UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
TIFARAH CHENAL MCDANIEL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 11-545 (EGS)
)
FEDITC LLC, )
FEDERAL IT CONSULTING, )
)
Defendant. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On February 18, 2011, plaintiff Tifarah C. McDaniel,
proceeding pro se, filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia against defendant FEDITC LLC (“FEDITC”) for
retaliation and wrongful termination.1 Defendant timely removed
the action to this Court. Pending before the Court is
defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. Upon
consideration of defendant’s motion, the response and reply
thereto, the applicable law, the entire record, and for the
reasons set forth below, the Court hereby GRANTS defendant’s
motion to dismiss.
1
Plaintiff’s complaint does not specify the law under
which she is seeking relief. Plaintiff alleges, however, that
the “EEOC has granted me a right to sue letter; EEOC could not
find any violation of sexual harassment by the client . . . .
Nonetheless, I endured retaliated [sic] against by the defendant
for my complaint which led to wrongful termination.” Compl. at
3:1-6. Accordingly, the Court understands that plaintiff intends
to bring suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant FEDITC is a minority-owned Maryland limited
liability company specializing in information technology, with
its principal place of business in Rockville, Maryland. Def.
Mot. Ex. 1, Declaration of Richard Goudie (“Goudie Decl.”), Doc.
No. 5-2, ¶ 3. On or about July 24, 2008, FEDITC hired plaintiff
Tifarah McDaniel for contract work in Alexandria, Virginia.
Goudie Decl. ¶ 4. At the time of her employment with FEDITC,
plaintiff was a resident of Virginia.2 Compl. at 4:1-2; Pl. Opp.
at 2 (“[A]t the time of my employment with the defendant, I lived
in Alexandria, Virginia . . . .”).
Plaintiff alleges that within a week of her employment, she
began experiencing “harassing behaviors, comments and remarks of
me [sic] sexual involvement with co-workers.” Compl. at 2:8-10.
Plaintiff alleges that she complained about this behavior to
FEDITC managers by e-mail but received no response about how the
incident would be handled. Compl. at 2:14-18. On August 8,
2008, plaintiff’s employment was terminated, purportedly due to a
security breach. Def. Mot. Ex. 2, Amended Charge of
Discrimination, Doc. No. 5-3, at 1 (“Am. Charge”).
On September 4, 2008, plaintiff filed a complaint against
2
Prior to her employment with FEDITC, plaintiff was a
resident of California. Compl. at 4:1. Plaintiff currently
resides in Washington, DC. See Notice of Removal Ex. 3, Summons,
Doc. No. 1-3.
2
FEDITC with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),
charging discrimination based on race and retaliation under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Pl. Opp. Ex. 1, Charge of
Discrimination, Doc. No. 7-1, at 1. This complaint was later
amended to add a charge of discrimination on the basis of sex.
See Am. Charge at 1. Both complaints were cross-filed with the
Alexandria, Virginia Office of Human Rights. The EEOC ultimately
dismissed plaintiff’s charges and closed its investigation on
November 23, 2010, finding no information sufficient to establish
a statutory violation by FEDITC. Pl. Opp. Ex. 5, Dismissal and
Notice of Rights, Doc. No. 7-1.
Plaintiff subsequently filed suit in the Superior Court of
the District of Columbia and served notice of the complaint on
defendant by mail to its principal business address in Rockville,
Maryland. Notice of Removal Ex. 1, Affidavit of Service, Doc.
No. 1-1. Plaintiff seeks monetary relief in excess of $100,000
for lost wages, as well as compensatory damages. Compl. at 4:14-
16 (seeking monetary relief in the amount of $52,000 per year for
two years); Pl. Opp. at 4 (requesting “2.5 years of back pay and
compensatory damages amounting $140,000 or greater”).
Defendant timely removed plaintiff’s action to this Court on
grounds of diversity and federal question jurisdiction.3 On April
3
Based on the facts set forth in plaintiff’s complaint,
the Court finds that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over this
action. Plaintiff has not sought to remand this action to
3
5, 2011, defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for
lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(2), and for forum non conveniens, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1404. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is now ripe for
consideration by the Court.
II. ANALYSIS
“It is plaintiff’s burden to make a prima facie showing that
the Court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants.”
Lammers Kurtz v. United States, 779 F. Supp. 2d 50, 51 (D.D.C.
2011) (quoting Ballard v. Holinka, 601 F. Supp. 2d 110, 117
(D.D.C. 2009)). A plaintiff must plead specific facts providing
a basis for personal jurisdiction. Kurtz, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 51.
Although complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs are to be
liberally construed, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007), “[p]ro se plaintiffs are not freed from the requirement
to plead an adequate jurisdictional basis for their claims.”
