UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
VANESSA MOORE )
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Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Case No. 09-54 (RJL)
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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, )
)
Defendant. )
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
(FebruarYZ62010) [# 17]
Plaintiff, Vanessa Moore ("Moore"), brings this action against the District of
Columbia, (the "defendant") seeking damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation
of her First Amendment rights; 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for violation of her Fifth Amendment
rights; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., for sexual
harassment and retaliation; two claims of breach of contract; and a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Before the Court is the defendant's Motion To Dismiss.
Upon consideration of the parties' pleadings, relevant law, and the entire record herein,
the defendant's motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a police officer employed by the District of Columbia Metropolitan
Police Department ("MPD"). CompI. ~ 1. On March 22, 2004, Moore filed a complaint
with MPD of sexual harassment by her supervisor. See id. ~ 4. On September 22,2004,
the MPD' s EEO investigator recommended sustaining her allegation of sexual harassment
in violation of Title VII and restoring her sick leave. Id. ~ 5. On April 20, 2005, the
MPD EEO Unit affinned the investigator's findings of sexual harassment and a hostile
work environment in violation of Title VII. Id. ~ 6. On June 14,2005, Moore wrote the
Chief ofMPD asking for restoration of 672 hours of sick leave. Id. ~ 7. Moore's sick
leave was never restored. Id. ~ 8. Moore also alleges that beginning in October 2004,
MPD claimed that she failed to comply with the qualification required for her fireann.
See id. ~~ 10-12. Moore asserts that she complied with the requirements for
reinstatement and was prevented from returning to her previous job assignment as
retaliation for her decision to file an internal EEO complaint. See id. ~~ 12-18. On
January 9, 2009, Moore filed the instant action.
ANALYSIS
Defendant moves to dismiss this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss shall be granted if a plaintiff fails "to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff s
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels
and conclusions, and a fonnulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations and quotation marks
omitted) (alteration in original). Unfortunately for Moore, even taking as true all of the
allegations in her complaint, each one of her claims must be dismissed.
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Before suing under Title VII in district court, an aggrieved party must exhaust her
administrative remedies. See Currier v. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc., 159 F.3d
1363, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Under Title VII, an administrative complaint must be filed
with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, unless the
complainant first instituted proceedings with a state or local agency, in which case the
limitations period is extended to a maximum of 300 days. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5( e);
Currier, 159 F.3d at 1366 & n.2. In Moore's case, she failed to file a complaint with the
EEOC, and her time to do so has long since expired, even using the more generous 300
day limit. Accordingly, she cannot bring suit in this Court for her Title VII claims
because of her failure to exhaust her administrative remedies.
Moore's claims under § 1981 and § 1983 must also fail, as they fall outside of the
relevant statute of limitations. l In our Circuit, the statute of limitations for both § 1981
and § 1983 claims is three years. See Carney v. American Univ., 151 F .3d 1090, 1096
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing D.C. Code § 12-301(8)). As described in the Complaint and
delineated above, the alleged discriminatory and retaliatory conduct in question occurred
in 2004, and Moore did not file suit until 2009, well beyond the three-year statute of
limitations. Moore's repeated requests for MPD to restore her leave over the next few
years do not change the fact that the limitations period had already commenced. See Del.
As noted by the defendant, the plaintiffs First Amendment claim may have been
mistakenly included in the Complaint, as this claim alleges facts found nowhere else in
the Complaint and refers to violations of "Captain Gresham's rights." See Compl. ~ 34.
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State Coli. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980) (noting that the limitations period runs
from the date of the alleged discrimination, even when the effects of the alleged
discrimination do not occur until later).
Moore's common law claims are also time-barred. Her contract claims arise from
alleged breaches of her employment contract and settlement contract because she was
sexually harassed and allegedly retaliated against for reporting the harassment. Her
intentional infliction of emotion distress claim alleges that the defendant filed an adverse
action against her by misrepresenting that she failed to qualifY with her weapon. The
statute of limitations for these claims is three years. See D.C. Code § 12-301(7) (contract
claims); Saunders v. Nemati, 580 A.2d 660,665 (D.C. 1990) (intentional infliction of
emotion distress falls under D.C. Code § 12-301(8)). As with her constitutional claims,
Moore failed to file her complaint within three years of the conduct on which she bases
her claims. Therefore, her common law claims must also be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the defendant's Motion To
Dismiss and DISMISSES the action in its entirety. An order consistent with this decision
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
United States District Judge
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