UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
1443 CHAPIN STREET, LP,
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant
v.
PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Civil Action No. 08-1532 (CKK)
Defendant/Counter- and Third-Party
Plaintiff
v.
STEVEN F. SCHWAT,
Third-Party Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(June 21, 2010)
Plaintiff, 1443 Chapin Street, LP, (“Chapin Street”), the owner and developer of a
condominium project in the District of Columbia, brings this case against Defendant, PNC Bank,
National Association (“PNC”). As set forth in the Complaint, Chapin Street alleges that it
entered into a construction loan agreement with PNC to provide construction financing for its
condominium project. According to Chapin Street, PNC breached the parties’ agreement when it
wrongfully stopped funding the project in the middle of construction. PNC disputes these claims,
arguing that Chapin Street was in default of the loan and that PNC properly withheld funding
under the terms of the parties’ agreement. PNC has filed a Counterclaim against Chapin Street
on the basis of Chapin Street’s alleged breach and seeks all monies allegedly owed by Chapin
Street under the parties’ contract. In addition, PNC has filed a Third-Party Complaint against
Third-Party Defendant Steven F. Schwat, whom PNC asserts executed an absolute and
unconditional guaranty of payment for Chapin Street’s debts in connection with the loan
agreement, seeking to enforce the terms of Schwat’s guaranty.
Presently before the Court are two motions, both of which relate to PNC’s Third-Party
Complaint against Schwat. First, Third-Party Defendant Schwat has filed a [29] Motion to
Dismiss for Improper Venue or, in the Alternative, to Abstain Under the Colorado River Doctrine
(“Motion to Abstain”). Schwat’s Motion focuses solely on PNC’s Third-Party Complaint against
him; it does not address either Chapin Street’s Complaint or PNC’s Counterclaim against Chapin
Street. In response, PNC filed a [43] Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 against
Schwat and his attorneys, which is also now pending before the Court. PNC asserts that Schwat
and his attorney should be sanctioned for filing the Motion to Abstain, which PNC contends is
frivolous, unsupported by law, and was filed for an improper purpose. The Court has throughly
considered the parties’ Motions and supporting briefing, applicable case law, and the entire
record of the case herein. For the reasons set forth below, the Court shall DENY WITHOUT
PREJUDICE Schwat’s [29] Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue or, in the Alternative, to
Abstain Under the Colorado River Doctrine and shall DENY PNC’s [43] Motion for Sanctions
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
I. BACKGROUND
As discussed above, the above-captioned matter stems from a loan agreement entered into
between Chapin Street and PNC and which was guaranteed by Third-Party Defendant Schwat.
Chapin Street alleges that PNC breached the parties’ agreement when it wrongfully stopped
funding the project in the middle of construction. PNC counters that it rightfully withheld further
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funding under the terms of the parties’ agreement and that Chapin Street had defaulted on the
loan. This dispute has fostered two separate civil actions — one in federal court and one in state
court. The first action was filed by PNC against Schwat on June 13, 2008, in the Circuit Court
for Baltimore County (the “Baltimore County Lawsuit”). The second is the instant action, filed
by Chapin Street against PNC on August 5, 2008. The Court briefly discusses both below.
