UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT )
LLOYDS LONDON, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 06-731 (GK)
)
GREAT SOCIALIST PEOPLE’S )
LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA, )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
______________________________)
)
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT )
LLOYDS LONDON, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 08-504 (GK)
)
GREAT SOCIALIST PEOPLE’S )
LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA, )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In C.A. No. 06-731, Plaintiffs Certain Underwriters at
Lloyds London (“Lloyds”), Allianz Cornhill Insurance, PLC;
Aviation & General Insurance Company, Ltd.; English & American
Insurance Company Ltd.; Markel Insurance Company Ltd.; Minster
Insurance Company Ltd.; MMO/New York Marine and General; Nippon
Insurance Company of Europe Ltd.; Riverstone Insurance UK Ltd.;
Sovereign Marine & General Insurance Company Ltd.; SR
International Business Insurance Company Ltd.; Tower Insurance
Ltd.; and La Réunion Aérienne (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring
these actions against Defendants Great Socialist People’s Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya; Libyan Internal Security; Libyan External
Security; Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi; Abdallah al-Sanusi; Ibrahaim al-
Bishari (collectively, “Libyan Defendants”); the Syrian Arab
Republic; Syrian Air Force Intelligence; and Muhammed al Khuli
(collectively, “Syrian Defendants”),1 pursuant to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1602, et seq.
(2006) (Count I); common law conversion and trespass (Counts II
and III); and Aircraft Piracy under the Alien Tort Claims Act
(“ATCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (Count IV). Second Am. Compl.
[C.A. No. 06-731, Dkt. No. 60].
In C.A. No. 08-504, the same Plaintiffs bring suit pursuant
to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083, 122 Stat. 3 (2008). They claim that
Defendants violated the FSIA (Count I); committed common law
conversion and trespass (Counts II and III); and engaged in
1
Defendants Syrian Arab Republic, Syrian Air Force
Intelligence, and Muhammed al Khuli defaulted in C.A. No. 06-731
[Dkt. Nos. 21-23] and have failed to appear in C.A. No. 08-504.
Hereinafter, “Defendants” refers to all Defendants except the
Syrian defendants.
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Aircraft Piracy under the ATCA (Count IV). Compl. [C.A. No. 08-
504, Dkt. No. 1].
These cases are before the court on Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss Duplicative Complaint [C.A. No. 06-731, Dkt. No. 74; C.A.
No. 08-504, Dkt. No. 18] and Defendants’ Supplemental Motions to
Dismiss [C.A. No. 06-731, Dkt. No. 80; C.A. No. 08-504, Dkt. No.
24].
I. BACKGROUND2
On November 23, 1985, three members of the Abu Nidal
Organization3 (“ANO”) hijacked Egypt Air Flight 648, traveling
from Athens, Greece to Cairo, Egypt. At that time, the
governments of Libya and Syria sponsored ANO by providing a
variety of monetary, material, diplomatic, and logistical
support.
Shortly after takeoff, the plane made an emergency landing
at the Malta International Airport, where it remained for twenty-
2
For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss, the factual
allegations of the Complaint must be presumed to be true and
liberally construed in favor of the Plaintiff. Aktieselskabet AF
21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 17 (D.C. Cir.
2008). Therefore, the facts set forth herein are taken from
Plaintiff’s Complaint unless otherwise noted.
3
The ANO is also known as Black September, the Fatah
Revolutionary Council, the Arab Revolutionary Council, the Arab
Revolutionary Brigades, and the Revolutionary Organization of
Socialist Muslims.
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four hours until Egyptian Commandos attempted to board it. The
combination of gunfire by the ANO members, a fire started by the
Egyptian Commandos’ explosives, and the ANO members’ deployment
of hand grenades rendered the plane “damaged beyond repair” and
unfit “for any purpose whatsoever.” Compl. ¶ 51 [C.A. No. 08-
504].
Plaintiffs, which are both foreign and United States
national juridical entities, provided liability insurance for the
hull of the plane. Following the hijacking, they “compensated”
Egypt Air “for the cost of the destroyed airplane.” Id. ¶ 64.
On April 21, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in this
Court against the Libyan and Syrian Defendants. The original
Complaint alleged Conversion (Count I), Trespass (Count II), and
Aircraft Piracy (Count III). On November 9, 2006, Plaintiffs
filed an Amended Complaint adding an additional allegation of
International Terrorism in Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (Count
IV) [Dkt. No. 26].
