UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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BARBARA BOND, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Case No. 10-1961 (RJL)
)
A TSI/JACKSONVILLE JOB CORPS )
CENTER, et al. )
)
Defendants. )
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
(September''l;n, 2011) [Dkt. # 7, 8, 13,20]
I. Introduction and Background.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, claims that she was sexually harassed by her former
coworker at the Jacksonville Job Corps Center (JJCC), which provides "a no-cost education and
career technical training program administered by the U.S. Department of Labor that helps
young people ages 16 through 24 improve the quality of their lives through career technical and
academic training" in Florida. CompI. ~ 1, 10-15, ECF No.1; About Us, Jacksonville Job Corps
Center, http://jacksonville.jobcorps.gov/about.aspx (last visited Sept. 12,2011). She commenced
this action against the A TSIIJacksonville Job Corps Center (A TSIIJJCC); Clark V. Hayes, who
plaintiff alleges was the owner, the CEO, and an employee of A TSIIJJCC; and Marvin Owens,
an employee of A TSIIJJCC over whom plaintiff alleges Mr. Hayes exercised supervision.
CompI. ~~ 5-7. She alleges: (1) discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 by ATSI/JJCC; (2) a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights by
ATSIIJJCC and Mr. Owens; (3) battery by Mr. Owens; and (4) negligent retention and
supervision by ATSIIJJCC. Id. ~~ 16-55. Nowhere does plaintiff specifically pray for relief
against Mr. Hayes. See generally CompI. 1
Mr. Owens and Mr. Hayes (collectively, not including ATSIIJJCC, "defendants") have
moved to dismiss the claims against them, arguing in relevant part that the Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over them. See Def. Marvin Owens' Mot. Dismiss, ECF No.7; Def. Marvin Owens'
Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 2-5, ECF No. 7-1 [hereinafter Owens's Mem.]; Def. Clark V.
Hayes' Special Appearance Mot. Dismiss, ECF No.8; Hayes's Mem at 3-6. 2 Plaintiff has
opposed these motions, but instead of directly addressing the merits, plaintiff requests discovery
regarding defendants' contact with this forum. See PI's Mot. Opp'n Defs. Clark V. Hayes &
Marvin M. Owens Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 17 [hereinafter Opp'n]. Plaintiff has also filed a
separate motion for leave to conduct that discovery. See PI.' s Mot. Conduct Disc. Limited to
Issue Personal Jurisdiction, ECF No. 13 [hereinafter Disc. Mot.]. Finally, plaintiff has moved to
strike defendants' dispositive motions. See Mot. Strike Defs.' Answers & Defenses, ECF No. 20
[hereinafter Mot. to Strike].
First, plaintiffs motion to strike is denied because the federal rules only provide for
striking pleadings, not dispositive motions. An opposition to a dispositive motion serves as a
party's objection to arguments made in that motion but does not necessitate formally striking
those arguments. Second, defendants' motions to dismiss will be granted because defendants do
not have, and have not had, contacts with this forum sufficient to support the exercise of personal
jurisdiction. Finally, the motion for leave to conduct discovery will be denied because the
1 Although Mr. Hayes has pointed this out, he has not moved to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Mem. P. & A. Supp. Def. Clark V. Hayes'
Special Appearance Mot. Dismiss at 2, n.1, ECF No. 8-1 [hereinafter Hayes's Mem.].
2 ATSIIJJCC has not yet responded to the complaint.
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discovery sought would not show that the Court would have personal jurisdiction over
defendants.
II. Analysis.
A. The Motion to Strike Will Be Denied.
Plaintiff asks that "Defendants['] Motion[ s] to Dismiss be stricken." Mot. to Strike at 2.
In her motion, plaintiff points to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 7(a) and 12(f). Id at 1. "The
court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Only the following are pleadings:
"(1) a complaint; (2) an answer to a complaint; (3) an answer to a counterclaim designated as a
counterclaim; (4) an answer to a crossclaim; (5) a third-party complaint; (6) an answer to a third-
party complaint; and (7) if the court orders one, a reply to an answer." Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a). A
motion to strike a motion is therefore not proper under Rule 12(f). See Structural Concrete
Prods., LLC v. Clarendon Am. Ins. Co., 244 F.R.D. 317, 321 (E.D. Va. 2007).
