UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MICHAEL B. DORSEY, :
:
Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 10-0741 (RMU)
:
v. : Re Document No.: 2
:
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DENYING THE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the court on the pro se plaintiff’s motion for a temporary
restraining order (“TRO”). The plaintiff, an individual engaged in the business of “assisting
persons and businesses with parking and moving violation matters,” commenced this action on
May 7, 2010, alleging that agents of the District of Columbia Department of Motor Vehicles
violated the District of Columbia Code and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution by “persecut[ing], discriminat[ing] against and engag[ing] personal animus against
him.” Compl. at 1-3. The plaintiff also asserts that the defendants improperly withheld
information to which he was entitled under the Freedom of Information Act. See id. at 3.
The plaintiff seeks a TRO requiring the defendants to “cease withholding pertinent
information to this case” and “ceas[e] and desist[] efforts to interfere with th[e] plaintiff’s efforts
to assist persons and businesses with parking and traffic ticket problems.” See Pl.’s Mot. at 2.
The plaintiff suggests that injunctive relief is necessary to prevent the defendants from damaging
the plaintiff’s relationships with his clients. See id. at 2-3. For the reasons discussed below, the
court denies the plaintiff’s motion.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard for Injunctive Relief
This court may issue interim injunctive relief only when the movant demonstrates “[1]
that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an
injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365,
374 (2008) (citing Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2218-19 (2008)). It is particularly important
for the movant to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. Cf. Benten v. Kessler, 505
U.S. 1084, 1085 (1992) (per curiam). Indeed, absent a “substantial indication” of likely success
on the merits, “there would be no justification for the court’s intrusion into the ordinary
processes of administration and judicial review.” Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Nat’l Credit Union
Admin., 38 F. Supp. 2d 114, 140 (D.D.C. 1999) (internal quotation omitted).
The other critical factor in the injunctive relief analysis is irreparable injury. A movant
must “demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.” Winter, 129
S. Ct. at 375 (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 (1983)). Indeed, if a party fails to
make a sufficient showing of irreparable injury, the court may deny the motion for injunctive
relief without considering the other factors. CityFed Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision,
58 F.3d 738, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Provided the plaintiff demonstrates a likelihood of success
on the merits and of irreparable injury, the court “must balance the competing claims of injury
and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.”
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987). Finally, “courts of equity should pay
particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of
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injunction.” Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982).
As an extraordinary remedy, courts should grant such relief sparingly. Mazurek v.
Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). The Supreme Court has observed “that a preliminary
injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the
movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Id. Therefore, although the trial
court has the discretion to issue or deny a preliminary injunction, it is not a form of relief granted
lightly. In addition, any injunction that the court issues must be carefully circumscribed and
“tailored to remedy the harm shown.” Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Yeutter, 918 F.2d
968, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
B. The Court Denies the Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief
The plaintiff does not address any of the factors of the injunctive relief analysis except by
alleging, without significant elaboration, that the defendants’ actions “cause irreparable and
imminent harm.” Pl.’s Mot. at 3. The plaintiff correctly recognizes that the irreparable injury
prong is critical in the injunctive relief analysis. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 375. To satisfy this
standard, however, he must do more than simply assert that he faces irreparable injury absent
injunctive relief. Id. Rather, it is the plaintiff’s burden to make a clear showing “that irreparable
injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.” Id.; Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972
(1997). By offering only bald, unsupported allegations of irreparable injury, the plaintiff has
failed to satisfy this burden. See Cornish v. Dudas, 540 F. Supp. 2d 61, 65 (D.D.C. 2008)
(denying the plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief because the plaintiff had failed to submit
competent evidence and instead offered “only broad conclusory statements” as to the prospect of
irreparable injury).
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Given that the plaintiff has failed to make a sufficient showing of irreparable injury, the
court may deny his motion without considering the three remaining prongs of the injunctive
relief analysis, namely, the likelihood of success on the merits, the balance of the equities and
the public interest. See CityFed Fin. Corp., 58 F.3d at 747. In any event, the plaintiff has
entirely failed to address these three factors. See generally Pl.’s Mot. As a result, the court is
not persuaded that the plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the plaintiff’s motion for a TRO. An Order
consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued this 17th
day of May, 2010.
RICARDO M. URBINA
United States District Judge
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