On December 5, 2006, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), (5), and
(6) [Dkt. No. 32]. On June 12, 2007, this Court held a Motions
Hearing. On July 9, 2007, it granted Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction [Dkt. Nos. 45-
-4-
46]. Plaintiffs filed an appeal on August 3, 2007, and on
February 1, 2008, our Court of Appeals ruled that it lacked
jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Consequently, it ordered
that the Motion to Dismiss be granted. See Certain Underwriters
at Lloyd’s of London v. Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, No. 07-7117 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 14, 2007) [Dkt. No. 61].
On February 22, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for
Reconsideration [Dkt. No. 51] and a Motion for Leave to File a
Second Amended Complaint [Dkt. No. 52]. On March 28, 2008, the
Motion for Leave was granted and Plaintiffs filed their Second
Amended Complaint the same day [Dkt. No. 60]. The Second Amended
Complaint alleges a violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(d) (Count I),
Conversion (Count II), Trespass (Count III), and Aircraft Piracy
(Count IV), seeking a sum in excess of $40 million on each count.
On April 14, 2008, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Reconsideration without prejudice [Dkt. No. 64].
On March 24, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a second Complaint
against the same Defendants,4 alleging a violation of 28 U.S.C. §
4
Plaintiffs also filed a Notice of Related Cases on April 21,
2006 [C.A. No. 06-731, Dkt. No. 2]. In it, they indicated that
another case, Baker, et al. v. Libya, et al., C.A. No. 03-749,
“relate[d] to common property; involve[d] common issues of fact;”
and “[grew] out of the same event or transaction.” Notice of
Related Cases at 1.
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1605A(d) (Count I), Conversion (Count II), Trespass (Count III),
and Aircraft Piracy (Count IV), seeking a sum in excess of $40
million on each count [C.A. No. 08-504, Dkt. No. 1]. On July 25,
2008, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Consolidate Cases [C.A. No.
08-504, Dkt. No. 17], and Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss
Duplicative Complaint [C.A. No. 06-731, Dkt. No. 74; C.A. No. 08-
504, Dkt. No. 18].
On November 20, 2008, Defendants filed Supplemental Motions
to Dismiss [C.A. No. 06-731, Dkt. No. 80; C.A. No. 08-504, Dkt.
No. 24]. On March 16, 2009, the United States filed a Statement
of Interest in each case [C.A. No. 06-731, Dkt. No. 84; C.A. No.
08-504, Dkt. No. 28].
On July 10, 2009, the two cases--06-731 and 08-504--were
consolidated. [C.A. No. 06-731, Dkt. No. 92; C.A. No. 08-504,
Dkt. No. 36].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff need only plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face” and to “nudge[] [his or her] claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). “[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it
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may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the
allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 579.
Under the standard set out in Twombly, a “court deciding a
motion to dismiss must not make any judgment about the
probability of the plaintiff's success . . . must assume all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)
. . . [and] must give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable
inferences derived from the facts alleged.” Aktieselskabet AF
21.November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 17 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
On August 4, 2008, the Libyan Claims Resolution Act (“LCRA”)
was signed into law in order to “provide for ‘fair compensation
to all nationals of the United States who have terrorism-related
claims against Libya through a comprehensive settlement of claims
by such nationals.’” Statement of Interest of the United States
at 4-5 (quoting Pub. L. No. 110-301, § 3, 122 Stat. 2999 (2008)).
The statute states that
section 1605A(c) of title 28, United States Code,
section 1083(c) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2008 . . . and any other private
right of action relating to acts by a state sponsor of
terrorism arising under Federal, State, or foreign law
shall not apply with respect to claims against Libya,
or any of its agencies, instrumentalities, officials,
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employees, or agents in any action in a Federal or
State court.
Pub. L. No. 110-301, § 5(a)(1)(B). The Act provides Libya with
immunity that applies to suits brought in the United States by
plaintiffs of any nationality.5 Id. at § 5(a)(1).
On August 14, 2008, shortly after the passage of the LCRA,
Libya and the United States signed the Claims Settlement
Agreement (“Settlement Agreement”) in order to “terminate
permanently all pending suits . . . [and] preclude any future
suits” in United States or Libyan courts arising from terrorist
acts, including aircraft hijacking and hostage-taking, which
occurred prior to June 30, 2006. Claims Settlement Agreement
Between the United States of America and the Great Socialist
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, art. I, August 14, 2008. After
the United States Government received $1.5 billion in settlement
funds, President Bush signed an Executive Order stating that
“[a]ll claims within the terms of Article I of the Claims
Settlement Agreement . . . are settled.” Exec. Order No. 13,477,
§ 1 (2008).
