next review the district court’s grant of summary

judgment on Kolon’s attempted monopolization claim.

38
 “Attempted monopolization employs ‘methods, means and

practices which would, if successful, accomplish monopolization,

and which, though falling short, nevertheless approach so close

as to create a dangerous probability of it.’ ” DuPont I, 637

F.3d at 453 (quoting M & M Med. Supplies & Serv., Inc. v.

Pleasant Valley Hosp., Inc., 981 F.2d 160, 166 (4th Cir. 1992)).

To prevail on an attempted monopolization claim under § 2, a

claimant must show (1) a specific intent to monopolize a

relevant market, (2) predatory or anticompetitive acts, and (3)

a dangerous probability of successful monopolization. Spectrum

Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).

Focusing only on the final two prongs, the district court

found neither satisfied since (1) Kolon had failed to

demonstrate substantial foreclosure of the relevant market

resulting from DuPont’s supply agreements, meaning there was no

anticompetitive conduct; and (2) DuPont had lost market share

during the relevant period and had failed to prevent Teijin’s

ascendance, meaning there was no dangerous probability of

successful monopolization by DuPont.

Kolon first contends that DuPont’s supply agreements were

anticompetitive, arguing that DuPont entered these agreements

against its own interest in order to block Kolon’s market entry.

Appellant’s Br. at 31-32 (citing M & M Med. Supplies, 981 F.2d

at 166 (noting that where “a firm has been attempting to exclude

39
rivals on some basis other than efficiency, it is fair to

characterize its behavior as predatory”)). On the “dangerous

probability of success” prong, Kolon maintains that even if

DuPont’s share of the U.S. para-aramid market did not constitute

actual monopoly power, it was at least consistent with a

“dangerous probability” of achieving such power. Id. at 23-24

(citing M & M Med. Supplies, 981 F.2d at 168 (4th Cir. 1992)

(“[C]laims involving greater than 50% share should be treated as

attempts at monopolization when the other elements for attempted

monopolization are also satisfied.”)). And Kolon notes that

even though “DuPont’s market share declined slightly over the

three-year period, that does not, as a matter of law, preclude a

finding of monopoly power, much less a dangerous probability of

achieving it.” Id. at 24 (citing cases finding monopoly power

despite a declining market share).

But again, even viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to Kolon, the claim fails.

First, as discussed above, DuPont’s alleged anticompetitive

conduct--its customer supply agreements--did not have the

probable effect of “foreclos[ing] competition in a substantial

share of the line of commerce affected.” Tampa Elec., 365 U.S.

at 327; see also IIIB Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 806a,

at 412 (3d ed. 2008) (“[T]he same basic definition of

exclusionary conduct should apply to both monopolization and

40
attempt claims.”). Nor, contrary to its suggestion, did Kolon

show that the agreements were anticompetitive as without

business justification or against DuPont’s own interest.

Rather, DuPont introduced unrebutted evidence that it entered

the supply agreements as a competitive response to Teijin’s use

of that same practice, and because customers requested them.

Second, Kolon has not raised a genuine issue that DuPont

had a “dangerous probability” of successfully achieving monopoly

power during the relevant period. As the district court

observed, DuPont’s market share had been in steady decline for

seventeen years, and DuPont has proven unable to control U.S.

prices or exclude Teijin from entering the market. And even if

declining market share does not preclude a finding of monopoly

power, Kolon pointed to no affirmative evidence indicating a

“dangerous probability” that DuPont would sooner or later regain

its former market dominance.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to DuPont on Kolon’s attempted monopolization

claim.

V.

In sum, we conclude that following Owens, recusals under 28

U.S.C. § 455(b) include a judicially implied timely-filing

requirement, and that the district court acted within its

41
discretion when it denied Kolon’s recusal motion on timeliness

grounds.

We defer to the district court’s considerable discretion in

overseeing discovery and will not disturb its discovery rulings.

On the merits of Kolon’s antitrust suit, we agree with the

district court that Kolon failed to raise a triable issue of

material fact sufficient to sustain either its attempted or

actual monopolization claims.

The judgment of the district court is hereby

AFFIRMED.

