12-3270
Cretu v. Holder
BIA
Vomacka, IJ
A088 935 659
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 10th day of April, two thousand fourteen.
PRESENT:
JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
VADIM CRETU,
Petitioner,
v. 12-3270
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Serghei Potorac, Falls Church, VA.
FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Linda S. Wernery,
Assistant Director; Gregory M.
Kelch, Trial Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Vadim Cretu, a native and citizen of
Moldova, seeks review of a July 24, 2012, order of the BIA,
affirming the February 16, 2011, decision of an Immigration
Judge (“IJ”), which denied asylum, withholding of removal,
and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In
re Vadim Cretu, No. A088 935 659 (B.I.A. July 24, 2012),
aff’g No. A088 935 659 (Immig. Ct. New York City Feb. 16,
2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
We review the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA,
i.e., minus the arguments for denying relief that were
rejected by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Yun-Zui
Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The
applicable standards of review are well established. See 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562
F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534
F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008).
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For applications such as Cretu’s, which are governed by
the REAL ID Act, the agency may base a credibility finding
on an applicant’s demeanor, the plausibility of his account,
and inconsistencies in his statements, without regard to
whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). We “defer to an IJ’s
credibility determination unless, from the totality of the
circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder
could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia
Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.
Cretu does not contest the demeanor finding and
testimonial deficiencies that served as the basis for the
agency’s adverse credibility finding. He challenges only
the agency’s related corroboration finding. However, the
agency reasonably determined that Cretu’s failure to submit
corroborating evidence further undermined his credibility.
We have recognized that an applicant’s failure to
corroborate his testimony may bear on credibility, either
because the absence of particular corroborating evidence is
viewed as suspicious, or because the absence of
corroboration makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate
testimony that has already been called into question. See
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Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (per
curiam). Although Cretu argues that additional
corroborating evidence was unavailable because the Moldovan
government had repeatedly intercepted his mail, the agency
reasonably rejected this assertion because the country
conditions evidence did not reflect pervasive mail
censorship in Moldova. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160,
168-69 (2d Cir. 2007) (“So long as an inferential leap is
tethered to the evidentiary record, we will accord deference
to the finding.”); cf. Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80
(2d Cir. 2005) (stating that agency need not accept an
applicant’s explanation unless a reasonable fact-finder
would be compelled to do so); 8 U.S.C. § 1254(b)(4) (“No
court shall reverse a determination made by a trier of fact
with respect to the availability of corroborating evidence .
. . [unless] a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to
conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.”).
Accordingly, Cretu has failed to show that the agency erred
in finding that he did not meet his burden for asylum due to
a lack of credibility. See Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273; Xiu
Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.
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For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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