A. The Baltimore County Lawsuit
PNC filed the Baltimore County Lawsuit on June 13, 2008. Schwat’s Mot. to Abstain,
Docket No. [29], at 2; PNC’s Mem. in Opp’n, Docket No. [32], at 3 & Ex. 2 (Baltimore County
Lawsuit docket sheet). On December 3, 2008, PNC filed a motion for summary judgment
arguing that it was entitled to payment on the guaranty. Schwat’s Mot. to Abstain at 2; PNC’s
Mem. in Opp’n at 4-5 & Ex. 6. PNC’s motion was denied by the Circuit Court on February 11,
2009. Schwat’s Mot. to Abstain at 2; PNC’s Mem. in Opp’n at 4-5 & Ex. 8. By that time, the
instant action had been filed and was pending before this Court. Given the pendency of this
litigation, PNC approached Schwat about the possibility of jointly stipulating to dismissal of the
Baltimore County Lawsuit without prejudice so that PNC’s claims against Schwat could be re-
brought as a third-party complaint in this Court. See PNC’s Mem. in Opp’n at 5 & Ex. 9. The
parties were unable to reach agreement on the issue, however, and PNC proceeded to file a
Motion to Dismiss its claims against Schwat without prejudice, which Motion was opposed by
Schwat. See Schwat’s Mot. to Abstain at 2-3; PNC’s Mem. in Opp’n at 5-6 & Exs. 10-11.
PNC’s Motion to Dismiss was also denied by the Circuit Court. PNC’s Mem. in Opp’n, Ex. 12.
A bench trial was subsequently held in February 2010, and the Court has been advised that the
post-trial briefs have been submitted and closing arguments have been (or will soon be)
3
completed. See Notice, Docket No. [47]. No final decision has yet been issued.
B. The Instant Lawsuit
Chapin Street initially filed this action in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia
on August 5, 2008. The case was subsequently removed to this Court by PNC on the basis of
diversity jurisdiction on September 3, 2008. See Notice of Removal, Docket No. [1]. As
discussed above, Chapin Street’s Complaint in this action alleges that it entered into a
construction loan agreement with PNC to provide construction financing for a condominium
project and that PNC breached that agreement when it wrongfully stopped funding the project in
the middle of construction. See id., Ex. A (“Complaint”). Shortly after the case was removed
and before discovery had yet commenced, PNC filed a Motion to Dismiss or for Summary
Judgment. See Docket No. [3]. Chapin Street opposed the Motion, arguing in relevant part that
it was entitled to discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). See Docket No.
[12]. By Memorandum Opinion and Order dated July 31, 2009, the Court granted Chapin
Street’s request for discovery and denied without prejudice PNC’s motion for summary
judgment. See Chapin Street v. PNC Bank, 258 F.R.D. 186 (D.D.C. 2009).
As required, PNC then filed its Answer to the Complaint. In addition, PNC
simultaneously filed a Counterclaim against Chapin Street for monies allegedly owed under the
parties’ contract and also filed a Third-Party Complaint against Schwat. See [24] Answer,
Counterclaim, and Third-Party Complaint. PNC asserts that Schwat executed an absolute and
unconditional guaranty of payment for Chapin Street’s debts in connection with the loan. See id.
The parties agree that the allegations at issue in PNC’s Third-Party Complaint are identical to
those at issue in the Baltimore County Lawsuit. See Am. Jt. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) and LCvR
4
16.3(d) Report, Docket No. [25], at p. 3, ¶ 2 (“This Third-Party Complaint raises the identical
claims as an action brought by PNC against Schwat in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County,
Maryland in June 2008 (Case No. 03-C-08-006454).”).
An Initial Scheduling Conference was held on September 3, 2009, at which time the
Court set a discovery schedule. See Sept. 3, 2009 Order, Docket No. [28]. The Court
subsequently referred this case to Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola for all pretrial management
purposes (except for resolution of any dispositive motions that may be filed by the parties)
pursuant to Local Civil Rule 72.2(a). See Referral Order, Docket No. [33]. Several discovery-
related motions remain pending and are currently under consideration by Magistrate Judge
Facciola. The parties are scheduled to appear before this Court for a status hearing on June 22,
2010, and separately before Magistrate Judge Facciola for an evidentiary hearing related to the
discove issues on that same date. No dispositive motions schedule has yet been set.
C. The Pending Motions
During the course of the September 3, 2009 Initial Scheduling Conference, Schwat’s
counsel raised concerns regarding the propriety of proceeding with the litigation of PNC’s Third-
Party Complaint given the identical lawsuit filed by PNC in the Baltimore County Circuit Court.
See Transcript of Sept. 3, 2009 Initial Schedule Conference (“Tr.”) at 11:15-12:8. Counsel
advised that he believed the parallel proceedings were inappropriate and that he anticipated filing
a motion on the issue. See id. The Court suggested that the parties confer in an effort to resolve
Schwat’s concerns regarding the parallel proceedings without the need for briefing. See id. at 17-
2-6, 19-24. No such agreement was reached, however, and Schwat filed the now-pending Motion
to Abstain. See Schwat’s Mot. to Abstain, Docket No. [29]. Schwat contends that this Court
5
should stay or dismiss PNC’s Third-Party Complaint against him in light of the Baltimore County
Lawsuit, which involves the identical claims.1 See id. PNC has filed an Opposition to the
Motion. See PNC’s Opp’n, Docket No. [32]. Schwat declined to file a reply.
Several months after briefing on Schwat’s Motion to Abstain had been completed but
before the Court had yet ruled on the motion, PNC filed the now-pending Motion for Sanctions
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. See PNC’s Mot. for Sanctions, Docket No. [43]. As set forth
therein, PNC contends that the pending Motion to Abstain is “frivolous, unsupported by law and
premised upon misleading factual representations” and was “undertaken in bad faith.” Id., Ex. 15
(“PNC’s Mem.”) at 2, 27. Schwat has filed an Opposition to PNC’s Motion, see Schwat’s Opp’n,
Docket No. [52], and PNC a Reply, see PNC’s Reply, Docket No. [53]. Accordingly, both
motions are fully briefed and ripe for the Court’s review and resolution.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND DISCUSSION
A. Schwat’s Motion to Abstain
The Court turns first to consider Schwat’s [29] Motion to Abstain. As the Supreme Court
has made clear, federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the
jurisdiction given to them.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 817 (1976). For this reason, “[g]enerally, as between state and federal courts, the rule is that
‘the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter
1
Schwat also initially argued in his Motion to Abstain that the Third-Party Complaint
should be dismissed for lack of venue. See Schwat’s Mot. to Abstain at 3-5. Schwat has since
voluntarily withdrawn this argument. See Schwat’s Opp’n to PNC’s Mot. for Sanctions, Docket
No. [52], at 11, n. 4 & 29. Accordingly, in considering Schwat’s Motion to Abstain, the Court
shall address only Schwat’s contention that abstention is appropriate under the Colorado River
doctrine. See id.
6
in the Federal court having jurisdiction.’” Id. (quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282
(1910)). The Supreme Court, however, has recognized that in “exceptional” circumstances,
“considerations of wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial
resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation” may permit the dismissal or stay of “a
federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding.” Id. at 817-18 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court emphasized that such circumstances are
considerably limited and afford only a very narrow exception to the general rule that ongoing
state litigation is not a bar to federal court proceedings on the same matter. See id.
The Supreme Court has identified several factors that inform a district court’s
discretionary decision whether to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction for reasons of wise
judicial administration. As are relevant here, these considerations include (1) the inconvenience
of the federal forum, (2) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation, and (3) the order in
which jurisdiction was obtained by and the progress of the litigation in the concurrent
jurisdictions.2 Id. at 818. In addition, courts should consider whether (4) the case involves
federal or state law and (5) the inadequacy of the concurrent proceedings to protect the litigants’
rights. Moses H. Cones Memor’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23-26 (1983); see
also Sheehan v. Koonz, 102 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1999) (listing factors for consideration);
Johnston Lemon & Co., Inc. v. Smith, 882 F. Supp. 4, 4 (D.D.C. 1995) (same). “The weight to be
given to any one factor may vary greatly from case to case, depending on the particular setting of
2
The Supreme Court in Colorado River also indicated that in cases involving in rem
jurisdiction, courts should consider which court first assumed jurisdiction over the property at
issue. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818. As this case does not involve in rem jurisdiction, this
factor is irrelevant to the Court’s inquiry.