42
SHEDD, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I dissent. Federal judges have an “absolute duty . . . to

hear and decide cases within their jurisdiction,” United States

v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 215 (1980), but “[f]airness . . .

requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases,”

United States v. Werner, 916 F.2d 175, 178 (4th Cir. 1990)

(internal quotation marks omitted). To that end, “our system of

law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of

unfairness.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Consistent with this principle, Congress has explicitly created

another absolute duty for federal judges: they must recuse

themselves from any case where, “in private practice [the judge]

served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer

with whom [the judge] previously practiced law served during

such association as a lawyer concerning the matter.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 455(b)(2). In creating this duty, Congress “placed the

obligation to identify the existence of those grounds upon the

judge himself, rather than requiring recusal only in response to

a party affidavit.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548

(1994).

I thus disagree with the majority’s unwarranted imposition

of a timeliness requirement that shifts the burden of bringing

forward recusal grounds under § 455(b)(2) from the judge to the

litigants. That decision flies in the face of the plain

43
language and thwarts the clear congressional purpose of

§ 455(b)(2). It is also inconsistent with our precedent. See

United States v. Lindsey, 556 F.3d 238, 246-47 (4th Cir. 2009).

Even accepting that timeliness plays some limited role under §

455(b)(2), I further disagree with the majority’s conclusion

that Kolon Industries, Inc. (Kolon), acted in an untimely manner

here. Rather, Kolon moved for the district judge’s recusal (on

grounds with which the judge was already well aware) within a

reasonable time after being presented with voluminous discovery

that had been impeded by E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Company

(DuPont). Finally, in my view, the district judge presiding in

this case falls squarely within the terms of § 455(b)(2) in both

this appeal and the companion appeal, E. I. DuPont De Nemours &

Co. v. Kolon Industries Inc., No. 12-1260 (Trade Secrets Case).

I would thus vacate the summary judgment order in this appeal

and remand for further proceedings.

I.

I begin with a brief recitation of the pertinent facts.

DuPont has commercially produced para-aramid fibers under the

name Kevlar© since the 1970s. In the 1980s, DuPont engaged in

worldwide litigation with Akzo N.V., which sold a competing

para-aramid fiber, Twaron©, including a case filed in the

Eastern District of Virginia (the Akzo litigation). In that

litigation, DuPont was represented by McGuire Woods & Battle

44
(now McGuireWoods) and Fitzpatrick, Cella, Harper & Scinto

(Fitzpatrick Cella). During the time of the litigation, the

district judge below was a partner at McGuireWoods’ Richmond

office. Documents reflect that during the Akzo litigation the

district judge spoke with co-counsel from Fitzpatrick Cella on

the phone and sent a letter with a copy of Akzo’s complaint

attached to him.

In 2009, DuPont instituted this action against Kolon,

arguing that Kolon misappropriated its trade secrets. As the

majority recounts, the district judge, through the clerk of

court, issued a brief notice informing the parties of the

judge’s prior partnership at McGuireWoods and instructed the

parties to move for recusal if they believed it was warranted.

The judge took no further action on the issue. Kolon filed an

answer and a counterclaim, contending that DuPont’s actions in

the market for para-aramid fibers violated the antitrust laws.

In August 2009, early in discovery, Kolon sought access to

documents from the Akzo litigation, believing that DuPont had

made public the trade secrets it was now claiming Kolon had

misappropriated. DuPont’s counsel (McGuireWoods) informed Kolon

that it had no documents from the Akzo litigation. Kolon

renewed this request prior to the close of discovery in April

2010 and was again informed that McGuireWoods possessed no

documents. Undeterred, after the close of discovery Kolon

45
served a subpoena on Fitzpatrick Cella, which revealed that

Fitzpatrick Cella did have documents from the Akzo litigation.

These materials were turned over to Kolon in August 2010. The

involvement of the district judge, including the letter he sent

to Fitzpatrick Cella, was not highlighted, but was part of a

roughly 59,000 page production.

While the district judge was not made aware of the letter

until July 2011, it cannot be disputed that throughout discovery

the judge was aware that Kolon intended to defend itself against

DuPont’s claims by contending that DuPont had publicized the

trade secrets in the Akzo litigation. Upon being informed of

the letter in July 2011, prior to trial in the trade secrets

case and prior to severance of the antitrust claims, 1 the judge

stated that he had “no recollection whatsoever” of any

involvement in that litigation. (J.A. 689). As the majority

further recounts, the judge refused to rule on recusal until

Kolon formally filed a motion for recusal in both the trade

secrets and the antitrust case.

