UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Parkridge 6, LLC et al )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
) Civil Action No. 09-cv-01478(GK)
United States Department of )
Transportation, et al )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Parkridge 6 is a Virginia-based LLC which owns
property adjoining the proposed development route of the Dulles
Corridor Metrorail Project (“Project”). Plaintiff Dulles Corridor
Users Group is a Virginia-based civic advocacy group established to
monitor the development of the Project. Defendants are the United
States Department of Transportation (“USDOT”), the Federal Transit
Administration (“FTA”), the Federal Highway Administration
(“FHWA”), the Virginia Department of Transportation (“VADOT”), and
the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (“MWAA”).
Plaintiffs bring this action against Defendants alleging that the
Project violates numerous provisions of federal and Virginia state
law. This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to
Transfer Venue to the Eastern District of Virginia.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The Project is a transportation construction project currently
underway to expand the Washington Metropolitan Metrorail system for
twenty-three miles in Northern Virginia. The Project aims to
extend Metrorail service to Washington Dulles International Airport
(“Dulles Airport”), which will impact the area surrounding Route
267, a Virginia state highway. Plaintiff Parkridge 6 owns land
adjacent to Route 267. Compl. ¶ 13.
Defendant MWAA is a public interstate compact entity based in
Virginia. Defs.’ Mot. 3. In 1987, Defendants USDOT and MWAA
entered into a lease transferring operational responsibility for
Dulles Airport and the Dulles Airport Access Road to MWAA. Compl.
¶ 53. Pursuant to a 2006 agreement between MWAA and the
Commonwealth of Virginia, the Commonwealth transferred possession
and control of certain land in Northern Virginia to the MWAA in
exchange for MWAA’s assumption of the obligation to design and
construct the Project on that land. Defs.’ Mot. 3
On March 10, 2009, the federal government and MWAA entered
into a full funding grant agreement. Compl. ¶ 4. The Project is
being financed through contributions of MWAA, the Commonwealth of
Virginia, Fairfax County, Loudoun County, grant funds from
Defendant FTA, and revenue from the Dulles Toll Road. Defs.’ Mot.
3. Defendant FHWA maintains jurisdiction over federal highway
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design, including proposed use of the highway for public transit.
Compl. ¶ 346.
B. Procedural Background
On August 6, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a 15-count Complaint with
this Court against USDOT, FTA, FHWA, VADOT, and MWAA.
Twelve of the counts allege Defendants’ violations of Virginia
law: Counts II and XIII allege violations of the Virginia
Constitution, Count III alleges violations of the Virginia State
Bond Revenue Act, Count IV alleges violations of MWAA’s lease
agreement with the FAA, which is “governed by the law of the
Commonwealth of Virginia,” Counts VI and VII rely on MWAA’s
enabling statute, Va. Code § 5.1-152, Count VIII asserts violations
of the Virginia Freedom of Information Act, Counts IX and X allege
violations of the Virginia Public Private Partnership Act, and
Counts XI and XV allege violations of Va. Code. § 33.1-287, which
authorizes the use of toll roads.
Only Counts I, V, and XIV contain no causes of action under
Virginia law, and assert exclusively federal claims.1
On September 22, 2009, all Defendants filed a Joint Motion to
Transfer Venue to the Eastern District of Virginia and to Stay
1
Count I alleges the FTA violated 49 U.S.C. § 5309, which
authorizes capital investment grants, Count V alleges a violation
of unspecified federal law by FHWA and MWAA for a failure to obtain
a waiver of federal highway safety standards, and Count XIV alleges
MWAA violated 23 C.F.R. §§ 620, 635, 6363, and 710 by failing to
complete a market validation study.
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Response Deadline. On October 7, 2009, this Court granted
Defendants’ Motion to Stay, pending resolution of the Motion to
Transfer.
II. ANALYSIS
The federal venue transfer statute provides that “[f]or the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice,
a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) (2006). The statute vests “discretion in the district
court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an
individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and
fairness.” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27
(1988). As the moving party, Defendants bear the burden of
establishing that the transfer of these actions to another federal
district is proper. See Onyeneho v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2006).
The threshold question under 1404(a) is whether the action
could have been brought in the Eastern District of Virginia. Van
Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 613 (1964). In a suit brought
under federal question jurisdiction, venue is proper in any
district “in which a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of
property that is the subject of the action is situated.” 28 U.S.C.
