Company Doe v. Public Citizen

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-2209

COMPANY DOE,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

PUBLIC CITIZEN; CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA; CONSUMERS
UNION,

Parties-in-Interest – Appellants,

and

INEZ TENENBAUM, in her official capacity as Chairwoman of
the Consumer Product Safety Commission; CONSUMER PRODUCT
SAFETY COMMISSION,

Defendants.

------------------------------

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION; AARP; ADVANCE
PUBLICATIONS, INCORPORATED; BLOOMBERG, INCORPORATED; DOW
JONES AND COMPANY, INCORPORATED; GANNETT COMPANY,
INCORPORATED; THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY; NPR,
INCORPORATED; THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS; TRIBUNE COMPANY; WP COMPANY LLC, d/b/a The
Washington Post,

Amici Supporting Appellants,

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS; THE AMERICAN
COATINGS ASSOCIATION; THE ASSOCIATION OF HOME APPLIANCE
MANUFACTURERS; THE MANUFACTURERS ALLIANCE FOR PRODUCTIVITY
AND INNOVATION; THE RECREATIONAL OFF−HIGHWAY VEHICLE
ASSOCIATION; THE SPECIALTY VEHICLE INSTITUTE OF AMERICA,

Amici Supporting Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District
Judge. (8:11-cv-02958-AW)

Argued: October 31, 2013 Decided: April 16, 2014

Before FLOYD, Circuit Judge, and HAMILTON and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judges.

Vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded with
instructions by published opinion. Judge Floyd wrote the
opinion, in which Senior Judge Davis joined. Senior Judge
Hamilton wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment.

ARGUED: Scott Matthew Michelman, PUBLIC CITIZEN LITIGATION
GROUP, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Baruch Abraham
Fellner, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP, Washington, D.C., for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: Allison M. Zieve, Julie A. Murray, PUBLIC
CITIZEN LITIGATION GROUP, Washington, D.C., for Appellants.
Thomas M. Johnson, Jr., Amanda C. Machin, GIBSON, DUNN &
CRUTCHER, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. Ben Wizner,
Brian M. Hauss, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, New
York, New York, for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation. Julie Nepveu, AARP FOUNDATION LITIGATION, Michael
Schuster, AARP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae AARP. Cary
Silverman, SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for
Amici Curiae National Association of Manufacturers, American
Coatings Association, Association of Home Appliance
Manufacturers, Manufacturers Alliance for Productivity and
Innovation, Recreational Off-Highway Vehicle Association, and
Specialty Vehicle Institute of America. Leslie Moylan,
Washington, D.C., Robert D. Balin, Edward J. Davis, Eric Feder,
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP, New York, New York, for Amici Curiae
Media Organizations.

2
FLOYD, Circuit Judge:

This appeal presents numerous issues relating to

transparency in federal courts and the public’s constitutional

and common-law rights of access to judicial records and

documents. The plaintiff in the underlying proceedings, known

to the public only as “Company Doe,” filed suit under the

Administrative Procedure Act to enjoin the United States

Consumer Product Safety Commission (the Commission) from

publishing in its online, publicly accessible database a “report

of harm” that attributes the death of an infant to a product

manufactured and sold by Company Doe. The case generated ample

media attention, for this was the first legal challenge to the

implementation of the Commission’s newly minted database

mandated by the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008.

Regrettably, the district court allowed the entire litigation—

from filing to judgment—to occur behind closed doors, keeping

all documents filed in the case under seal, not even reflected

on the public docket. As a result, neither the press nor the

public was able to monitor the litigation as it unfolded.

Three months after the district court entered judgment in

favor of Company Doe and enjoined the Commission from publishing

the challenged report in its online database, the court released

its memorandum opinion on the public docket with sweeping

redactions to virtually all of the facts, expert testimony, and

3
evidence supporting its decision. Much of the record—including

the pleadings, the briefing pertaining to Company Doe’s motion

for injunctive relief, the Commission’s motion to dismiss, the

parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, and numerous

residual matters—remains sealed in its entirety.