Eventually, the trade secrets claims proceeded to trial and

culminated in a jury award of $919.9 million. The district

judge later entered a twenty-year worldwide production shutdown

1
The antitrust claims, which are the subject of this
appeal, were severed from the trade secrets claims in September
2011.

46
injunction against Kolon and granted DuPont’s motion for summary

judgment on the antitrust claims.

II.

Section 455(b) provides that recusal is mandatory, inter

alia, “[w]here in private practice [the judge] served as a

lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he

previously practiced law served during such association as a

lawyer concerning the matter.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2).

Mandatory recusal is not waivable by the parties. 28 U.S.C.

§ 455(e). The majority concludes that, although not waivable, a

mandatory recusal under § 455(b) is nonetheless subject to a

stringent timeliness requirement and that Kolon simply waited

too long in this case. I disagree.

The majority’s timely-filing requirement is misconstrued

for several reasons. First, it simply constitutes the addition

of words to the statute. “When interpreting statutes we start

with the plain language.” U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. N.C. Growers

Ass’n, 377 F.3d 345, 350 (4th Cir. 2004). “It is well

established that when the statute’s language is plain, the sole

function of the courts-at least where the disposition required

by the text is not absurd 2-is to enforce it according to its

2
The majority’s reference to the absurdity canon is
misplaced. There is nothing absurd about my reading of
§ 455(b)—as discussed infra, given the purpose of the statute,
(Continued)
47
terms.” Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004)

(internal quotation marks omitted). The statutory language of

§ 455(b) could not be plainer; it “sets forth no procedural

requirements.” United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th

Cir. 1980). See also Delesdernier v. Porterie, 666 F.2d 116,

120 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that “even after” statutory

amendments in 1974 Ҥ 455 still contains no explicit procedural

requirements”). Congress’ omission of any reference to a

timely-filed motion as a prerequisite to § 455(b) recusal should

end our inquiry. 3 After all, “[w]e do not lightly assume that

it is entirely plausible that Congress did not intend to impose
a timely-filing requirement. The absurdity canon allows courts
to disregard statutory text when adhering to the text “would
result in a disposition that no reasonable person could
approve.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 234 (2012). But the canon “can be
a slippery slope. It can lead to judicial revision of public and
private texts to make them (in the judges' view) more
reasonable.” Id. at 237. The hurdle for invoking the canon is
thus “a very high one.” Id. The fact that there is a “plausible
reason[]” for omitting a timely-filing requirement in § 455(b)
“forecloses recourse to the absurdity canon.” Little v. Shell
Exploration & Prod. Co., 690 F.3d 282, 291 (5th Cir. 2012).
3
The majority compounds its error by requiring not only
that recusal be raised in a timely fashion by the parties, but
that recusal be raised in a formal motion. As noted, § 455(b)
includes no procedural requirements. Moreover, the requirement
of a motion is further undercut by the existence of 28 U.S.C.
§ 144. That statute provides:

Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court
makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that
the judge before whom the matter is pending has a
(Continued)
48
Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it

nonetheless intends to apply.” Jama v. Immigration and Customs

Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005).

Second, as if this silence were not enough, § 455 contains

two additional signals that a timely-filed motion is not

required under § 455(b). First, § 455(e) provides that

mandatory recusals may not be waived by the parties. Even

accepting that “waiver and timeliness are distinct issues,”

United States v. York, 888 F.2d 1050, 1055 (5th Cir. 1989), the

non-waiver of § 455(b) recusals reinforces the mandatory nature

of the section; if the presiding judge has a triggering event

under § 455(b), the judge is disqualified and must recuse even

if the parties oppose his recusal. Second, § 455(f) provides

personal bias or prejudice either against him or in
favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed
no further therein, but another judge shall be
assigned to hear such proceeding.

The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons
for the belief that bias or prejudice exists, and
shall be filed not less than ten days before the
beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be
heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to
file it within such time. A party may file only one
such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by
a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is
made in good faith.

Section 144, which was in existence at the time Congress
amended § 455, clearly illustrates that Congress knew how to
require a formal filing raising a judge’s bias or prejudice and
declined to do so in § 455(b).

