UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
________________________________
)
CHARLES L. FONVILLE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Civil Action No. 02-2353 (EGS)
v. )
)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, )
)
Defendant. )
________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is [142] defendant’s motion to stay
the proceedings. Upon consideration of the motion, opposition
and reply, the representations of counsel at the hearing held
February 17, 2011, the relevant law, and the record as a whole,
the Court hereby GRANTS defendant’s motion for a stay.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Charles Fonville filed this suit in 2002 to
contest his summary demotion from Commander in the Metropolitan
Police Department to Captain by then-police chief Charles F.
Ramsey. In 2006 this Court denied defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, finding in relevant part that, on the record before the
Court at the time, plaintiff retained all the protections of the
Comprehensive Merit Protection Act (“CMPA”) when he was promoted
to Commander. Accordingly, the Court concluded plaintiff had “a
constitutionally-protected property interest in the Commander
position” and therefore could not be demoted to Captain without
cause and due process. Memorandum Opinion of August 22, 2006,
Doc. No. 48 at 12. Since the Court issued its ruling in 2006,
the defendant has consistently sought to have the Court
reconsider it. The case has undergone several additional rounds
of briefing, additional discovery, and the Court has held
additional motions hearings. The parties agree that whether
plaintiff had a property interest in his Commander position is a
threshold - and dispositive - issue in this litigation. See,
e.g., Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, Doc. No. 119 at 30 - 37; Plaintiff’s Opposition and
Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 122 at 1, 13-
25.
Since August 2009, the parties have filed multiple notices
of subsequent authority with the Court. All of the cases cited
are from the District of Columbia Office of Employee Appeals or
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, and they squarely
address the issue before this Court: whether a Metropolitan
Police Department Commander (or, in one case, an Inspector) has a
property interest in his position, or whether he may be demoted
to the rank of Captain at the pleasure of the Chief of Police.
Two of the cases presented to the Court as subsequent authority,
Hoey v. D.C. Office of Employee Appeals and D.C. Metropolitan
Police Dep’t, and Burton v. D.C. Office of Employee Appeals,
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have been appealed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
See District of Columbia Court of Appeals Cases 09-CV-1493 and
10-CV-963. Briefing is complete in the Burton case, and is
scheduled to conclude by no later than March 1, 2011 in the Hoey
matter. The Solicitor General’s Office for the District of
Columbia has advised that the cases have been or will be assigned
to the same merits panel for consideration.
On November 23, 2010, the defendant filed a motion to stay
this case pending resolution of the Court of Appeals’ decision in
Hoey and Burton. Plaintiff opposes the stay because he believes
the relevant statutes in this case are different than those in
Hoey and Burton, and because of the delay which will result from
a stay.
II. ANALYSIS
“A trial court has broad discretion to stay all
proceedings in an action pending the resolution of independent
proceedings elsewhere.” Hisler v. Gallaudet Univ., 344 F.Supp.2d
29, 35 (D.D.C. 2004) (citing Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S.
248, 254 (1936)). The court “must weigh competing interests and
maintain an even balance,” when determining when to stay a
proceeding. Landis, 299 U.S. at 254. “The power to stay
proceedings is . . . inherent in every court to control the
disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and
effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Air Line
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Pilots Ass’n v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866, 879 n.6 (1998) (quoting
Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55). “Indeed, ‘a trial court may, with
propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket and the
fairest course for the parties to enter a stay of an action
before it pending resolution of independent proceedings which
bear upon the case.” IBT/HERE Employee Representatives’ Council
v. Gate Gourmet Div. Ams., 402 F.Supp.2d 289, 292 (D.D.C. 2005).
Defendant argues that a stay of proceedings in the instant
case pending final resolution of Hoey and Burton is warranted
because it would promote efficiency and provide guidance on a
question of law which is dispositive in this case. See Def’s
Motion to Stay at 2. The Court agrees. In Hoey and Burton, the
highest Court of the District of Columbia will be determining
what, if any, property interest Commanders in the Metropolitan
Police Department have in their positions. This is one of the
questions squarely before this Court in the instant case. As a
general rule, “state law determines whether a public employee has
a property interest in continued employment.” Cambriello v.
County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 2002). And as the
highest “state” court, decisions of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals on matters of local law are entitled to a high
degree of deference from the federal courts. See, e.g., Pernell
v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 368 (1974). Accordingly, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ decisions in Hoey and
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Burton are likely to be extremely persuasive to, if not binding
upon, this Court.