Three consumer advocacy groups—Public Citizen, Consumer

Federation of America, and Consumers’ Union (collectively

Consumer Groups)—filed a post-judgment motion to intervene for

the purpose of appealing the district court’s sealing order as

well as its decision to allow Company Doe to proceed under a

pseudonym. The district court, however, neglected to rule on

the intervention motion before the period to appeal the

underlying judgment expired. Consumer Groups therefore noted

their appeal of the district court’s sealing and pseudonymity

orders as well as the court’s “constructive denial” of the

motion to intervene. Three months after Consumer Groups filed

their notice of appeal, the district court issued an order

denying Consumer Groups’ motion to intervene.

We hold that Consumer Groups’ notice of appeal deprived the

district court of jurisdiction to entertain Consumer Groups’

motion to intervene, and, therefore, we vacate the district

court’s order denying intervention. Although Consumer Groups

were neither parties to, nor intervenors in, the underlying case

before the district court, we nevertheless conclude that they

4
are able to seek appellate review of the district court’s

sealing and pseudonymity orders because they meet the

requirements for nonparty appellate standing and have

independent Article III standing to challenge the sealing and

pseudonymity orders. As for the merits, we hold that the

district court’s sealing order violates the public’s right of

access under the First Amendment and that the district court

abused its discretion in allowing Company Doe to litigate

pseudonymously. Accordingly, we vacate in part, reverse in

part, and remand to the district court with instructions to

unseal the case in its entirety.

I.

A.

A brief summary of the relevant statutory and regulatory

framework provides the necessary background for this appeal.

Congress passed the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of

2008 (CPSIA or the Act) to establish more stringent safety and

testing standards for manufacturers of children’s products.

CPSIA, Pub. L. No. 110-314, 122 Stat. 3016 (2008); 15 U.S.C.

§ 2051(a)(1). To enhance public access to product safety

information, the Act required the Commission, the federal

regulatory agency responsible for the implementation and

enforcement of the Act, to create and maintain a publicly

5
accessible, Internet database containing “[r]eports of harm”

about product safety. 15 U.S.C. § 2055a(a)(1)(A)-(C), (b)(1).

The purpose of the database was to provide consumers an avenue

to report safety hazards about specific consumer products and to

learn of and evaluate the potential dangers posed by products

that had entered the stream of commerce. See H.R. Rep. No. 110-

501, at 34 (2007).

Recognizing that inaccurate or erroneous information would

thwart the intended goals for the database, Congress engrafted

into the statute certain safeguards aimed at excluding

misleading material. The Act, for example, establishes minimum

requirements that reports must meet to be included in the

database and provides manufacturers the right to receive notice

of a report prior to its publication. See 15 U.S.C. § 2055a.

One such minimum requirement is that the harm described in the

report must “relat[e] to the use of the consumer product.” Id.

§ 2055a(b)(2)(B)(iii). A manufacturer has an opportunity to

object to the inclusion of information that it believes to be

materially inaccurate or confidential. Id. § 2055a(c)(2). The

Commission’s promulgated regulations define “materially

inaccurate information” as “information that is false or

misleading, and which is so substantial and important as to

affect a reasonable consumer’s decision making about the

product.” 16 C.F.R. § 1102.26(a)(1). If a manufacturer submits

6
a claim that a report is materially inaccurate and the

Commission substantiates the manufacturer’s claim, the

Commission must either correct the inaccuracy or exclude the

materially inaccurate information from the database. 15 U.S.C.

§ 2055a(c)(4). To avoid delays in making reports available to

the public, the Commission is required to publish a report

within twenty business days of receipt of the report. Id.

§ 2055a(c)(1), (c)(3)(A), (c)(4)(A).

B.

