FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 14 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SUSAN MAE POLK, No. 13-15602
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 4:12-cv-00193-PJH
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LINDA DALY; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Phyllis J. Hamilton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 7, 2014**
Before: TASHIMA, GRABER, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Susan Mae Polk appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging claims regarding
the sale of family property to reimburse county officials for her criminal defense
costs related to her conviction for the second degree murder of her husband. We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000), and may
affirm on any ground supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055,
1058-59 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.
Dismissal of Polk’s claims under §§ 1983 and 1985 for alleged violations of
her First, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments rights, and for a conspiracy to
discriminate based on religious animus, was proper because Polk failed to file this
action within the applicable two-year statute of limitations, or establish grounds for
equitable tolling or equitable estoppel. See Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103,
1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (§ 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should
know of the injury that is the basis of the cause of action); Taylor v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 993 F.2d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (California’s statute
of limitations for personal injury actions governs claims brought under §§ 1983
and 1985); see also Lukovsky v. City & County of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044,
1051-52 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing requirements for equitable tolling and
equitable estoppel under California law); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (two-year
statute of limitations for personal injury claims).
The district court properly dismissed Polk’s claims under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) because, despite numerous
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amendments, Polk failed to allege sufficient facts to show that defendants
conducted an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection
of an unlawful debt. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985)
(setting forth elements of a civil RICO claim under); Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v.
Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (court need not accept as true allegations
that are conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences).
Polk’s contentions regarding defendants’ alleged violation of the Hobbs Act,
the district court’s alleged failure to grant an additional extension of time to further
amend her complaint, and the allegedly premature dismissal of her action before
the commencement of discovery are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
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