5
The LCRA states that “Libya, an agency or instrumentality of
Libya, and the property of Libya or an agency or instrumentality of
Libya, shall not be subject to the exceptions to immunity from
jurisdiction, liens, attachment, and execution contained in section
1605A, 1605(a)(7), or 1610 . . . of Title 28, United States Code.”
Pub. L. No. 110-301, § 5(a)(1)(A).
-8-
The Order declares that “[n]o United States national may
assert or maintain any claim within the terms of Article I in any
forum” outside the provisions of the Settlement Agreement and
that “[a]ny pending suit in any court . . . by United States
nationals . . . coming within the terms of Article I shall be
terminated.” Id. § 1(a)(i-ii). With regard to foreign
nationals, the Order states that “[n]o foreign national may
assert or maintain any claim coming within the terms of Article I
in any court in the United States,” and “[a]ny pending suit in
any court in the United States by foreign nationals . . . coming
within the terms of Article I shall be terminated.”6 Id. §
1(b)(i-ii).
In the federal system, the FSIA is the “sole basis for
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state.” Argentine Republic
v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989). See
also Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486
(1983) (“[I]f none of the exceptions to sovereign immunity set
forth in the [FSIA] applies, the District Court lacks both
statutory subject matter jurisdiction and personal
jurisdiction”). While Plaintiffs rightly point out that, under
6
The Order does permit foreign nationals “to pursue other
available remedies for claims coming within the terms of Article I
in foreign courts or through the efforts of foreign governments.”
Exec. Order No. 13,477, § 1(b)(iii).
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28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c), the January 2008 amendments to the FSIA
provide a new federal cause of action against nations that
sponsor terrorism, the LCRA explicitly overrides § 1605A(c) and
restores immunity to Libya pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. 7
Principles of statutory interpretation establish that “a
specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general
one, regardless of the priority of enactment.” Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974). That principle is
applicable to this case where the explicit language of the LCRA
negates a general provision of the FSIA.8
Plaintiffs concede that their claims fall within Article I
of the Settlement Agreement [C.A. No. 06-731, Dkt. No. 81; C.A.
No. 08-504, Dkt. No. 25]. Pls.’ Opp’ns ¶ 6. Furthermore,
Defendants all fall within the class for which the LCRA provides
immunity--the Libyan government, its agencies (Internal and
7
As quoted, supra, “section 1605A(c) of title 28, United States
Code . . . and any other private right of action relating to acts
by a state sponsor of terrorism arising under Federal, State, or
foreign law shall not apply with respect to claims against Libya,
or any of its agencies, instrumentalities, officials, employees, or
agents in any action in a Federal or State court.” Pub. L. 110-
301, § 5(a)(1)(B).
8
Retroactivity is not at issue in this case because Congress has
made clear its intent to apply the provisions of the LCRA to events
prior to June 30, 2006. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S.
244, 280 (1994) (requiring deference to Congressional intent with
respect to statutes’ retroactive application).
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External Security), and its officials, employees, or agents (al-
Qadhafi, al-Sanusi, and al-Bishari).
Because the LCRA, Settlement Agreement, and Executive Order
specifically and comprehensively withdraw any exception to
sovereign immunity that may be provided in the FSIA with regard
to Defendants’ pre-2006 support of terrorist acts, this Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Libyan Defendants. 9
See Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 485 n.5.
Plaintiffs nevertheless “suggest” that the Court retain
jurisdiction over the case until it is clear that an alternate
forum can provide relief for their claims. Pls.’ Statement of
Position at 3 [C.A. No. 08-504, Dkt. No. 33]. The Court cannot
comply with Plaintiffs’ wish: the jurisdictional issue is
dispositive. See Antolok v. United States, 873 F.2d 369, 375
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Congress has deprived the courts of the United
States of jurisdiction over these claims. . . . That is the end
of the matter.”).
9
Because the Court lacks jurisdiction, there is no need to
analyze the allegedly duplicative nature of Plaintiffs’ Complaint
in C.A. No. 08-504.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss are granted with respect to the Libyan Defendants.10 An
Order shall accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
/s/
January 6, 2010 Gladys Kessler
United States District Judge
Copies to: Attorneys of record via ECF
10
Plaintiffs raise several additional contentions alleging that
the provisions under the LCRA and Settlement Agreement are
insufficient to address their claims. However, the lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction is dispositive in
this case. See Antolok, 873 F.2d at 375.
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