The underlying case stems from a report of harm received by

the Commission from an unidentified local government agency

concerning a product manufactured by Company Doe. Upon

transmittal of the report, Company Doe submitted a claim that

the report was materially inaccurate, asserting that the

Commission should not publish the report in its online database

because it contained confusing and contradictory statements that

rendered the information materially inaccurate within the

meaning of the Act and the Commission’s regulations. The

Commission attempted to correct the report by redacting certain

information that it deemed materially inaccurate, but Company

Doe insisted that the report remained unpublishable due to the

material inaccuracies. The Commission proposed multiple

versions of the report in its endeavor to purge the materially

7
inaccurate information, but the parties ultimately reached an

impasse as to whether the report satisfied the requisite

criteria to be included in the database. When the Commission

signaled its intent to publish the report, Company Doe filed

suit to enjoin the Commission from including the report of harm

in the database.

Company Doe filed with its complaint a motion to litigate

the case under seal and to proceed under a pseudonym. It

claimed that exposing the content of the challenged report of

harm through court documents would vitiate the very relief it

sought to obtain by filing suit. Disclosure of its identity as

well as any facts that would enable the public to link its

product to the harm alleged in the report, Company Doe argued,

would have the same effect as disclosure via the Commission’s

database.

The district court’s local rules prohibited the court from

ruling on the motion to seal for at least fourteen days to allow

interested parties to object to the sealing request. The local

rules also required that the suit remain sealed pending

resolution of the sealing motion. Both Consumer Groups and the

Commission filed objections to the motion to seal, maintaining

that Company Doe’s sealing request was overbroad and, if

countenanced, would violate the public right of access to court

documents. Although they were not named parties to the

8
underlying litigation, Consumer Groups also filed a motion to

unseal the briefing related to Company Doe’s sealing motion.

Despite the objections to Company Doe’s sealing motion, the

district court failed to rule on the motion for nine months, at

which time it issued its memorandum opinion adjudicating the

parties’ summary judgment motions. As a result, the entire

litigation—which included Company Doe’s motion for a preliminary

injunction, the Commission’s motion to dismiss, Company Doe’s

motion to amend the complaint, the parties’ motions for summary

judgment, and oral argument—occurred under seal.

On the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the

district court entered judgment in favor of Company Doe. In

doing so, the court found that the challenged report of harm

failed to describe a harm or risk “relating to the use” of

Company Doe’s product as required by the Act and that the

information contained in the report was materially inaccurate.

It therefore concluded that the Commission’s decision to publish

the report of harm was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of

discretion. The district court further found that publication

of the materially inaccurate report risked harm to Company Doe’s

reputational and pecuniary interests. Accordingly, the court

permanently enjoined the Commission from publishing the report

in the online database.

9
 After adjudicating the merits of Company Doe’s claims, the

district court addressed Company Doe’s motion to seal and to

proceed under a pseudonym. The court acknowledged the

presumption favoring public access to judicial documents but

determined that Company Doe’s interest “in preserving its

reputational and fiscal health” outweighed the public’s

“abstract interest” in obtaining information about the lawsuit.

The district court reasoned that permanent sealing of certain

documents and pseudonymity were necessary because drawing public

attention to the report was the consequence Company Doe sought

to avoid in bringing its suit. To hold otherwise, the district

court believed, would “reduce [Company Doe’s] First Amendment

interest in petitioning the Court for redress of its grievance

to a Hobson’s choice, a figurative fork that would fly in the

face of fundamental notions of fairness.” Accordingly, the

court denied Consumer Groups’ motion to unseal, overruled their

objections to Company Doe’s sealing motion, and granted Company

Doe’s motion to proceed under a pseudonym.

Recognizing that the public retained some “residual

interest” in accessing its memorandum opinion and that the First

Amendment public right of access likely attached to some of the

documents filed in the litigation, the district court refused to

seal the entire case. Instead, it ordered Company Doe to

propose redactions to information that, if disclosed, would harm

10
Company Doe’s reputation, explaining that Company Doe was in the

“best position to determine what level of redaction . . .