49
yet another signal. That provision states that,

“[n]otwithstanding” the statute’s preceding provisions, if a

judge has invested “substantial judicial time” “to the matter”

and then discovers that he has a financial conflict of interest

under § 455(b)(4), the judge may remain in the case if he

“divests himself or herself of the interest.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 455(f). This provision represents Congress’s response to

judicial economy concerns, and, importantly, it is limited to a

single provision of § 455(b). The fact that Congress spoke

specifically to this one area suggests that timeliness and

efficiency are less important than ensuring that the

impartiality of the judiciary is upheld.

In addition, I believe a timely-filing requirement subverts

the statute’s intent. Section 455 serves to “promote public

confidence in the integrity of the judicial process.” Liljeberg

v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858 n.7

(1988). See also Delesdernier, 666 F.2d at 121 (noting statute

serves “to increase public confidence in the judiciary by

removing even the appearance of impropriety or partiality”).

“Put simply, avoiding the appearance of impropriety is as

important in developing public confidence in our judicial system

as avoiding impropriety itself.” United States v. Jordan, 49

F.3d 152, 155-56 (5th Cir. 1995). The statute was amended in

50
1974 4 to harmonize § 455 with existing law by “clarify[ing] and

broaden[ing] the grounds for judicial disqualification and to

conform with the recently adopted ABA Code of Judicial Conduct,

Canon 3C (1987).” Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 858 n.7. These codes

of conduct exist independently of § 455 and must be followed by

judges absent action by a party. Indeed, our entire recusal

system is based upon the notion that, when the judge has

information that triggers one of the subsections of § 455(b),

that judge will recuse himself or herself regardless of any

urging by a party. In recognition of this fact, § 455 “is

directed to the judge, rather than the parties, and is self-

enforcing on the part of the judge.” Sibla, 624 F.2d at 867-68.

Thus, if the judge “is aware of grounds for recusal under

section 455, that judge has a duty to recuse himself or

herself.” Id. at 868. While these provisions “may be asserted

also by a party to the action,” the primary duty remains with

the judge. United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 880 (9th

4
Prior to the 1974 amendments the statute provided:

Any justice or judge of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any case in which he has a
substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has
been a material witness, or is so related to or
connected with any party or his attorney as to render
it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the
trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.

28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970 ed.).

51
Cir. 1980). 5 The timely filing requirement, as implemented by

the majority, pivots responsibility from the judges to the

litigants when that duty and responsibility should lie with us.

As the Federal Circuit has explained:

Application of a “timeliness” requirement requires a
fixed point or bench mark from which the timeliness or
untimeliness of an action can be measured (e.g. 10
days after event X; before event Y). There is no such
provision anywhere in section 455. Nor could there
be. The statute deals only with action of a judge.
It has nothing to do with actions of counsel.

Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 867 F.2d 1415, 1418 (Fed.

Cir. 1989) (emphasis added).

Finally, to the extent one insists that timeliness should

play a role in recusal, I agree with Kolon that the role should

be tied to equitable considerations and limited in scope. In

fact, the earliest cases applying a timeliness requirement were

concerned primarily with parties’ gamesmanship after losing a

case. For instance, in York, 888 F.2d at 1055, cited by the

majority, the court noted that a timeliness requirement served

to “proscribe motions that would have invalidated a fully

completed trial” and chastised parties that would sit on

information gleaned prior to trial until the trial’s outcome.

5
To this end, we require parties to file a Corporate
Disclosure Statement under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
26.1 so that we can generate our own disqualifications; we do
not require each party in every appeal to file a motion
requesting the recusal of certain judges.

52
See also Conforte, 624 F.2d at 879-880 (finding recusal motion

untimely where information was learned prior to trial but not

raised until after trial); Stone Hedge Props. v. Phoenix Capital

Corp., 71 Fed. App’x 138, 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (motion untimely

when party learned of information prior to judgment but recusal

was not raised until five years later, well after judgment and

appeal); Apple v. Jewish Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 829 F.2d 326, 334

(2d Cir. 1987) (noting whether motion was “made after the entry

of judgment” is one of four factors in determining if request

was timely). A timeliness requirement in such circumstances—

where a party learns of information that the judge does not (or

may not) possess but then sits on that information as a

litigation strategy—makes sense as a matter of fairness or

equity. Thus, in most of these cases “[t]he refusal of courts

to ‘start over’ has rested not on the mere passage of time, but

on the events that had occurred and the balancing of

equity/fairness considerations in deciding whether to expunge

those events from history’s pages.” Polaroid Corp., 867 F.2d at

1419.