Kurtz, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 51 (quoting Gomez v. Aragon, 705 F.
Supp. 2d 21, 23 (D.D.C. 2010)).
In the D.C. Circuit, personal jurisdiction “must be
determined by reference to District of Columbia law.” United
States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1995). District
of Columbia law provides three avenues by which a court may
Superior Court.
4
exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant. The Court will
address each in turn.
First, under D.C. Code section 13-422, “[a] District of
Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person
domiciled in, organized under the laws of, or maintaining his or
its principal place of business in, the District of Columbia as
to any claim for relief.” Here, it is undisputed that FEDITC is
a Maryland limited liability corporation that maintains its
principal place of business in Rockville, Maryland. Accordingly,
FEDITC does not fall within the scope of D.C. Code section 13-
422, and this Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over
defendant on these grounds.
A court may nonetheless exercise jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant under the District of Columbia “long-arm”
statute, set forth at section 13-423 of the D.C. Code. This
statute allows District of Columbia courts to exercise
jurisdiction over “acts of a defendant that touch and concern the
forum.” See Steinberg v. Int’l Criminal Police Org., 672 F.2d
927, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1981). To establish so-called “specific”
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, plaintiff must plead
facts sufficient to show that the defendant, acting directly or
through an agent, engages in certain types of conduct in the
District, including, among other things, transacting business in
the District of Columbia or contracting to supply services in the
5
District of Columbia. D.C. Code § 13-423(a). However, where
jurisdiction is based solely on this provision, “only a claim for
relief arising from acts enumerated in this section may be
asserted against [the defendant].” D.C. Code § 13-423(b)
(emphasis added).
While plaintiff’s complaint itself contains no allegation
that FEDITC engages in activity in the District of Columbia, in
her opposition to defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff does
contend that FEDITC “has ties to Washington DC by their
announcement March 2010 of jobs contracted in the Washington DC
area.” Pl. Opp. at 2. As support, plaintiff points to FEDITC’s
website, which indicates that defendant had secured at least one
contract for services in the District of Columbia as of March
2010. Pl. Opp. Ex. 6, Doc. No. 7-1. The Court finds these
allegations insufficient to support specific personal
jurisdiction over defendant FEDITC in this case. Although
plaintiff may be correct that FEDITC contracts to supply services
in the District of Columbia, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate
that her retaliation claim is in any way related to the business
that FEDITC currently conducts in the District. Rather, it is
undisputed that FEDITC hired plaintiff in 2008 solely to work on
a contract for services in Alexandria, Virginia.4 Accordingly,
4
It is also undisputed that plaintiff herself resided in
Virginia during her brief tenure at FEDITC.
6
the Court concludes that it cannot assert specific personal
jurisdiction over defendant FEDITC under the District of Columbia
long-arm statute.5
Finally, a court may exercise “general” personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident corporate defendant pursuant to
section 13-334 of the D.C. Code (the “General Jurisdiction
Statute”). This statute provides for personal jurisdiction over
a foreign corporation “doing business in the District.” D.C.
Code § 13-334(a). This statute makes clear, however, that in
order for service to be “effectual to bring the corporation
before the court,” process must be served within the District of
Columbia. Id. (“In an action against a foreign corporation doing
business in the District, process may be served on the agent of
the corporation or person conducting its business, or, when he is
absent and can not be found, by leaving a copy at the principal
place of business in the District, or, where there is no such
place of business, by leaving a copy at the place of business or
residence of the agent in the District . . . .”). Even assuming
plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that FEDITC is doing business
in the District of Columbia, it is undisputed that plaintiff
5
Because the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to
plead sufficient facts under the District of Columbia long-arm
statute, it does not reach the second part of the specific
jurisdiction analysis, which is whether the exercise of personal
jurisdiction would satisfy the requirements of due process. See
Ferrara, 54 F.3d at 828.
7
served FEDITC by mail to its principal place of business in
Rockville, Maryland, and not in the District of Columbia. Such
service does not meet the requirements of D.C. Code section 13-
334. See Gowens v. DynCorp, 132 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42 (D.D.C. 2001)
(finding service of process at company headquarters in Virginia
insufficient to confer general personal jurisdiction in the
District of Columbia). Accordingly, the Court concludes that it
cannot assert general personal jurisdiction over defendant
FEDITC.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court must GRANT defendant’s
motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Having found sufficient grounds to grant
defendant’s motion, the Court does not reach defendant’s
arguments regarding forum non conveniens.
III. CONCLUSION
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint is
hereby GRANTED. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum
Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: EMMET G. SULLIVAN
United States District Judge
November 18, 2011
Notice to:
Tifarah C. McDaniel
P.O. Box 15377
Washington, DC 20003-0377
8