[would] suffice to balance the competing interests.” The court

noted that it “prognosticated the propriety of heavy redactions”

and even wholesale sealing of certain records, documents, and

evidence filed in the proceedings.

Company Doe thereafter filed a response to the district

court’s order and proposed redactions to the court’s memorandum

opinion as well as other documents filed in the litigation. The

Commission objected to Company Doe’s redactions as overbroad and

submitted redactions of its own. After considering the parties’

submissions, the district court adopted the redactions proposed

by Company Doe and rejected the Commission’s redactions, citing

concern that the public would be able to uncover Company Doe’s

identity and link Company Doe to the challenged report.

Three months after the district court entered judgment in

favor of Company Doe, the court released its memorandum opinion

on the public docket with significant redactions to its

analysis, the underlying facts, and the expert opinion testimony

upon which its conclusions relied. As noted above, numerous

documents remain completely sealed, not even reflected on the

public docket.

11
 C.

On August 7, 2012, seven days after the district court

issued its opinion granting Company Doe’s motion for summary

judgment, partially granting the motion to seal, and granting

Company Doe’s motion to proceed under a pseudonym, Consumer

Groups filed a post-judgment motion to intervene for the purpose

of appealing the district court’s sealing and pseudonymity

orders. The district court failed to rule on the intervention

motion before the period to appeal the underlying judgment

expired, causing Consumer Groups to appeal the “constructive

denial” of their motion to intervene as well as the court’s

sealing and pseudonymity rulings. The Commission filed a notice

of appeal of the district court’s adverse judgment.

On October 9, 2012, the district court issued a nunc pro

tunc order granting Consumer Groups’ motion to intervene, noting

that Company Doe did not oppose the motion. Company Doe

thereafter requested that the district court modify its

October 9 order to reflect that its consent to Consumer Groups’

intervention hinged upon the continuance of a case or

controversy between the original parties and that it might wish

to object to the motion in the event the Commission abandoned

its appeal. The district court approved Company Doe’s request

for clarification, stating that its October 9 order was

conditioned upon Company Doe’s lack of opposition and that

12
Company Doe could file a motion asking the court to reconsider

its previous order granting the motion to intervene in the event

that it subsequently desired to oppose the intervention motion.

On December 7, 2012, the Commission withdrew its appeal of

the district court’s judgment, and Company Doe promptly moved

for the district court to reconsider its October 9 order. On

January 14, 2013, more than three months after Consumer Groups

filed their notice of appeal, the district court granted Company

Doe’s motion to reconsider and revoked Consumer Groups’

intervention, concluding that intervention was improper because

the underlying merits of the dispute and the sealing orders were

“inextricably intertwined,” and, therefore, Consumer Groups’

objections to the sealing order became moot when the district

court enjoined the Commission from including the report in its

online database.

On January 16, 2013, Consumer Groups filed an amended

notice of appeal encompassing the district court’s January 14

order as well as the district court’s rulings on Company Doe’s

motions to seal and to proceed under a pseudonym. Company Doe

subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the appeal.

II.

Before proceeding to the merits of Consumer Groups’

arguments, we first must address several threshold issues that

13
threaten our power to entertain this appeal. In its motion to

dismiss Consumer Groups’ appeal, Company Doe maintains that

Consumer Groups are unable to seek appellate review of the

district court’s sealing and pseudonymity rulings because

(1) they were neither parties to, nor intervenors in, the

underlying action, and (2) they lack Article III standing.

Consumer Groups counter that they are proper appellants because

the district court abused its discretion in denying their motion

to intervene or, alternatively, because they satisfy the

requirements for nonparty appellate standing. Consumer Groups

further argue that the denial of access to documents filed in

the proceedings below is a concrete injury sufficient to make

their claims on appeal justiciable. A prior motions panel

deferred ruling on the motion to the merits panel. For the

reasons set forth below, we reject Company Doe’s arguments and

deny its motion to dismiss the appeal.

