UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MICHAEL DORSEY, :
:
Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 10-0741 (RMU)
:
v. : Re Document Nos.: 5, 6, 7, 10, 12, 18, 19,
: 24
:
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA’S MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING DEFENDANT
CLAYTOR’S MOTION TO DISMISS; DISMISSING SUA SPONTE THE CLAIMS AGAINST
DEFENDANTS AFFILIATED COMPUTER SERVICE, BABERS, BUTLER, MATTHEWS AND GLASSOR
I. INTRODUCTION
The pro se plaintiff has brought suit against the District of Columbia (“the District”), the
D.C. Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”), various DMV employees and a DMV contractor,
Affiliated Computer Services (“ACS”). He alleges that the defendants have interfered with his
business of “assisting persons and businesses with parking and moving violation matters.” Two
of the defendants – the District and DMV employee Cassandra Claytor – have filed motions to
dismiss. Because the plaintiff lacks standing to bring his claims, the court grants these
defendants’ motions to dismiss and sua sponte dismisses the claims against the remaining
defendants.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background 1
The plaintiff is an individual engaged in the business of “assisting persons and
businesses with parking and moving violation matters.” 2 See Compl. at 1. The plaintiff alleges
that the defendants have “devised numerous . . . tactics that interfere with the plaintiff’s efforts to
assist persons and business[es] with parking and traffic ticket problems at the District of
Columbia [DMV].” Id. at 2. Among these “tactics” are the refusal by the DMV clerk to
schedule hearings for the plaintiff, the public’s lack of access to online scheduling for parking
ticket hearings and the refusal by hearing officers to proceed with hearings when the police
officer who issued the ticket fails to appear or when a required affidavit is unattainable. Id. at 2,
7. The plaintiff also states that a District of Columbia law is interfering with his business by
denying enrollees of a DMV program called the “fleet program” the ability to challenge their
parking tickets. 3 Id. at 2. The plaintiff does not indicate that he is a participant in this program.
See generally Compl.
1
The plaintiff presents a cornucopia of claims, many of which are incoherent and wholly unrelated
to one another. See generally Compl. Indeed, the complaint itself is riddled with incomplete
sentences and is largely incomprehensible. Id. Notwithstanding these challenges, the court
attempts to glean the relevant facts from the complaint and treats all discernable factual
allegations as true. City of Waukesha v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 320 F.3d 228, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(per curiam) (holding that the merits of a case must be assumed when considering standing);
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (noting that a “document filed pro se is to be
liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).
2
The plaintiff provides no information regarding his business or employment duties beyond this
statement. See generally Compl.
3
The plaintiff fails to provide any description or further information regarding the “fleet program,”
beyond professing that it is illegal. See Compl. at 6. Nor does the plaintiff specify the D.C. Code
provision that he claims states that companies enrolled in the “fleet program” “may not receive
hearings regarding parking tickets.” See id. at 3.
2
Additionally, the plaintiff alleges that DMV officials were “punishing” him by changing
the format of parking tickets. Id. at 8. The old format of parking tickets required police officers
to check the “owner box” on the ticket, which presumably would require that a vehicle’s owner
be held liable for the ticket. Id. DMV officials requested that the D.C. Council modify the
parking tickets so as to not require that the “owner box” be checked. Id. at 8.
According to the plaintiff, the defendants have “created what came to be known as ‘The
Dorsey Rules,’ a group of discriminatory artifices that target the plaintiff.” Id. at 4. One of these
rules allows the chief hearing examiner to ban the plaintiff from the DMV building for a time
period which she deems appropriate if it is discovered that the plaintiff gave a DMV employee
anything of value. Id. The plaintiff claims that this rule, which is incorporated into the
“Municipal Regulations,” is not enforced against “other representatives.” 4 Id.
In addition, the plaintiff’s complaint presents the following broad allegations, though
with little if any factual context:
(1) The DMV management “maintain[s] a gender-based hierarchy. . . that
deliberately excludes males.” Id. at 6.