Applying such a limited rule here leads inescapably to the

conclusion that Kolon acted in a timely fashion. As recounted

above, DuPont impeded the discovery of Akzo documents and turned

over voluminous discovery that did not highlight the district

judge’s role in the prior litigation. Moreover, at all times

53
the district court was aware that Kolon was pursuing discovery

of the Akzo litigation. Given these circumstances, Kolon’s

specific raising of recusal prior to trial in the trade secrets

claims is sufficiently timely under § 455(b)(2).

The majority reaches the opposite conclusion by

misconstruing, and then incorrectly relying on, United States v.

Owens, 902 F.2d 1154, 1155 (4th Cir. 1990). 6 In my view, Owens

is limited to recusals under § 455(a) and has no relevance to

cases, like this one, involving § 455(b). Section 455(a) 7

provides that a judge “shall disqualify himself in any

proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Owens itself relied on a case

interpreting only § 455(a), see Delesdernier, 666 F.2d at 121, 8

and our cases citing to Owens’ timeliness requirement have all

arisen under § 455(a), see Newport News Holdings Corp. v.
6
The majority also relies, in part, on the decisions of our
sister circuits imposing a timeliness requirement. Of course,
“agreement among courts of appeals on an issue . . . does not
invariably garnish Supreme Court approval.” McMellon v. United
States, 387 F.3d 329, 361 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Motz, J.,
dissenting). Given the plain language of § 455(b), I find these
decisions unpersuasive.
7
This section, like § 455(b) has no specific timeliness
requirement. Nonetheless, for purposes of this case, I accept
that the language is more susceptible to a requirement that the
party raise the issue with the judge and that such a requirement
is mandated by Owens.
8
In fact, Delesdernier specifically reserved the timeliness
question under § 455(b). See Delesdernier, 666 F.2d at 123 n.3.

54
Virtual City Vision, Inc., 650 F.3d 423, 432 (4th Cir. 2011);

United States v. Whorley, 550 F.3d 326, 339 (4th Cir. 2008).

Conversely, of more relevance here is United States v. Lindsey,

556 F.3d 238, 246-47 (4th Cir. 2009). In Lindsey, the district

judge had previously worked as an Assistant United States

Attorney on the criminal defendant’s case more than a decade

earlier. For the first time on appeal of the denial of his 18

U.S.C. §3582(c) motion, the criminal defendant raised the

potential recusal of the district judge under § 455(b)(3).

Although the district judge was unaware of his prior

participation, and no one brought it to his attention, “his

participation at that time is nonetheless undisputed,” and

recusal was thus required. Id. at 247. In reaching this

result, we included neither a citation to Owens nor a discussion

of timeliness. Instead, we simply concluded that, because the

district judge fell within § 455(b), recusal was required

regardless of when the issue was raised. Thus, contrary to the

majority, I believe our most relevant precedent supports the

conclusion that timeliness is not relevant under § 455(b). 9

9
The majority misapprehends the importance of Lindsey.
According to the majority, Owens mandates a timely-filing
requirement in all § 455 cases. In Lindsey, although the
recusal issue was not raised until appeal, there is no
discussion about timeliness, which is wholly consistent with my
view that timeliness is irrelevant to § 455(b) cases because
they hinge on the mandatory nature of the recusal, not the
(Continued)
55
 In sum, the rule employed by the majority—that a recusal

motion is timely only if raised “at the earliest moment after

[its] knowledge of the facts,” (Majority Op. at 22), regardless

of whether any delay was caused by gamesmanship or whether it

was raised early enough in the litigation that no prejudice

would result—is incompatible with the language and purpose of

§ 455(b) and is not required by our precedent. This case proves

the point. The district judge knew, from the outset of

litigation, that his prior law firm was representing a client

that it represented when he was partner. As discovery began,

the judge had before him multiple requests from Kolon to look

into the Akzo litigation and pleadings and filings, indicating

that the Akzo litigation was central to Kolon’s defense on the

merits of the trade secrets claims. This is not a case in which

a party discovered, for instance, financial information that the

judge was unaware of and sat on that information until after

trial. In this case the judge was, at all times, aware of the

facts relevant to recusal under § 455(b)(2) and it was up to the

timely raising of it. If timeliness was as important in all §
455 cases, as the majority suggests, surely the issue would have
at least been identified in Lindsey. Lindsey’s silence on
timeliness only reinforces the case’s thorough discussion of
recusal under § 455(b) as a mandatory proposition.

