FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 10 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SURINDER SINGH, No. 12-74149
Petitioner, Agency No. A089-302-602
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 7, 2014**
Before: TASHIMA, GRABER, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Surinder Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence factual
findings. Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006). We
review for abuse of discretion the agency’s denial of humanitarian asylum.
Belayneh v. INS, 213 F.3d 488, 491 (9th Cir. 2000). We deny the petition for
review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that, even if Singh
established past persecution by Punjab police, his presumption of a well-founded
fear of future persecution was rebutted by evidence that he could safely and
reasonably relocate elsewhere in India. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B); see
also Gonzalez-Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 995, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2003)
(noting that BIA has expertise to construe country reports). Contrary to Singh’s
contentions, the agency provided an individualized analysis of Singh’s claim and
the country conditions evidence in the record in determining that he could safely
and reasonably relocate. See Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir.
2003) (presumption of a well-founded fear can be rebutted by showing that under
all the circumstances the applicant could reasonably be expected to relocate).
Furthermore, the agency did not abuse its discretion in determining that the past
persecution Singh suffered was not severe enough to qualify for a grant of
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humanitarian asylum. See Belayneh, 213 F.3d at 491. Accordingly, Singh’s
asylum claim fails.
Because Singh has not established eligibility for asylum, he necessarily
cannot meet the more stringent standard for withholding of removal. See Zehatye,
453 F.3d at 1190.
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because
Singh failed to establish that it is more likely than not he will be tortured by or with
the consent or acquiescence of a government official if he returns to India. See
Hasan v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 1114, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 2004).
Finally, we reject Singh’s contention that the agency failed to adequately
consider his evidence. See Larita-Martinez v. INS, 220 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir.
2000) (petitioner must overcome the presumption that the agency considered all
the evidence).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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