(2) Defendants David Glasser and Desiree Matthews made a false written claim that
the plaintiff sexually harassed Matthews without providing any evidence of
sexual harassment. Id.
(3) D.C. Council members receive preferential treatment at the DMV. Id. at 9-10.
(4) DMV hearing officers do not receive copies of recent court and Traffic
Adjudication Appeals Board decisions that may have an impact on their own
4
Presumably, the plaintiff’s reference to “other representatives” are individuals who are also in the
“business [of] assisting persons and businesses with parking and moving violation matters.”
Compl. at 1.
3
decisions, resulting in erroneous hearing officer decisions and, in turn, unlawful
increased revenues for the DMV. Id. at 8.
(5) The DMV is issuing illegal, unfair and defective tickets. Id. at 9.
(6) Defendant ACS 5 failed to maintain tickets properly, resulting in ticket recipients
receiving ticket reports two years after a ticket had been issued. Id. at 6.
(7) DMV agents “illegally withheld and [] allowed to be withheld information
according to the Freedom of Information Act of the District of Columbia,”
concerning D.C. Council member Michael Brown. Id. at 3.
B. Procedural History
On May 5, 2010, the plaintiff commenced this action, alleging that the defendants
violated the Fourteenth Amendment when they “persecuted, discriminated against and engaged
[in] personal animus against him.” Compl. at 1, 3. The plaintiff also contends that he was
discriminated against when D.C. Council members “receive[d] unfair and preferential treatment
with parking ticket costs.” Id. at 4. Additionally, the plaintiff makes broad, conclusory
allegations of gender discrimination, slander and violations of the District of Columbia Freedom
of Information Act (“D.C. FOIA”). See Compl. at 3, 6. Although the plaintiff’s complaint does
not specify that he is bringing suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he does indicate on the civil cover
sheet form attached to his complaint that he is filing the suit under “the Fourteenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution [and] 42 USC 1983.” See Compl., Civil Cover Sheet at 2. As relief, the
plaintiff seeks an order requiring the Department of Justice to perform “[a] comprehensive
investigation of the operations at the District of Columbia [DMV].” Compl. at 9. He also
requests a court order requiring that DMV officials “cease and desist allowing members of the
5
Affiliated Computer Services, Inc. owns ACS State and Local Solutions, Inc., an independent
subsidiary company that provides services to the District of Columbia “in connection with tickets
issued by the [DMV] for parking violations.” ACS Mot. to Dismiss at 1.
4
D.C. Council to receive preferential treatment when they receive notices of [an] infraction.” Id.
Finally, the plaintiff requests punitive and compensatory damages in the amount of $500,000. 6
Id. at 9.
The District and defendant Claytor have filed motions to dismiss the complaint, arguing,
inter alia, that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring this suit.7 See District’s Mot. to Dismiss; Def.
Claytor’s Mot. to Dismiss. 8 With these motions ripe for adjudication, the court turns to the
applicable legal standards and the parties’ arguments.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard for Standing
Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to cases or
controversies. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. These prerequisites reflect the “common
understanding of what it takes to make a justiciable case.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998). Consequently, “a showing of standing ‘is an essential and
unchanging’ predicate to any exercise of [a court’s] jurisdiction.” Fla. Audubon Soc’y v.
Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
6
The plaintiff also sought a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) requiring the DMV employees to
“cease and desist [utilizing] tactics against this plaintiff’s efforts to assist persons and businesses
with notices of infraction that appear before the agency; and allow participants in the Fleet
Adjudication Program to adjudicate parking tickets.” Compl. at 9-10. On May 17, 2010, this
court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a TRO. See generally Mem. Op. (May 17, 2010). The
plaintiff has since filed multiple motions asking the court to reconsider its ruling. See generally
Pl.’s Mot. to Recons. TRO; Pl.’s Mot. for Protective Order; Pl.’s Mot. to Expedite. Because the
court dismisses the plaintiff’s claims for lack of standing, the plaintiff’s motions for
reconsideration of this court’s May 17, 2010 ruling are denied as moot.