56
judge to self-enforce those statutory provisions. 10 To the

extent any burden is placed on Kolon, it satisfied that burden

by raising the issue in July, prior to trial on the trade

secrets claims.

At the end of the day, the majority’s determination that

Kolon’s recusal requests were untimely means that a district

judge who, by the majority’s own determination, is no longer

permitted to conduct further proceedings involving the trade

secrets claims, presided over a trial that ended in a one

billion dollar verdict and a twenty-year worldwide production

shutdown injunction. Such a result does not, I think, inspire

public confidence in the judiciary. The majority’s rule leaves

judges with no enforceable duty to remove themselves from cases

absent action by a party. This result cannot be squared with

the statute’s purpose or language.

III.

Having concluded that Kolon’s request is appropriately

before this court, I now address whether recusal was required

10
My opinion should not be read to suggest that the
district judge engaged in actual bias or impartiality in this
case. Rather, the purpose of § 455(b)(2) is to disqualify
judges, even if they have no actual bias in a particular case,
because of the great risk of the appearance of bias or
impartiality in a certain set of cases. That appearance is the
issue in this case.

57
under § 455(b)(2). 11 We have held that a judge “need not recuse

himself simply because he possesses some tangential relationship

to the proceedings.” United States v. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658, 665

(4th Cir. 2003). In this case, however, the district judge had

more than a “tangential” relationship.

Our precedent establishes that the “matter in controversy”

includes more than the claims brought by DuPont. In In re

Rodgers, 537 F.2d 1196 (4th Cir. 1976), the criminal defendants

were charged with using illegal means to procure the passage of

a racetrack consolidation bill in Maryland. The presiding

judge’s former law firm had represented a separate group of

individuals who were not criminally charged but engaged in

similar lobbying efforts. The criminal defendants thus argued

that the judge should recuse; as part of this argument, the

defendants argued that they were intending to have his former

law partner (and some of the clients) testify as to the means

they undertook to gain passage of the consolidation bill. The

Government opposed recusal, contending that the “matter” was not

the “matter in controversy” because it was not the “actual case

before the court.” Id. at 1198. Even accepting that reading of

11
The majority declines to address this issue, yet in the
companion case, uses its “supervisory powers” under 28 U.S.C. §
2106 to remand the case for further proceedings before another
district judge. See Trade Secrets Case at 15-16.

58
the statute, we found recusal was required because “the actual

case before the court consists of more than the charges brought

by the government. It also includes the defense asserted by the

accused.” Id. In that case, recusal was thus triggered because

the defendants’ proposed defense “in part at least, will consist

of evidence of matters in which the judge’s former partner

served as a lawyer.” Id. See also Preston v. United States,

923 F.2d 731, 733-35 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding §455(b)(2) matter

in controversy requirement satisfied when judge’s former law

partners represented a company that was not a party to the court

case but might be liable in an indemnification proceeding if the

plaintiffs prevailed in the underlying case).

As Rodgers makes clear, Akzo is a matter in controversy in

this action. Kolon’s defense to DuPont’s trade secrets claims

is that DuPont made public many of these secrets during the Akzo

litigation. It cites to, including other materials, a letter

from DuPont’s counsel, McGuireWoods, stating that DuPont agreed

to “totally declassify all trial exhibit documents, all proposed

findings of fact and all deposition excerpts and summaries

submitted to the Court.” (J.A. 12-1260 at 13347). The district

court excluded this evidence—an exclusion we today rule was

reversible error. See Trade Secrets Case at 14-15. This

evidence, so pertinent to Kolon’s defense, makes Akzo a matter

in controversy.

59
 DuPont contends—at least as to this appeal—that the

antitrust claims are too attenuated from Akzo to be the same

matter in controversy. In reality, this litigation is all the

same action and the same case. Moreover, in my view, recusal

was required, at the very latest, by July 2011, prior to the

severance of the trade secret claim from the antitrust

counterclaim, which occurred on September 21, 2011. Thus, the

district court’s mandatory recusal in the trade secrets claims

likewise mandates recusal on the antitrust counterclaims brought

by Kolon.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, I would vacate summary judgment

and remand for new proceedings before a different district

judge. I therefore dissent.

60