7
the case.” Moses H. Cones, 460 U.S. at 16.
The Supreme Court has counseled that “the decision whether to dismiss [or stay] a federal
action because of parallel state-court litigation does not rest on a mechanical checklist, but on a
careful balancing of the important factors as they apply in a given case, with the balance heavily
weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction.” Id. The Court’s task “is not to find some
substantial reason for the exercise of federal jurisdiction . . .; rather, the task is to ascertain
whether there exist ‘exceptional’ circumstances, the ‘clearest of justifications,’ that can suffice
under Colorado River to justify the surrender of that jurisdiction.” Id. at 25-26. Upon
consideration of the factors in this case and cognizant of the Court’s “unflagging obligation” to
exercise its jurisdiction absent extraordinary circumstances, the Court finds in its discretion that
abstention is not warranted.
Turning to the factors outlined above, the Court finds that these considerations do not
substantially weigh in favor of abstention. First, while the parties dispute whether Baltimore or
the District of Columbia is more convenient for the other side — with Schwat arguing that
Baltimore is more convenient for PNC and PNC arguing that the District is more convenient for
Schwat — the Court finds that the this factor is of little import in this case given the relatively
close proximity of Baltimore and the District. Cf. Onyeneho v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d
1, 4 (D.D.C. 2006) (“because Maryland and the District of Columbia are in close proximity, the
convenience of the parties would not be greatly affected whether this action remains in the
District of Columbia or is transferred to Maryland”).
Second, although the parallel proceedings arguably create a risk of piecemeal litigation,
staying or dismissing the Third-Party Complaint, as Schwat requests, will do little to address that
8
concern. Chapin Street’s Complaint, PNC’s Counterclaim, and PNC’s Third-Party Complaint all
arise from the same transaction and appear to involve substantially overlapping questions of fact
and law. The Baltimore County Lawsuit involves only PNC’s claims against Schwat as the
guarantor. Whether or not the Court abstains from exercising its jurisdiction over the Third-Party
Complaint, the allegations at issue in Chapin Street’s Complaint and in PNC’s Counterclaim will
remain before this Court. Resolution of these remaining claims will likely require the Court to
decide many of the same factual and legal issues presently before the Baltimore County Circuit
Court. As such, abstention will not substantially reduce or avoid the risk of piecemeal litigation
and conflicting judgments.
Nonetheless, while piecemeal litigation may be unavoidable under the present
circumstances, Schwat’s concern that he may be subjected to conflicting judgments is mitigated
by the parties’ concession that any ruling issued in the Baltimore County Lawsuit would be res
judicata as to Schwat and PNC. PNC’s Opp’n at 21; Schwat’s Opp’n at 23. As a practical
matter, then, the parties have already agreed that any decision issued — whether by this Court or
by the Baltimore County Circuit Court — will be binding on the relevant parties. Accordingly,
while proceeding with litigation in both state and federal court could be considered inefficient, it
is unlikely to create a substantial risk that Schwat will be subjected to conflicting decisions. See
Johns v. Rozet, 770 F. Supp. 11, 15 (D.D.C. 1991) (“In analyzing the problem of piecemeal
litigation, ‘the district court must look beyond the routine inefficiency that is the inevitable result
of parallel proceedings to determine whether there is some exceptional basis for requiring the
case to proceed entirely in [state[ court.’”) (quoting Villa Marina Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Hatteras
Yachts, 915 F.2d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 1990)).
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Finally, neither party has alleged the presence of any particular policy concerns
counseling against piecemeal litigation in this case. T he Supreme Court was concerned with the
avoidance of piecemeal litigation in Colorado River largely “because the litigation there involved
a federal statute under which Congress had explicitly recognized the availability of state systems
for the adjudication of water rights and had expressed a strong policy favoring resolution of those
rights in a single, comprehensive forum.” Hoai v. Sun Refining & Marketing Co., Inc., 866 F.2d
1515, 1520 (D.C. Cir. 1989). No such concern is present in this case. On balance, then, the
Court finds that this second factor does not weigh strongly either for or against abstention.