7
Defendant ACS also filed a motion to dismiss, but did not assert standing grounds. See generally
ACS Mot. to Dismiss at 1. Because the court sua sponte dismisses any claims against ACS based
on the plaintiff’s lack of standing, its motion to dismiss is denied as moot.
8
The motions filed by the District and Claytor are largely identical. Compare Def. D.C.’s Mot. to
Dismiss and Def. Claytor’s Mot. to Dismiss.
5
555, 560 (1992)). Put slightly differently, “Article III standing must be resolved as threshold
matter.” Raytheon Co. v. Ashborn Agencies, Ltd., 372 F.3d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing
Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 96-102).
As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 104; City of Waukesha v. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 320 F.3d 228, 233 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (per curiam). The extent of the plaintiff’s burden
varies according to the procedural posture of the case. Sierra Club v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 292
F.3d 895, 898-99 (D.C. Cir. 2002). At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury
resulting from the defendant’s conduct will suffice. Id. On a motion for summary judgment,
however, the “plaintiff can no longer rest on such mere allegations, but must set forth by
affidavit or other evidence specific facts which for purposes of the summary judgment motion
will be taken to be true.” Id. at 899 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at
561; FED. R. CIV. P. 56); accord Fla. Audubon, 94 F.3d at 666.
To demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-pronged test. Sierra Club, 292
F.3d at 898 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in
fact, defined as a harm that is concrete and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.
Byrd v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 174 F.3d 239, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Steel Co., 523 U.S. at
103). Second, the injury must be fairly traceable to the governmental conduct alleged. Id.
Finally, it must be likely that the requested relief will redress the alleged injury. Id. This Circuit
has made clear that no standing exists if the plaintiff’s allegations are “purely ‘speculative[,
which is] the ultimate label for injuries too implausible to support standing.’” Tozzi v. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 271 F.3d 301, 307 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Advanced Mgmt. Tech.,
Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 211 F.3d 633, 637 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). Nor does standing exist
6
where the court “would have to accept a number of very speculative inferences and assumptions
in any endeavor to connect [the] alleged injury with [the challenged conduct].” Winpisinger v.
Watson, 628 F.2d 133, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
B. The Court Dismisses the Plaintiff’s Claims for Lack of Standing
The District and Claytor argue that the plaintiff lacks standing because he has “made no
showing . . . that he, personally, suffered any threatened or actual injury resulting from the
defendant’s putatively illegal action.” District’s Reply at 2; Def. Claytor’s Reply at 2. The
plaintiff does not address the issue of standing in his oppositions, except to say that he has
standing under Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). See Pl.’s Opp’n to District’s Mot. to
Dismiss; Pl.’s Opp’n to Def. Claytor’s Mot. to Dismiss.
The plaintiff is correct insofar as he suggests that under Erickson v. Pardus, courts are
required to liberally interpret a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings and documents. 551 U.S at 94. This
principle does not, however, dispense with the constitutional requirement that the plaintiff have
standing to bring his claims. See Ndaba v. Obama, 697 F. Supp. 2d 75, 78 (D.D.C. 2010)
(dismissing a pro se plaintiff’s action because he failed to show the requisite standing to bring
his claims). Instead, to survive the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must satisfy, inter
alia, the first element of the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” by alleging that he
has “suffered an ‘injury in fact’ – an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete
and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, nor conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S.
at 560 (citations omitted).
The bulk of the plaintiff’s claims are based on actions taken by the defendants that
purportedly impede ticket recipients from receiving a fair hearing. See generally Compl.
