UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________
)
DIPESH V. CHAUHAN, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 10-491 (EGS)
)
JANET NAPOLITANO, Secretary, )
U.S. Dept. of Homeland )
Security, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
_________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs, husband and wife Dipesh V. Chauhan and Divya D.
Chauhan bring claims against the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security, the Attorney General of the United States, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), the
Director of United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(“USCIS”), the Director of USCIS’ Dallas Field Office, and the
Director of USCIS’ Atlanta District Office, alleging that they
have unreasonably delayed processing plaintiffs’ applications for
adjustment of their status. Pending before the Court is
defendants’ motion to transfer venue to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas (“Northern
District of Texas”). Upon consideration of the motion, the
response and reply thereto, the applicable law, and the entire
record, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to transfer venue.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
Plaintiffs, Indian nationals, have at all times relevant
been residents of Irving, Texas. Compl. ¶¶ 13-14. On May 12,
2008, plaintiffs filed with the USCIS Form I-485 Applications for
Adjustment of Status (“I-485 applications”) to become lawful
permanent residents. Compl. ¶¶ 28-29. USCIS initially processed
plaintiffs’ I-485 applications at its Service Center in Missouri,
and then transferred plaintiffs’ applications to its Dallas Field
Office, located in Irving, Texas, for adjudication. Compl. ¶ 31;
see also Defs.’ Mem. at Ex. 1, Declaration of Alma L. Montellano
(“Montellano Decl.”) ¶ 1. Plaintiffs appeared at the Dallas
Field Office for biometrics appointments in June 2008. Compl. ¶
32. Plaintiffs also attended interviews at the Dallas Field
Office on February 9, 2009. Compl. ¶ 33; Exs. L and M.
Plaintiffs have contacted the USCIS on multiple occasions
regarding the status of their applications. They have spoken
with USCIS representatives by telephone and Mrs. Chauhan has met
with USCIS representatives in the Dallas Field office. Compl. ¶¶
45-46. Mrs. Chauhan alleges that during one of these meetings,
on December 11, 2009, she was told that plaintiffs’ files had
been transferred to USCIS’ Atlanta District Office for review,
and the Atlanta office would “then return the[] [files] to the
Dallas Office to make a final decision.” Compl. Ex. B,
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Declaration of Divya Chauhan (“Divya Chauhan Decl.”) ¶ 12.c.
Plaintiffs have not yet received final decisions regarding their
applications. Compl. ¶ 6.
B. Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed suit in this Court on March 24, 2010
pursuant to the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, to compel action on their I-485 applications
for adjustment of immigration status. On June 4, 2010,
defendants filed a motion to transfer this case to the Northern
District of Texas and for an extension of time to respond to the
complaint until the Court rules on the motion to transfer venue.
On June 11, 2010, the Court stayed further proceedings in this
case pending resolution of defendants’ motion to transfer venue.
The parties completed briefing on the motion to transfer, and it
is now ripe for determination by the Court.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The federal venue transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),
provides that “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in
the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The district court has
discretion to adjudicate motions to transfer according to an
“‘individualized case-by-case consideration of convenience and
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fairness.’” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29
(1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)).
The moving party bears the burden of establishing that transfer
of the action is proper. See Devaughn v. Inphonic, Inc., 403 F.
Supp. 2d 68, 71 (D.D.C. 2005).
Defendants must make two showings to justify transfer.
First, defendants must establish that the plaintiffs could have
brought suit in the proposed transferee district. See id. at 71-
72; Trout Unlimited v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 944 F.
Supp. 13, 16 (D.D.C. 1996). Second, defendants must demonstrate
that considerations of convenience and the interests of justice
weigh in favor of a transfer. Devaughn, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 72;
Trout Unlimited, 944 F. Supp. at 16. The Court may consider
materials outside the pleadings in considering a motion to
transfer. See, e.g., Stearns v. McGuire, 512 F.2d 918, 933-34
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Where the Case Could Have Been Brought
Before the Court transfers an action to another venue, the
defendant must show that the plaintiff could have brought the
action in the proposed transferee district. Devaughn, 403 F.
Supp. 2d at 72. In an action brought against an officer of
employee of the United States or its agencies venue is proper in
any district where (1) a defendant resides; (2) a substantial
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part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred; or (3) the plaintiff resides, if no real property is
involved in the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).
The defendants argue and the plaintiffs do not contest that
plaintiffs could have brought this case in the Northern District
of Texas. The director of USCIS’ Dallas Field Office, who has
been named as a defendant, resides in that district. The
plaintiffs also reside in that district. As set forth in Section
I.A., a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise
to the claim occurred in the Dallas Field Office. Finally, while
the plaintiffs’ files may have been transferred to UCSIS’ Atlanta
District Office at one point, their files are currently at the
Dallas Field Office, where it is undisputed that “a final
decision” on their I-485 applications will be made. Compl. Ex.