Third, the Baltimore County Lawsuit was filed first and has proceeded significantly
further than litigation before this Court. Indeed, as indicated above, a bench trial on PNC’s
Complaint in the Baltimore County Lawsuit has already been held and post-trial briefing is now
complete. Litigation in this case currently remains in the discovery phase. However, there may
be no need to duplicate discovery as the discovery conducted for the Baltimore County Lawsuit
can be used in the instant action. Therefore, this third factor is in equipoise. Moreover, the
importance of this factor is mitigated in light of the particular circumstances of this case.
Specifically, as noted above, there will likely be substantial overlap between the legal and factual
issues involved in the Third-Party Complaint and in PNC and Chapin Street’s remaining claims.
Accordingly, although the Baltimore County Lawsuit has progressed significantly further than the
litigation in this Court, abstention is unlikely to result in a more efficient use of judicial resources
as the Court will likely need to resolve many of the same issues whether or not it stays or
dismisses the Third-Party Complaint.
Fourth, the Court considers whether the case involves federal or state law. The instant
10
matter was removed to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. State law, not federal
law, thus applies. The mere absence of federal law, however, does not counsel in favor of
abstention, particularly where, as here, there are no complex or novel state law issues. See
Sheehan, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 5 (“‘The fact that there are no issues of federal law in the present
case . . . does not . . demand the conclusion that abstention is appropriate [particularly as] [t]here
is no indication that the sate-law issues raised in this case are particularly complex or
unsettled.’”) (quoting Cottman Transmission Sys. v. Lehwald, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 919, 923 (E.D.
Pa. 1991)); see also Rozet, 770 F. Supp. at 16 (“Although only state law will govern all claims in
this lawsuit, the Court does not weigh that factor heavily against the exercise of its diversity
jurisdiction” because “‘[t]he court cannot abstain simply because state law is controlling.’”)
(quoting Barron v. Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1011, 1015 (D.C. Ga. 1985)).
Fifth, with respect to the adequacy of the respective tribunals to protect the parties’ rights,
there is no question that both this Court and the Baltimore County Circuit Court are able to
adequately protect the parties’ rights relevant to PNC’s allegations against Schwat. Accordingly,
this factor is neutral.
In addition to the five factors outlined above, Schwat argues that PNC filed the Third-
Party Complaint for improper purposes and that this further counsels in favor of abstention.
Schwat’s Mot. to Abstain at 9. Specifically, Schwat argues that PNC filed the Third-Party
Complaint in this case in an apparent effort to “relitigate in a supposedly more favorable forum[]
the adverse decision it received on its summary judgment motion in Maryland.” Id. at 9. Courts
in this jurisdiction have at times considered the vexatious nature of the federal or state litigation
in determining whether abstention is warranted. See, e.g., Rozet, 770 F. Supp. at 16; Sheehan,
11
102 F. Supp. 2d at 5-6. The Court, however, does not find that there is sufficient evidence in the
record supporting Schwat’s claims that the Third-Party Complaint was filed for improper
purposes.3
Accordingly, considering the factors on balance, “with the balance heavily weighted in
favor of the exercise of jurisdiction,” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 16, the Court finds in its
discretion that abstention is not appropriate at this time. While proceeding with litigation of
PNC’s Third-Party Complaint may result in a duplicative and in efficient use of judicial resources,
there is no indication that the circumstances in this case qualify as sufficiently “extraordinary” to
justify this Court in declining its “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise its jurisdiction.
