UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
___________________________________
)
BRYAN H. SIMMS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civ. Action No. 08-177 (RWR)
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BALL STREET VENTURES, LLC, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
___________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On December 24, 2008, the parties executed a settlement
agreement under which the defendants jointly and severally
promised to pay the plaintiff a sum of $650,000, with interest,
in three installments. The settlement agreement, endorsed by the
court on December 31, 2008, provides that the court retains
jurisdiction over this action for the limited purpose of
enforcing the payment provisions of the parties’ settlement
agreement. On March 11, 2009, after the defendants missed the
first two installment payments, the plaintiff’s motion to enforce
the settlement agreement was granted and the defendants were
ordered to pay amounts owed within twenty-four hours of the
court’s order.
The defendants have moved to modify the March 11, 2009 order
requiring payment within twenty-four hours, arguing that
defendants’ companies are in serious financial debt and that
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individual defendant Davis is in the process of refinancing and
restructuring assets to pay the settlement amount within a
reasonable time period. Simms has moved for entry of judgment in
the amount of all payments due to the plaintiff under the
parties’ settlement agreement, alleging that despite the court’s
previous order, the defendants have made no payments under the
settlement agreement. The defendants oppose entry of judgment,
arguing that factual claims related to the defendants’ ability to
pay that preclude summary enforcement of the settlement
agreement.
Where “a binding settlement bargain is conceded or shown,”
and “there is no factual dispute and no legal defense to
enforcement,” the court may summarily enforce a settlement
agreement. Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir.
1969); see Kukla v. Nat’l Distillers Products Co., 483 F.2d 619,
621 (6th Cir. 1973) (noting that “the authority for a District
Court’s entry of final judgment incorporating the terms of a pre-
trial settlement agreement rests under neither [Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure] 56 nor Rule 16[,]” but “such judgment is in the
nature of a judgment by consent, . . . authorized under what has
been consistently recognized as the trial court’s inherent power
to summarily enforce settlement agreements entered into by
parties” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). In
this case, the defendants concede that there is a binding
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settlement agreement between the parties. (Defs.’ Opp’n at 2.)
Under the settlement agreement, “in the event of any default in
making any payment by its due date . . . the Settlement Payment
shall accelerate and be immediately payable in full[,]” and
“unpaid principal and accrued interest shall accrue late fees at
the rate of 15% per annum.” The defendants have also conceded
that they failed to pay timely the first required payment, which
under the settlement agreement’s acceleration clause, made the
entire settlement amount immediately payable with interest and
late fees. Nor do the defendants dispute the plaintiff’s
representation that no payments have been made under the
settlement agreement. To the extent that the defendants now
contend that judgment cannot be entered until a hearing has been
held on the defendants’ ability to pay, they have not established
the relevance of their ability to pay as defense to enforcement
of their unambiguous and undisputed contractual obligation.
Accordingly, because there is no factual dispute or legal bar to
enforcement of the settlement agreement, the plaintiff’s motion
for entry of judgment will be granted, and the defendants’ motion
to modify the March 11, 2009 order will be denied. An
appropriate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.
SIGNED this 14th day of May, 2009.
/s/
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge