UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-2258
SSA COOPER, LLC; HOMEPORT INSURANCE COMPANY,
Petitioners,
v.
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; LAMONT A. BROWN,
Respondents.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review Board.
(13-0127)
Submitted: March 27, 2014 Decided: April 9, 2014
Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Richard P. Salloum, FRANKE & SALLOUM, PLLC, Gulfport,
Mississippi, for Petitioners. E. Paul Gibson, E. PAUL GIBSON,
P.C., Charleston, South Carolina; Betty English, OFFICE OF THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL, Washington, D.C.; Mark A. Reinhalter,
Jonathan Peter Rolfe, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Washington, D.C., for Respondents.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
SSA Cooper, LLC (“employer”) seeks review of the
Benefits Review Board’s (BRB) decision and order affirming the
administrative law judge’s (ALJ) award of longshore disability
benefits to Lamont Brown pursuant to 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950
(2012). On appeal, employer argues that the ALJ applied the
“true doubt” rule, in violation of the Supreme Court’s holding
in Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Greenwich
Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 281 (1994). Employer also argues
that the ALJ’s evaluation and weighing of the medical evidence
is not supported by substantial evidence. Finally, employer
asserts that Brown could have obtained an exemption that would
have allowed him to return to longshore work with medical
limitations and consequently the ALJ erred in concluding that
Brown was unable to return to this work. We deny the petition
for review.
We review “BRB decisions for errors of law and to
ascertain whether the Board adhered to its statutorily mandated
standard for reviewing the ALJ’s factual findings.” Ceres
Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Green, 656 F.3d 235, 239 (4th Cir.
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The factual findings
of the ALJ must be affirmed if supported by substantial
evidence. Review of legal questions is de novo, and no
deference is due to the Board’s legal conclusions.” Id.
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(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The court
will not disregard the ALJ’s factual findings merely because
other inferences might have been more reasonable, and deference
is accorded to the ALJ’s inferences and credibility assessments.
Id. “The ALJ may not merely credulously accept the assertions
of the parties or their representatives, but must examine the
logic of their conclusions and evaluate the evidence upon which
their conclusions are based.” Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp.
Programs v. Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co. (Carmines),
138 F.3d 134, 140 (4th Cir. 1998).
Employer first argues that the ALJ erred in finding
that Brown was unable to return to his previous employment due
to his back injury. The dispute in this case essentially comes
down to whether the ALJ’s crediting of the medical opinion of
Dr. Patel over that of Dr. Kolehma is supported by substantial
evidence. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but
less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Employer
argues that the ALJ applied the “true doubt” rule, which was
held inapplicable to cases under the LHWCA. We disagree. The
ALJ thoroughly discussed the medical evidence in this case and
properly considered the different opinions regarding Brown’s
condition. We conclude that the ALJ’s decision to credit the
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opinion of Brown’s treating physician, Dr. Patel, is supported
by substantial evidence.
Employer next argues that the ALJ erred in failing to
consider that, even with restrictions, Brown could have sought
an exemption from the longshore union that would have allowed
him to return to work within his restrictions at no loss of pay.
Employer bases this argument on the testimony of the vocational
expert describing a previous case in which a claimant received
an exemption and returned to longshore work with restrictions,
and cites two provisions of the longshore contract as supporting
its position. We conclude that employer’s argument is without
merit, and the ALJ properly concluded that Brown could not
return to longshore employment. The provisions of the longshore
contract cited by employer merely indicate that a union member
will not lose any seniority credit for a break in service that
results from an injury or illness “to the extent of becoming
eligible for workman’s compensation or for benefits under the
Employers I.L.A. Welfare Plan,” (J.A. 595), and that a union
member may be disciplined for “[p]ersistently failing to accept
employment which he is capable of performing without an
exemption.” (J.A. 599).
These provisions do not establish that a union member
may return to work by seeking an exemption from certain jobs
based on medical restrictions. Moreover, as the ALJ noted,
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Brown produced a letter from the union stating that a
longshoreman must be 100 percent physically qualified and that
there were no light duty or sedentary positions on the
waterfront. Thus, the ALJ correctly concluded that Brown could
not return to longshore employment with the restrictions imposed
by Dr. Patel.
Our review of the record discloses that the Board’s
decision is based upon substantial evidence and is without
reversible error. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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