By the very text of the rules cited by plaintiff, then, this motion may not be granted: She
asks that a motion be stricken, but a motion is not a pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b). A
motion to strike a motion may be considered instead as an opposition. Fisherman's Harvest,
Inc. v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 681, 690 (Fed. Cl. 2006); Goyal v. Thermage, Inc., No. 08-cv-
20,2010 WL 2651185, at *2, n. 12 (D. Md. July 1,2010). Therefore, the Court will deny
plaintiff s motion to strike, but will consider the substantive arguments made therein-that
defendants have sufficient contacts with this forum, Mot. to Strike at I-as supplementing her
opposition to defendants' dispositive motions.
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B. The Motions to Dismiss Will Be Granted.
1. Legal Standard.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) provides for dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction. The plaintiff bears the burden of "establishing a factual basis for the [Court's]
exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant." Crane v. N. Y Zoological Soc y, 894 F.2d
454,456 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). To meet this burden, the plaintiff "must allege
specific acts connecting [the] defendant with the forum[.]" Second Amendment Found. v. Us.
Conference of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (alterations inoriginal)(citations
omitted). When evaluating whether a plaintiff has met her burden, "factual discrepancies
appearing in the record must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff." N. Y Zoological Soc y, 894
F.2d at 456 (citations omitted).
2. Personal Jurisdiction May Be Specific or General.
A court may exercise two forms of personal jurisdiction: specific and general. Specific
jurisdiction exists where a claim arises out of the defendant's contacts with the forum.
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984) (citations
omitted). First, specific jurisdiction must comport with the forum's long-arm statute. United
States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The District of Columbia's long-arm
statute extends personal jurisdiction over a defendant where a claim arises from the defendant's:
(1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia;
(2) contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia;
(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or
omission in the District of Columbia;
(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or
omission outside the District of Columbia if he regularly does or solicits business,
engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue
from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of Columbia;
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in the District
of Columbia;
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(6) contracting to insure or act as surety for or on any person, property, or
risk, contract, obligation, or agreement located, executed, or to be perfonned
within the District of Columbia at the time of contracting, unless the parties
otherwise provide in writing; or
(7) marital or parent and child relationship in the District of
Columbia ....
D.C. Code § 13-423(a). Second, specific jurisdiction must comport with constitutional
guarantees of due process: A defendant must have "certain minimum contacts [with the forum
state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotations
and citations omitted). Those guarantees are satisfied "if the defendant has purposefully directed
his activities at residents of the forum," and "the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise
out of or relate to those activities." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-73
(1985) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
General jurisdiction, by contrast, exists where a defendant maintains sufficiently
systematic and continuous contacts with the forum state, regardless of whether those contacts
gave rise to the claim. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.9. First, general jurisdiction must
comport with D.C. Code § 13-422, which provides that a "District of Columbia court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a person domiciled in, organized under the laws of, or
maintaining his or its principal place of business in, the District of Columbia as to any claim for
relief." § 13-422; Cornellv. Kellner, 539 F. Supp. 2d 311, 314 n.7 (D.D.C. 2008). Second,
general jurisdiction must also comport with constitutional guarantees of due process. Int'l Shoe
Co., 326 U.S. at 316. Those guarantees are satisfied if a defendant has such continuous and
systematic contacts with the forum that the defendant could reasonably foresee being hauled into
court in that forum. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,297 (1980).
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3. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendants.
Plaintiff has not met her burden to show that this Court has specific jurisdiction over
defendants. Mr. Owens resides and works for the ATSIIJJCC in Jacksonville, Florida. Decl. of
M. Owens ~~ 2-3, ECF No. 7-2. His only contact with the District of Columbia was one visit
approximately 10 to 12 years ago-a contact out of which plaintiff s claims plainly do not arise.