B, Divya Chauhan Decl. ¶ 12.c; see also Montellano Decl. ¶ 2;
Supplemental Declaration of Alma Montellano (“Montellano Supp.
Decl.”) ¶ 6. Accordingly, the Court concludes that venue is
proper in the Northern District of Texas.
B. The Balance of Private and Public Interests
As this action could have been brought in the Northern
District of Texas, the Court must now determine whether equitable
factors support defendants’ requested transfer. In determining
whether transfer is justified, the Court weighs a number of
private-interest and public-interest factors. See Devaughn, 403
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F. Supp. 2d at 72. In this case, these factors weigh in favor of
transfer to the Northern District of Texas.
1. Private Interest Factors
The private interest factors that the Court considers
include: (1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (2) the
defendants’s choice of forum; (3) where the claim arose; (4) the
convenience of the parties; (5) the convenience of the witnesses;
and (6) the ease of access to proof. See Montgomery v. STG
Int’l, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 29, 32-33 (D.D.C. 2008).
The first three factors weigh in favor of transfer. While a
plaintiff’s choice of forum is typically accorded substantial
deference, such deference is weakened when a plaintiff chooses a
forum other than his home forum, or when most of the relevant
events occurred elsewhere. See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance
v. Norton, 315 F. Supp. 2d 82, 86 (D.D.C. 2004). In this case,
both reasons to lessen deference apply. Plaintiffs live in the
Northern District of Texas, and, as discussed above, the relevant
events giving rise to plaintiffs’ claims have occurred or will
occur there.
Plaintiffs assert that their case should remain in this
District because the “unreasonable delay” in their case occurred
at “the headquarters of the FBI, located in Washington, D.C.,
through that office’s failure to timely complete name checks
and/or other background checks.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 6. This
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allegation cannot succeed as a matter of fact or of law. First,
it has been factually refuted by the defendants. Defendants have
provided two declarations from Alma L. Montellano, an Immigration
Services Officer for USCIS in its Dallas Field Office. Ms.
Montellano provided unrebutted statements that applications for
adjustment of status require different “level[s] of review and
investigation from either the USCIS or other agencies for a
number of reasons,” Montellano Decl. ¶ 5; that investigations
into the plaintiffs’ applications are “ongoing”; Montellano Decl.
¶ 11; and, more importantly, that the FBI name checks for
plaintiffs were not the cause of the delay. Indeed, the name
checks were completed by September 2008. See Montellano Supp.
Decl. at ¶¶ 3-4. Accordingly, as a factual matter, plaintiffs
have not demonstrated that the District of Columbia has
“meaningful ties” to their case. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance,
315 F. Supp. 2d at 86.
Second, even if the FBI had not timely completed plaintiffs’
name checks or other checks, it would not be sufficient to
support venue here. It is well established that “mere
involvement on the part of federal agencies, or some federal
officials who are located in Washington D.C., is not
determinative of venue” when the ultimate governmental decision
will not occur in this district. Aftab v. Gonzalez, 597 F. Supp.
2d 76, 82 (D.D.C. 2009) (internal quotation omitted) (collecting
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cases). This is the situation in this case. As set forth above,
plaintiffs’ applications are in the Dallas Field Office, where a
final decision will be made. Moreover, the Director of the
Dallas Field Office “has reviewed the ongoing investigations”
regarding plaintiffs’ applications and placed the applications
“in abeyance pending the outcome of these investigations.”
Montellano Decl. ¶ 11. The Court therefore concludes that the
final decisions regarding when to process plaintiffs’
applications and whether to ultimately approve them will be made
in the Northern District of Texas.
Other judges on this Court have repeatedly held that the
FBI’s role of conducting name checks as part of processing
applications for naturalization is attenuated and insignificant
when compared to the role of the USCIS field office where the
applications are actually adjudicated, and thus does not support
venue in Washington D.C. See, e.g., Aftab, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 82
(“[T]he FBI may affect the processing of [plaintiff’s]
application, but the FBI does not adjudicate applications and
generally provides a summary of available information to the
USCIS for its adjudicative process.” (internal quotations
omitted)); Abusadeh v. Chertoff, Case No. 06-2014, 2007 WL
2111036, at *7 (D.D.C. July 23, 2007) (“[T]hat the FBI, in
Washington, D.C., may play a role in the processing of
plaintiff’s application for naturalization does not alter the
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fact that the ultimate decision on plaintiff’s application for
naturalization - the sole decision challenged in plaintiff’s
complaint, will be made at the USCIS office in Houston, Texas.”);
Al-Ahmed v. Chertoff, 564 F. Supp. 2d 16, 19-20 (D.D.C. 2008)
(same). This Court is persuaded by the multiplicity of decisions
by other judges on this Court which are directly on point.
Moreover, plaintiffs have cited no authority to the contrary.
The Court therefore finds plaintiffs’ choice of forum is entitled
to less deference, and that defendants’ choice of the Northern
District of Texas is much more closely connected with the claims
in plaintiffs’ complaint.1
The final three private interest factors also favor the
Northern District of Texas. Plaintiffs’ complaint seeks to
expedite a decision that will be made in the Dallas Field Office.
In addition, plaintiffs are located in the Northern District of
Texas; plaintiffs’ files are located in Northern District of
Texas; and the ultimate decisionmaker is located in Northern
1
Plaintiffs also argue against transfer to the Northern
District of Texas because their applications were sent to the
USCIS Atlanta District Office for review. Pls.’ Opp’n at 9. As
noted above, even if plaintiffs’ files were in Atlanta at some
point, they have been returned to Dallas. See Montellano Supp.
Decl. ¶ 6. More important, there has never been any dispute that
the final decision regarding their applications would be made in
the Dallas Field Office. See Divya Chauhan Decl. ¶ 12.c. And in
any event, as defendants correctly argue, the fact that
plaintiffs’ files were in Atlanta does not make the District of
Columbia the only appropriate forum for this dispute. See Defs.’
Reply at 5.
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District of Texas. See Montellano Decl. ¶ 1; Montellano Supp.
Decl. ¶ 6. Plaintiffs’ argument that their counsel is located in
Maryland does not outweigh these considerations. See, e.g.,
McClamrock v. Eli Lilly & Co., 267 F. Supp. 2d 33, 40-41 (D.D.C.
2003) (“[T]he location of counsel carries little, if any, weight
in an analysis under § 1404(a).” (internal quotation omitted)).
2. Public-Interest Factors
Having concluded that plaintiffs’ choice of forum is
entitled to less deference and that the other private-interest
factors favor transfer to the Northern District of Texas, the
Court now turns to the public-interest factors. The public-
interest factors include: (1) the transferee’s familiarity with
the governing laws; (2) the relative congestion of the calendars
fo the potential transferee and transferor courts; and (3) the
local interest in deciding local controversies at home.
Devaughn, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 72.
The first public-interest factor is neutral in the Court’s
analysis. With regard to the transferee’s familiarity with the
governing laws, the Court notes that this case involves federal
law, with which both this Court and the Northern District of
Texas are equally familiar. The second factor weighs slightly in
favor of a transfer to the Northern District of Texas. The
median time for resolving cases from filing to disposition of a
civil case for the 12 month period ending September 30, 2009 was
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9.0 months in this Court, and 7.0 months in the Northern District
of Texas. See Defs.’ Mem. at 12 and Ex. 3.
The final factor for the Court to consider is the local
interest in deciding local controversies at home. As this Court
has repeatedly held, the local interest in resolving local
disputes at home “applies to controversies involving federal
decisions that impact the local environment, and to controversies
requiring judicial review of an administrative decision.”
Abusadeh, 2007 WL 2111036, at *8 (quoting Sierra Club v. Flowers,
276 F. Supp. 2d 62, 70 (D.D.C. 2003) (emphasis added)).
Plaintiffs argue that this matter is not local to Texas because
“FBI officials in Washington D.C. are involved in the delay,”
Pls.’ Opp’n at 12. However, as discussed supra, this case
ultimately involves a determination of whether the USCIS Dallas
Field Office should be compelled to expedite its adjudication of
plaintiffs’ applications for naturalization. As other judges on
this Court have concluded under substantially identical
circumstances, the district in which the relevant USCIS Field
Office is located is “better positioned” to be involved in
“dictating the priorities of a local USCIS office” and “may have
a superior interest in doing so.” Aftab, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 84
(quoting Abusadeh, 2007 WL 2111036, at *8); see also Mohammadi v.
Scharfen, 609 F. Supp. 2d 14, 19 (D.D.C. 2009) (public interest
favors transfer where plaintiff resides in transferee district,
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has been fingerprinted and interviewed there, and application for
naturalization will be adjudicated there; consequently transferee
district, not District of Columbia, had a “substantial interest
in the resolution of the claims.” (citation omitted)). The Court
concludes, therefore, that the public-interest factors weigh in
favor of transfer of this action to the Northern District of
Texas.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, having balanced plaintiffs’ choice of forum in the
District of Columbia against the relevant private- and public-
interest factors, the Court concludes that the balance of private
and public interest counsels in favor of transferring this case
to the judicial district with the greatest stake in the pending
litigation - plaintiffs’ home forum and the site where the
decisions on when to process plaintiffs’ I-485 applications and
whether to approve them will be made - the Northern District of
Texas. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to
transfer venue. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum
Opinion.
SIGNED: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Court Judge
October 25, 2010
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