UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
GRADY KING, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 1:07-cv-02302 (RJL)
)
PIERCE ASSOCIATES, INC., )
)
Defendant. )
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
(March 1-,
2009) [# 8]
The plaintiff, Grady King ("King," "a plaintiff') brought this action pro se against
his fonner employer, Pierce Associates, Inc., alleging discriminatory conduct in violation
of an unspecified provision of the law. Before this Court is Defendant's motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the
defendant's motion.
BACKGROUND
King alleges that on February 9,2005, he was "verbally abused, called negative
racial remarks, and physically assaulted and sexually harassed" by a co-worker. (Compi.
at 1.) King does not provide details of this event, although he states 1 that on an
IKing stated this in a filing following Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. King titled the filing
"Plaintiff s Motion." However, King did not seek any relief in the Motion and did not otherwise
file an opposition to the defendant's dismissal motion. Accordingly, the Court will treat the
filing as Plaintiffs Opposition and dismiss "Plaintiffs Motion."
unspecified date an unnamed person "punched [King] in the face and called [him] a
nigger." (Pl.'s Motion at 1.) King alleges in his pleading he "ha[s] a few witnesses to
testify on [his] behalf as to the allegation," although he does not identify these witnesses
or explain what they will testify to. (Jd.) King further alleges generally that he was
punished in some way as a result of this encounter and that his managers "pressed aside"
the incident. (Jd) Moreover, he contends the incident caused him to fear for his job and
suffer unspecified "abusive treatment" daily. (Jd) Further, King alleges he was not
provided with the "necessary tools," "equipment," or "protection" to keep him from
inhaling dust that caused him to become ill. (Jd.) According to King, he later injured his
spine in a car accident, and an unspecified person told him to "get off of the job." (Jd.)
Eventually he was transferred and fired. (Jd.) King also alleges the defendant "trashes
[his] name" to King's prospective employers. (Pl.'s Motion at 2.)
King does not identify the legal basis for his cause of action; he merely notes that
he seeks redress for "pain and suffering, the verbally and sexually harassment, and the
racial discrimination." (Compl. at 2.) Because King represented to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission that he was suing under "42 USC 2000," the Court
will treat King's claim as alleging harassment and discrimination in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.).
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ANALYSIS
Defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a claim for relief contain "a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." While a complaint need not
contain detailed factual allegations, "a plaintiff s obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions." Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544; 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (internal quotation and alteration
omitted). In short, a plaintiff must plead factual allegations, and the "[ f]actual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. King, however,
seeks to make his case only with vague and general allegations that do not "raise a right to
relief above the speculative level."
"Pro se complaints ... are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers." Hoai v. Superior Court o/Dist. o/Colombia, 539 F. Supp. 2d 432,
434 (D.D.C. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). "A pro se pleading is to be liberally
construed by the Court." Id. "Accordingly, pro se plaintiffs are not required to use
specific legal terms or phrases, and the Court will grant plaintiffs the benefit of all
inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged." Id. Nevertheless, the Court finds,
for the following reasons, that King has failed to state a claim on which relief can be
granted.
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A. Harassment Claim
To state a claim for harassment based on hostile work environment, King must
plead facts sufficient to show he suffered harassment because of his membership in a
protected class and that Pierce knew or should have known of the alleged harassment and
failed to take remedial action. Davis v. Coastal Int'l Sec., Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1122-23
(D.C. Cir. 2002). A hostile work environment consists of a series of acts that results in a
workplace "permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult." Rattigan v.
Gonzales, 503 F. Supp. 2d 56, 78 (D.D.C. 2007) (internal quotation omitted). In order to
amount to a hostile work environment, the conduct must be "extreme." Id. (internal
quotation omitted).
While King claims to have suffered abusive treatment and daily threats of losing
his job, he does not plead any facts in support of these claims. His claims, such as they
are, do not raise his right to relief above the "speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp., 550
U.S. 544; 127 S.Ct. at 1965. Indeed, King specifically alleges only one instance of
alleged discrimination, in which a co-worker allegedly made negative racial and sexual
remarks. (Compl. at 1.) This single instance, however, even if true, would not be
sufficient to state a claim for hostile work environment under Title VII. Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding that "isolated manifestations of
a discriminatory environment, such as a few ethnic or racial slurs may not raise a [Title
VII] cause of action").
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B. Adverse Action Discrimination Claim
To establish a prima facie case for employment discrimination based on adverse
action, a plaintiff must allege that he is a member of a protected class, that he suffered an
adverse employment action, and that the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of
discrimination. Chappell-Johnson v. Powell, 440 F .3d 484, 488 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In
short, a plaintiff must plead that the adverse employment action occurred because of his
status as a member of a protected class, and this requirement can be satisfied by merely
stating "[he] was turned down for ajob because of [his] race." Sparrow v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2000). King alleges he was not "provided
with the necessary tools and equipment" and not "provided with light duty" after
becoming injured. King also alleges he was fired. Plaintiff, however, fails to allege any
facts indicating any of the defendant's actions were taken "because of' his status as a
member of a protected class. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2) (defining "unlawful
employment practice[s]" as those occurring "because of [the plaintiffs] race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin"); cf Sparrow, 216 F.3d at 1115 (noting that a plaintiff
must allege the adverse employment action occurred "because of' status in a protected
class to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6». Accordingly, King's sparse
and vague allegations are insufficient to state a claim for discrimination under Title VII.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Defendant's motion to dismiss.
An Order consistent with this decision accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
United States District Judge
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