IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Nos. 00-60718 & 01-60285
Summary Calendar
JOSEPH JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI; ET AL.,
Defendants,
CITY OF JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:96-CV-510-LN
--------------------
February 7, 2002
Before JONES, SMITH, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges:
PER CURIAM:*
The City of Jackson, Mississippi, appeals from the
judgment following a jury trial for Joseph Jackson and from the
district court’s order denying relief pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P.
60(b) and denying attorneys fees. We affirm.
Regarding the underlying judgment, the City contends
solely that the district court should have directed the verdict in
its favor because Jones failed to prove the elements necessary for
municipal liability regarding Jones’s claim that he was held in
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 00-60718
No. 01-60285
-2-
jail without due process following the dismissal of city charges
against him. But Gilbert Sturgis’s testimony at trial provided a
legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to
determine that whether or not he was a policymaker, he was
authorized by appropriate city policymakers to devise policies and
procedures for the operation of the jail; that Jones was kept in
jail pursuant to Jackson City Jail practices; and that the due
process deprivation in his case occurred pursuant to those
policies. The district court did not err by denying the City’s
motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Piotrowski v. City of
Houston, 237 F.3d 567 (5th Cir. 2001; Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola
Co., 86 F.3d 1379, 1387 (5th Cir. 1996).
Regarding the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion, the City
contends that Jones’s post-judgment sentencing on outstanding
convictions constitutes newly discovered evidence on which relief
should have been granted. We agree with the district court that
the jury knew, when deliberating on the case, that Judge Hilbun
still intended to sentence Jones on the outstanding burglary
charges. Judge Hilbun’s intent, however, and the subsequent course
of Jones’s case do not as a matter of law relieve the City’s
responsibility for allowing Jones to remain in jail without any
contemporaneous basis for his incarceration. Various events could
have derailed the later sentencing. Thus, “evidence” was not
“newly discovered” and not significant enough to require relief
from the judgment.
Finally, regarding the denial of attorneys’ fees, the
City states that it was entitled to fees because Jones had no
No. 00-60718
No. 01-60285
-3-
grounds for suing three of the municipal defendants and because
Jones’s claim against a fourth was dismissed at the close of
testimony. As the district court noted, the City has not shown
that the suit was frivolous or groundless against those parties.
AFFIRMED.