Plaintiff argues that any decision by the D.C. Court of
Appeals would be “inapplicable to [his] case” because the
governing statute changed between the time he was promoted to
Commander and the time Mssrs. Hoey and Burton were promoted.
(Pl.’s Opp’n to Motion for Stay at 4.) Defendant responds that
the statutes are substantially identical, and accordingly the
Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the one statute will provide
meaningful guidance as to how to interpret the other. The Court
agrees with the Defendant.
In 1999, the relevant statutory provision that governed Mr.
Fonville’s promotion and demotion provided:
4-104. Appointments; assignments; promotions; applicable
civil service provisions; vacancies
The Mayor of said District shall appoint to office,
assign to such duty or duties as he may prescribe, and
promote all officers and members of said Metropolitan
Police force; provided, that all officers, members, and
civilian employees of the force except the Chief of
Police, the Assistant and Deputy Chiefs of Police, and
the inspectors, shall be appointed and promoted in
accordance with the provisions of [Federal Career Civil
Service laws] . . . ; provided further, that the
Assistant and Deputy Chiefs of Police and inspectors
shall be selected from among the captains of the force
and shall be returned to the rank of captain when the
Mayor so determines.
D.C. Official Code § 4-104 (1999) (emphasis added).
When Messrs. Hoey and Burton were promoted and demoted, two
statutory provisions governed the District’s actions. First,
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Section 4-104 had been re-codified as Section 5-105.01(a), but
was otherwise identical. Second, D.C. Code § 1-608.01(d-1) was
enacted after plaintiff’s demotion but before Hoey’s and
Burton’s. It states in relevant part:
1-608.01 Creation of Career Service
(a) The Mayor shall issue rules and regulations
governing employment, advancement and retention in the
Career Service . . . .
(d-1) For members of the Metropolitan Police Department
and notwisthstanding [ ] any other law or regulation, the
Assistant and Deputy Chiefs of Police and inspectors
shall be selected from among the captains of the force
and shall be returned to the rank of captain when the
Mayor so determines.
D.C. Official Code § 1-608.01.
The language is clear: two of the three sections at issue
are identical and the third, § 1-608(d-1), is substantially so.
Moreover, the relevant regulations - District Personnel Manual
Title 6, Chapter 8, §§ 872.1, 872.3 and 872.5 - are identical for
plaintiff in this case and Messrs. Hoey and Burton. Finally,
Metropolitan Police Department General Order 101.9, which the
Office of Employee Appeals and the Superior Court relied upon in
both Hoey and Burton, was in effect at all times relevant in this
case as well. Given the striking similarities between the
governing law in this case and in Hoey and Burton, efficiency
requires this case be stayed. See Fairview Hospital v. Leavitt,
Case No. 05-1065, 2007 WL 1521233 at *3 (D.D.C. May 22, 2007).
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The Court is not insensitive to the plaintiff’s concerns
regarding delay. This case has been pending for several years,
and plaintiff’s desire for finality is entirely understandable.
However, after balancing the competing interests, the Court is
persuaded that a stay is warranted because resolution of pending
litigation in the D.C. Court of Appeals will likely “narrow the
issues in the pending cases and assist in the determination of
the questions of law involved.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 253; see
also Fairview Hosp. v. Leavitt, 2007 WL 1521233 at *3. The need
to correctly resolve the Fifth Amendment property interest issue
is particularly acute in this case. As the District of Columbia
points out, this question “has now been adjudicated and
interpreted differently by a District of Columbia administrative
agency . . . the District of Columbia Superior Court, [and]
federal district courts.” Def’s Motion to Stay at 2. In light
of the centrality of the issue to the instant case, the Court is
persuaded that a stay is appropriate.
III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Because the case at hand raises nearly identical issues as
those currently awaiting judgment in Hoey v. D.C. Office of
Employee Appeals and D.C. Metropolitan Police Dep’t, 09-CV-1493
and Burton v. D.C. Office of Employee Appeals, 10-CV-963 (D.C.
Court of Appeals), and because holding this case in abeyance
pending the final resolution of those matters will foster
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efficiency and conservation of resources, the defendant’s motion
for a stay will be granted. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendant’s motion for a stay of the
proceedings be, and hereby is, GRANTED. This case is STAYED
pending final resolution of Hoey and Burton. It is further
ORDERED that District of Columbia provide the Court with all
briefs filed in the D.C. Court of Appeals in the Hoey and Burton
cases, and apprise this Court of all developments in either case
within (10) days of any and all developments, including when the
case(s) are scheduled for oral argument and when final resolution
has been reached.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
February 28, 2011
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