Moreover, given that the claims between Chapin Street and PNC — claims which would remain
before this Court even if it were to stay or dismiss the Third-Party Complaint against Schwat —
arise out of the same series of events underlying PNC’s allegations against Schwat and likely
involve substantially overlapping legal and factual questions, abstention in this case will do little
to conserve judicial resources or encourage comprehensive disposition of the litigation, the
principal concerns governing Colorado River abstention. For this reason, the Court shall DENY
Schwat’s [29] Motion to Abstain. It does so, however, without prejudice, such that Schwat may
re-file the motion in the event that there is a significant change in circumstances that warrants
3
Finally, the Court notes that Schwat, in an apparent reliance on two district court
decisions from the Seventh Circuit, also asserts that the Court should consider an additional two
factors — namely, the presence or absence of concurrent jurisdiction and the availability of
removal. See Schwat’s Mot. to Abstain at 6. It does not appear from the Court’s own review of
the relevant case law that courts in this Circuit have looked to either of these factors. Regardless,
the Court finds that neither factor weighs significantly in favor of or against abstention in this
case.
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reconsideration of the decision herein.
B. PNC’s Motion for Sanctions
The Court turns next to consider PNC’s Motion for Sanctions. Rule 11 provides that in
presenting to the Court a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney certifies that the
pleading or motion “is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation,” that “the claims, defenses, and
other legal contentions [therein] are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law,” and that “the
factual contentions [therein] have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)-(3). Where a pleading or motion is filed in violation of the Rule, the
Court may sanction the signatory attorney appropriately. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c).
The “central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in district court and thus . . .
streamline the administration and procedure of the federal courts.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). Since the 1993 amendments, the language of Rule 11 indicates
that the imposition of sanctions is left to the discretion of the district court judge. See Rafferty v.
Nynex Corp., 60 F.3d 844, 852 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c) (noting that when the
rule has been violated, a court may impose an appropriate sanction); see also 5A Charles Alan
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1336 (2d ed. Supp. 2000)
(commenting that the scope of the Advisory Committee’s list of factors to consider when
deciding whether or not to impose a sanction suggests that “the district court is given the widest
13
possible latitude under the new” version of Rule 11).4
PNC argues that Schwat’s Motion to Abstain is “frivolous, unsupported by law and
premised upon misleading factual representations” and was “undertaken in bad faith.” PNC’s
Mem. at 2, 27. As is evident from review of PNC’s Motion for Sanctions, these arguments are
largely tied to the merits of Schwat’s Motion to Abstain. Indeed, PNC’s Motion for Sanctions
consists almost entirely of the same substantive arguments it advanced in opposition to the
Motion to Abstain, repeating the arguments in near verbatim form. Although, as discussed
above, the Court finds that abstention is not warranted at this time, the Court cannot find that
Schwat’s Motion to Abstain, nor the factual and legal assertions therein, were presented for
improper purposes, nor that they were so incredible as to warrant sanctions. On the contrary, as
is evident from the Court’s discussion above, Schwat’s arguments in favor of abstention required
careful consideration by the Court and were by no means frivolous. Similarly, although Schwat
has since voluntarily withdrawn his argument, initially advanced in his Motion to Abstain, that
the Third-Party Complaint should be dismissed for improper venue, the Court has reviewed the
parties’ briefing and finds that his legal and factual assertions on this issue are not so incredible
as to warrant sanctions. The Court therefore finds, in its discretion, that there is no basis to
award Rule 11 sanctions in this case.
4
As Schwat points out in his Opposition, PNC, relying on case law interpreting the pre-
1993 version of Rule 11, incorrectly suggests that the Court lacks discretion to determine
whether sanctions are appropriate. See PNC’s Mot. for Sanctions at 3. As indicated above, this
assertion is in error.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court shall DENY WITHOUT PREJUDICE Schwat’s [29]
Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue or, in the Alternative, to Abstain Under the Colorado
River Doctrine and shall DENY PNC’s [43] Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: June 21, 2010
/s/
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
United States District Judge
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