A.

As a general rule, only named parties to the case in the

district court and those permitted to intervene may appeal an

adverse order or judgment. See Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301,

304 (1988) (per curiam). Indeed, it is typically only parties

who are bound by a judgment and sufficiently aggrieved by it who

possess constitutional and prudential standing to seek appellate

14
review of the district court’s decision. See Newberry v.

Davison Chem. Co., 65 F.2d 724, 729 (4th Cir. 1933) (“[I]t is

only a party affected by an order or decree who may appeal from

it.”). In this case, however, we have no appeal from a named

party or successful intervenor. The Commission and its

chairwoman were the only named party-defendants to the

underlying proceedings, and they abandoned their appeal of the

district court’s judgment in favor of Company Doe. Although

Consumer Groups sought intervention before the district court,

the court denied the motion to intervene. Thus, because

Consumer Groups were neither parties to, nor intervenors in, the

proceedings before the district court, Company Doe argues that

no case or controversy exists and that we lack authority to hear

Consumer Groups’ challenge to the district court’s sealing and

pseudonymity orders.

Whether Consumer Groups may appeal the sealing and

pseudonymity orders rests, in part, upon the propriety of the

district court’s denial of Consumer Groups’ motion to intervene.

That is, Consumer Groups have standing to appeal the denial of

their intervention motion, see Hill v. W. Elec. Co., 672 F.2d

381, 385-86 (4th Cir. 1982), and if we conclude the district

court erred in its decision to deny intervention, then Consumer

Groups’ newfound intervenor status in light of our holding would

supply an ongoing, adversarial case or controversy, thereby

15
allowing us to review Consumer Groups’ challenges to the

district court’s sealing and pseudonymity rulings, see Izumi

Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Phillips Corp., 510 U.S.

27, 34 (1993) (per curiam) (dismissing writ of certiorari as

improvidently granted but explaining that, if the Supreme Court

reversed the lower court’s denial of the motion to intervene,

the Court “could address the merits of the question on which

[it] . . . granted certiorari”); see also Ross v. Marshall, 426

F.3d 745, 761 & n.68 (5th Cir. 2005) (reversing denial of

intervention motion and entertaining the merits of intervenors’

claims on appeal); Crawford v. Equifax Payment Servs., Inc., 201

F.3d 877, 879, 881-82 (7th Cir. 2000) (same). We therefore turn

to the district court’s order denying Consumer Groups’ motion to

intervene, first considering whether the district court had

authority to rule on the motion at all.

1.

Consumer Groups filed their motion to intervene on August

7, 2012, seven days after the district court entered judgment in

favor of Company Doe. As noted above, the district court failed

to rule on the motion before the period to appeal the underlying

judgment expired. After Consumer Groups filed their notice of

appeal, the district court undertook a series of actions on the

intervention motion, which had the purported effect of first

16
granting, then conditionally granting, and ultimately denying

the motion on January 14, 2013. It is the district court’s

January 14 order denying intervention that is before us on

review.

Generally, a timely filed notice of appeal transfers

jurisdiction of a case to the court of appeals and strips a

district court of jurisdiction to rule on any matters involved

in the appeal. See Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459

U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam). This rule fosters judicial

economy and guards against the confusion and inefficiency that

would result if two courts simultaneously were considering the

same issues. See 20 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal

Practice § 3902.1 (3d ed. 2010). We have recognized limited

exceptions to the general rule that permit district courts to

take subsequent action on matters that are collateral to the

appeal, Langham-Hill Petroleum Inc. v. S. Fuels Co., 813 F.2d

1327, 1330-31 (4th Cir. 1987), or to take action that aids the

appellate process, Grand Jury Proceedings Under Seal v. United

States, 947 F.2d 1188, 1190 (4th Cir. 1991). As our case law

amply demonstrates, however, these exceptions are confined to a

narrow class of actions that promote judicial efficiency and

facilitate the division of labor between trial and appellate

courts. See, e.g., Lytle v. Griffith, 240 F.3d 404, 407 n.2

(4th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the district court’s limited

