FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 04 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALICE CASTLE, No. 12-56603
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:10-cv-02099-JAH-
RBB
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner MEMORANDUM*
of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
John A. Houston, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 7, 2014
Pasadena, California
Before: BYBEE, BEA, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Alice Castle appeals the district court’s judgement affirming the
Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) decision finding that Castle was not disabled
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
and was thus ineligible for benefits. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and we affirm.
Castle argues that the ALJ erroneously rejected licensed clinical social
worker Kellie Michael’s opinion regarding Castle’s limitations. Further, Castle
contends that the ALJ disregarded her cousin, Debra Robuson’s, testimony in
violation of Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987), and Smolen v.
Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996). We agree that an ALJ may not reject a
lay witness’s testimony solely because the witness is not an acceptable medical
source. Nevertheless, to the extent that the ALJ erred, that error was harmless
because the ALJ gave specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the relevant
testimony. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 887 (9th Cir. 2011). Specifically, the
ALJ rejected Michael’s testimony because it contradicted the four acceptable
medical sources’ opinions. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012)
(holding that an ALJ may discount testimony from “other sources” if the ALJ gives
germane reasons for doing so). Furthermore, Robuson’s opinion contradicted the
medical opinions and was similar to Michael’s testimony that was discredited for
that very reason. Id. at 1121 (“[W]here the ALJ rejects a witness’s testimony
without providing germane reasons, but has already provided germane reasons for
rejecting similar testimony, we cannot reverse the agency merely because the ALJ
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did not clearly link his determination to those reasons.” (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)).
Next, Castle notes that the ALJ incorrectly stated that Dr. Nicholson
determined she was “mildly limited” in her ability to associate with day-to-day
work activity. We agree that the ALJ was mistaken because Dr. Nicholson actually
determined that Castle is “moderately limited” in this one area. However, this
error was harmless because Dr. Nicholson opined that Castle has only mild
limitations overall, and the other objective medical evidence supports the ALJ’s
determination that Castle’s disability was not severe. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533
F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he court will not reverse an ALJ’s decision
for harmless error, which exists when it is clear from the record that the ALJ’s
error was inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Castle also disputes the ALJ’s decision that she does not have an impairment
or combination of impairments that significantly limit her ability to work.
Specifically, she claims that an impairment is severe if the impairments have “more
than a minimal affect on an individual’s ability to work,” Social Security Ruling
85-28, and here there is substantial evidence that her health concerns affect her
ability to work. We disagree. There is sufficient evidence in the record that
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Castle’s impairments are not severe, including objective medical evidence from
four acceptable medical sources that showed Castle was coherent and articulate,
had no physical limitations, and could perform basic work activities. Furthermore,
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to discredit the subjective
testimony from Castle and the lay witnesses. Indeed, Castle’s testimony is
undermined and discredited by the objective medical opinions and her own
description of her daily activities. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that an ALJ may consider a claimant’s reputation for truthfulness,
inconsistencies in claimant’s testimony or between her testimony and her conduct,
claimant’s daily activities, and testimony from physicians and third parties when
weighing a claimant’s credibility).
AFFIRMED.
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