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§ 1391(b)(2) (2006).2 Because Plaintiffs concede that “the Eastern
District of Virginia federal court has jurisdiction and venue for
all the claims made in this complaint,” there is no dispute as to
whether this action could have been brought in the Eastern District
of Virginia. Compl. ¶ 22.
Defendants must then demonstrate that considerations of
convenience and the interest of justice weigh in favor of transfer.
Trout v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 944 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D.D.C. 1996).
The Court weighs a number of private and public factors in that
determination. See id. at 13. The public interest considerations
include “(1) the transferee's familiarity with the governing laws;
(2) the relative congestion of the calendars of the potential
transferor and transferee courts;3 and (3) the local interest in
deciding local controversies at home.” Berenson v. Nat'l Fin.
Services, LLC, 319 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2-3 (D.D.C. 2004). The private
interest considerations include (1) the plaintiffs’ choice of
2
This analysis also applies under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e),
which governs venue in actions where a defendant is an officer or
employee of the United States acting in his official capacity. In
such cases, venue is proper in any district in which “a substantial
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred,
or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action
is situated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(2) (2006).
3
Plaintiffs rely on Onyeneho to assert that congestion is
not a factor to be considered in transfer. Pls.’ Am. Opp’n 10 n.8.
However, in Onyeneho, the court merely found that there was no
significant difference in the congestion of the dockets between the
transferee and the transferor courts, and did not deny the factor’s
relevance. See Onyeneho, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 3.
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forum, unless the balance of convenience is strongly in favor of
the defendants; (2) the defendants' choice of forum; (3) whether
the claim arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5)
the convenience of the witnesses of the parties, but only to the
extent that the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in
one of the fora; and (6) the ease of access to sources of proof.
Id.
A. The Public Interest Factors Support Transfer to Virginia
The Eastern District of Virginia is more familiar with the
governing law, and as such is a more appropriate venue for these
claims. Twelve of the fifteen counts in the complaint arise under
Virginia law,4 and the interests of justice are best served by
“having a case decided by the federal court in the state whose laws
govern the interests at stake.” Trout, 944 F. Supp. at 19; See
also Schmid Labs., Inc. v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., 654 F.
Supp. 734, 737 (D.D.C. 1986); Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing
Co., 477 F. Supp. 142, 144 (D.D.C. 1979). While Plaintiffs argue
that venue in the District of Columbia is proper given this
4
Further, Plaintiffs contend that “there is one state
claim in this lawsuit, the issue wether tolls on Route 267 are
really taxes improperly imposed by a nonelected body in violation
of the Virginia Supreme Court’s opinion in Marshall v. NVTA.”
Pls.’ Am. Opp’n 16. This contention lacks credibility in light of
the fact that Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges violations of the
Virginia Constitution, the Virginia Freedom of Information Act, the
Virginia Public Private Partnership Act, and numerous provisions of
the Virginia Code. See Compl. ¶¶ 295-327, 349-66, 371-437, 443-459,
446-67.
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District’s familiarity with administrative law, counts asserting
federal law claims in Plaintiffs’ Complaint allege straightforward
violations of statutes and regulations. Pls.’ Am. Opp’n 17.
The public interest in judicial efficiency also weighs in
favor of transfer. While “congestion alone is not sufficient
reason for transfer, relative docket congestion and potential speed
of resolution is an appropriate factor to be considered.” Starnes
v. McGuire, 512 F.2d 918, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For the twelve-
month period ending March 31, 2008, the median time from filing to
disposition in the District Court for the District of Columbia was
8.9 months. Ex. 2 to Defs.’ Mot. By contrast, the median time for
the Eastern District of Virginia was only 5.1 months. Id.
Furthermore, the median disposition time of cases proceeding to
trial in this District is thirty-six months, while the median time
in the Eastern District of Virginia is 10.6 months, nearly two
years less.5 Id. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of
transfer.
Finally, the local interest in deciding local controversies at
home weighs heavily in favor of transfer. This case concerns a
“greater matter of public concern” to the citizens of Virginia than
5
Plaintiffs cite a 2003-2004 District Court Case Weighting
Study to demonstrate that the weighted federal district court case
filings in the Eastern District of Virginia were significantly
higher than those in the District of Columbia. Pls.’ Am. Opp’n 10
n.8. However, courts evaluate the congestion factor on the basis
of “potential speed of resolution” rather than filings per judge.
See Starnes, 512 F.2d at 932.
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to residents of the District of Columbia. See Hawksbill Sea
Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 939 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C.
1996). The Project is located solely within Virginia, and
increased tax rates used to finance the Project are to be borne by
Virginia residents. The economic development surrounding the
Project involves Virginia businesses and residents. Plaintiffs
contend that this case is of concern to the District of Columbia
because the purposes of the Project include “serving the
transportation demand that begins or ends in the District of
Columbia.” Pls.’ Am. Opp’n 20. While there may be a not
inconsiderable impact on the District of Columbia, fundamentally
this dispute focuses on Virginia transportation development. See
Envtl. Def. v. U.S. Dept. of Trans., No. 06-CV-2176 (GK), 2007 WL
1490478, at *4 (D.D.C. May 18, 2007) (concluding in a similar case
that collateral effects on the District of Columbia will not
prevent transfer).
In sum, the public interest factors clearly indicate that
Virginia is the more appropriate forum for this litigation. The
claims center on Virginia law and primarily affect Virginia
residents. Furthermore, the relative congestion of court dockets
indicates parties will likely obtain faster resolution in Virginia.
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B. The Private Interest Factors Do Not Weigh Heavily Against
Transfer
The private interest factors do not outweigh the public
interest in transferring this case to the Eastern District of
Virginia.
Defendants clearly prefer transfer to Virginia, as all
Defendants have joined the Motion.6 While the Court must afford
some deference to Plaintiffs’ choice of forum, this deference is
mitigated “when the plaintiff is not a resident of its chosen
forum. . . .” Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Eastern Air Lines, 672 F.
Supp. 525, 526 (D.D.C. 1987); Chung v. Chrysler Corp., 903 F. Supp.
106, 165 (D.D.C. 1995). Furthermore, the deference to a
plaintiff's choice of forum is “substantially diminished where
. . . transfer is sought to the forum where plaintiffs reside.”
Citizen Advocates for Responsible Expansion, Inc. v. Dole, 561 F.
Supp. 1238, 1239 (D.D.C. 1983). In this case, Defendants seek
transfer to Virginia, the home forum of both Plaintiffs.
Convenience of the parties would not be greatly affected by
transfer, given the close proximity of the two jurisdictions. See
Oneyeho, 466 F. Supp. at 6 (finding that “because Maryland and the
District of Columbia are in close proximity, the convenience of the
6
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ preference is accorded
little weight because Defendants’ preference to litigate outside
their home forum infers forum shopping. Pls.’ Am. Opp’n 11.
However, the Eastern District of Virginia is the home forum of
Defendant VADOT.
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parties would not be greatly affected” by transfer). As Plaintiffs
point out, transfer “would move the case a mere eight miles.” Pls.’
Am. Opp’n 14.7 Similarly, none of the parties contend that
witnesses will be unavailable in Virginia, nor do any of them argue
that transfer would limit access to sources of proof.
Lastly, the fact that the claims arose in Virginia supports
transfer. Courts frequently grant transfer motions where the
circumstances giving rise to the controversy occurred in the
transferee forum. Berenson, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 2-3 (D.D.C. 2004).
The Project is a proposed development on Virginia land that will
greatly affect transportation in Northern Virginia. Plaintiffs
rely on the fact that the federal decisions and approvals relating
to the Project were made in the District of Columbia or “by
agencies headquartered in the District of Columbia which were,
without doubt, involved in the ultimate decisions reached by the
agency.” Pls.’ Am. Opp'n 14. Although the decisions and approvals
may have been made within the borders of the District of Columbia,
the object of the decisions and approvals was the proposed Virginia
transportation development. See Envtl. Def., 2007 WL 1490478 at
*7. In addition, the increased tax rates at dispute will affect
Virginia residents, in alleged violation of Virginia law.
7
Plaintiffs contend that transfer would “impose a hardship
on existing pro bono counsel.” Pls.’Am. Opp’n 15. However,
Plaintiffs base this hardship solely on the “congested highways” of
Northern Virginia. Id. Given the proximity of the two Districts,
the Court is not persuaded that this would impose substantial
inconvenience on Plaintiffs.
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Plaintiffs’ argument that their choice of forum should not be
disturbed thus fails. In this case, judicial economy and the
public interest of Virginia citizens outweigh any deference to
Plaintiffs’ choice of forum.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ Motion to Transfer is
granted.
November 9, 2009 /s/
Gladys Kessler
United States District Judge
Copies via ECF to all counsel of record
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