Nothing in the plaintiff’s submissions suggests, however, that the plaintiff has himself received a
7
ticket or been denied a hearing. See generally Compl.; Pl.’s Opp’n to District’s Mot. to Dismiss;
Pl.’s Opp’n to Def. Claytor’s Mot. to Dismiss. At most, the plaintiff’s complaint suggests that
his standing is derived from the economic harm that the defendants’ actions have on his business
when his clients’ rights are allegedly violated. See Compl. at 2, 3 (stating that DMV officials
“illegally interfere with the plaintiff’s efforts to assist companies” and that the defendants
“devised numerous unfair and illegal tactics that interfere with the plaintiff’s efforts to assist
persons and businesses with parking and traffic ticket problems” (emphasis added)). An injury
to his business interest derived from the alleged deprivation of a fair hearing for his clients is,
however, by itself insufficient to establish the plaintiff’s standing. See e.g., Rumber, 595 F.3d at
1301 (holding that the proper parties to bring suit opposing condemnation of a strip-mall were
the “property-owning businesses, not their employees or stakeholders” despite the injuries that
the latter might suffer as a result of condemnation); Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. Reno, 199
F.3d 1352, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that an immigration lawyer’s organizations had no
standing because they faced no legal sanction from the immigration law that they were
contesting, notwithstanding that the contested law had the effect of impeding the immigrants’
access to attorneys); Goodman v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 182 F.3d 987, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(concluding that a receiver lacked standing to bring suit on behalf of the receiver licensees
despite the congruency of their interests). Accordingly, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate
that he has standing to contest the DMV’s alleged denial of fair hearings to certain ticket
8
recipients. 9
The plaintiff also fails to demonstrate any personal harm that he incurred from the
DMV’s alleged “maint[enance of] a gender-based hierarchy . . . that deliberately excludes
males.” Compl. at 6. The plaintiff has not shown that this alleged discrimination has impaired
his business or that he himself has been discriminated against as a DMV employee or a
prospective employee. Rainbow/PUSH Coal. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 396 F.3d 1235, 1241
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting that “stigmatizing, noneconomic injury caused by racial discrimination
accords a basis for standing only to those persons who are personally denied equal treatment”).
In fact, the plaintiff has not claimed that he has suffered any injury as a result of the alleged
gender discrimination. See generally Compl. Thus, the plaintiff also lacks standing to bring any
employment-based gender discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
For these reasons, the court dismisses any of the plaintiff’s claims that relate to a
deprivation of a fair hearing on a violation or parking ticket matter or the alleged “gender-
hierarchy” of DMV officials. Such dismissal is rendered sua sponte as to those defendants who
have not moved to dismiss based on the plaintiff’s lack of standing. Weaver’s Cove Energy, LLC
v. R.I. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., 524 F.3d 1330, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (dismissing an action sua
sponte for lack of standing).
The plaintiff’s complaint, read liberally, also suggests a claim of defamation, see Compl.
at 6 (stating that defendants Glasser and Matthews made a false written claim that the plaintiff
9
Nor does the plaintiff establish that he has third party standing because he fails to show that his
clients, i.e. ticket recipients, are unable to sue the defendants themselves. Goodman, 182 F.3d at
992 (holding that “mere congruence of interests” was insufficient to establish third party standing
because the plaintiff had to also show that there was some hindrance to the third party’s ability to
protect his or her own interests); see also Reno, 199 F.3d at 1364 (noting that a presumption
exists “against suits seeking relief for a large and diffuse group of individuals, none of whom are
parties to the lawsuit”).
9
sexually harassed Matthews without providing any evidence of sexual harassment), and a claim
under the D.C. FOIA, see id. at 3 (alleging that DMV agents “illegally withheld and [] allowed to
be withheld information [about D.C. Council member Michael Brown] according to the Freedom
of Information Act of the District of Columbia”). The court, however, declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over these remaining claims and dismisses them pursuant to 28 U.S.C
§ 1367(c)(3). See Shekoyan v. Sibley Int’l, 409 F.3d 414, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (stating that “[a]
district court may choose to retain jurisdiction over, or dismiss, pendent state law claims after
federal claims are dismissed” and that “[i]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are
dismissed before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction
doctrine--judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity--will point toward declining to
exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims” (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the defendants District of Columbia and
Claytor’s motions to dismiss and dismisses the plaintiff’s complaint as to all remaining
defendants. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and
contemporaneously issued this 2nd day of November, 2010.
RICARDO M. URBINA
United States District Judge
10