Id. ~ 4. Mr. Hayes, an Ohio citizen who also maintains his offices in Ohio, apparently has no
contacts with the District of Columbia whatsoever. Aff. of C. Hayes, ECF No. 8-2. Therefore,
neither Mr. Owens nor Mr. Hayes can be reached by the District's long-arm statute. Moreover,
the events giving rise to this case allegedly took place in Jacksonville and have nothing to do
with any contacts made with this forum. Compl. ~ 10-15. Plaintiff has simply not pled any
jurisdictional facts to show that this Court can exercise specific jurisdiction over defendants. See
Compl.; Opp'n.
Concerning general jurisdiction, plaintiff has similarly not pled any jurisdictional facts to
show that defendants fall under any category ofD.C. Code § 13-422 or have any systematic and
continuous contacts with this forum. See Compl.; Opp'n. Plaintiffs only argument to the
contrary is that "the defendants have engaged in contractual business with the federal
government (e.g., United States Department of Labor)." Opp'n at 2; see also Compl. ~ 3
(contending that "Defendants transacts [sic] contractual business in this district with the United
States Department of Labor"); Mot. to Strike at 1 (contending that Mr. Owens "has entered into
contracts with the federal government"). This argument fails for several reasons. First, plaintiff
collapses Mr. Hayes and Mr. Owens with ATSIIJJCC in her conclusory assertion that all three
"defendants" have engaged in such business. Opp'n at 2. Second, even if Messrs. Owens and
Hayes have engaged in such business, such that they would be subject to the District's long-arm
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statute for "transacting any business in the District of Columbia," D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1), or
"contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia," D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(2),
plaintiffs claims have nothing to do with that business. Specific jurisdiction, therefore, cannot
be based on those contacts. Finally, as to general jurisdiction, plaintiff provides no specific
allegations from which the Court could examine whether these alleged contractual contacts are
systematic or continuous, and those contacts still fail to bring Messrs. Owens and Hayes under
any provision of D.C. Code § 13-422. See Compl.; Opp'n. 3
C. The Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery Will Be Denied.
Finally, plaintiff seeks leave to discover "facts evidencing purposeful activity by
Defendants within the District of Columbia." Disc. Mot. at 1. Such discovery "would aid the
plaintiff in acquiring contracts entered into by the defendants with the federal government,"
plaintiff states. Opp'n at 3. Plaintiff thus seeks to bolster her argument that defendants have
conducted business with the U.S. Department of Labor sufficient to support personal jurisdiction.
"[W]hile jurisdictional discovery is liberally granted, a plaintiff is not entitled to take it
solely because [she] requests it-[she] still must make the requisite showing of good cause." Nu
Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,322, No. 11-cv-301, 2011 WL 3240562, at *1 (D.D.C. July 29,2011).
Thus, a plaintiff must, inter alia, "reasonably demonstrate[] that [she] can supplement [her]
jurisdictional allegations through discovery." Exponential Biotherapies, Inc. v. Houthoff Buruma
3 Plaintiff also expresses concern that Mr. Hayes and ATSIIJJCC may be one and the
same, implying that general jurisdiction may be had over Mr. Hayes insofar as he is A TSIIJCCC,
presumably under D.C. Code § 13-334. Opp'n at 2; Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293
F.3d 506, 509 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing § 13-334(a)) ("District of Columbia law also permits
courts to exercise' general jurisdiction' over a foreign corporation as to claims not arising from
the corporation's conduct in the District, if the corporation is 'doing business' in the
District.")(citations omitted). But ATSIIJJCC is already a separate defendant in this case, and
plaintiff has made it clear that Mr. Hayes is sued only "in his individual capacity," i.e., not in
whatever corporate identity he may share with ATSIIJJCC. Compl. ~ 6. Plaintiffs concern is
therefore irrelevant to whether the Court has personal jurisdiction over Mr. Hayes.
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N. V, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Plaintiff
has failed to make that demonstration because, as discussed above, even if plaintiff were able to
plead jurisdictional facts demonstrating defendants' contact with the federal government, those
contacts would not suffice to support a finding of personal jurisdiction in this case. See
discussion supra Part II.B.3. The motion for discovery will therefore be denied.
III. Conclusion.
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will deny the motion to strike, deny the
motion for leave to conduct discovery, and grant the motions to dismiss. Separate orders
consistent with this Memorandum Opinion shall issue this date.
DATE: SeptembedQ 2011
+.- '2
RICH~
United States Istnct Judge
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