17
modification of an injunction appropriately “aided in th[e]

appeal by relieving [the court] from considering the substance

of an issue begotten merely from imprecise wording in the

injunction”); Fobian v. Storage Tech. Corp., 164 F.3d 887, 890

(4th Cir. 1999) (holding that a district court is authorized,

under the in aid of appeal exception, to entertain a Rule 60(b)

motion after a party appeals the district court’s judgment);

Grand Jury Proceedings Under Seal, 947 F.2d at 1190 (holding

that the district court retained jurisdiction to memorialize its

oral opinions soon after a decision was rendered).

Here, the district court found that it had authority, under

the “in aid of appeal” exception, to act on the intervention

motion after Consumer Groups noticed their appeal, a finding

neither Consumer Groups nor Company Doe directly challenges on

appeal. Notwithstanding the parties’ acquiescence to the

district court’s jurisdictional determination, we have an

independent obligation to address a lower court’s jurisdiction

to issue a ruling we are reviewing on appeal. See Arizonans for

Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 73 (1997); Stephens v.

Cnty. of Albemarle, 524 F.3d 485, 490 (4th Cir. 2008).

Whether a district court retains jurisdiction to rule on a

motion to intervene following a notice of appeal is a matter of

first impression in this Circuit. The majority of our sister

circuits that have confronted this issue have applied the

18
general jurisdiction-stripping rule to hold that an effective

notice of appeal deprives a district court of authority to

entertain a motion to intervene after the court of appeals has

assumed jurisdiction over the underlying matter. See Taylor v.

KeyCorp, 680 F.3d 609, 617 (6th Cir. 2012); Drywall Tapers &

Pointers of Greater N.Y., Local Union 1974 v. Natasi & Assocs.

Inc., 488 F.3d 88, 94-95 (2d Cir. 2007); Roe v. Town of

Highland, 909 F.2d 1097, 1100 (7th Cir. 1990); Nicol v. Gulf

Fleet Supply Vessels, Inc., 743 F.2d 298, 299 (5th Cir. 1984).

We see no reason why an intervention motion should be excepted

from the general rule depriving the district court of authority

to rule on matters once the case is before the court of appeals.

Accordingly, we join the majority of our sister circuits and

hold that an effective notice of appeal divests a district court

of jurisdiction to entertain an intervention motion.

We further conclude that the “in aid of appeal” exception

is inapposite in this case. After Consumer Groups appealed the

district court’s “constructive denial” of their motion to

intervene, the court undertook multiple actions on Consumer

Groups’ intervention motion. The district court’s final ruling

revoking its prior grant of intervention came three months after

Consumer Groups noted their appeal and one month after they

filed their opening brief. A district court does not act in aid

of the appeal when it “alter[s] the status of the case as it

19
rests before the court of appeals.” Coastal Corp. v. Tx. E.

Corp., 869 F.2d 817, 820 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Fobian, 164

F.3d at 890-91 (concluding that a district court’s grant of Rule

60(b) relief after an appeal of the underlying judgment has been

taken “cannot be considered in furtherance of the appeal”

because “two courts would be exercising jurisdiction over the

same matter at the same time”). By continuing to act on

Consumer Groups’ motion to intervene after we assumed

jurisdiction over the matter and briefing had commenced, the

district court purported to change the status of the appeal. In

doing so, it acted outside its authority.

Thus, we hold that Consumer Groups’ notice of appeal

deprived the district court of authority to rule on Consumer

Groups’ motion to intervene. Accordingly, we vacate the

district court’s January 14 order denying intervention on the

merits. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S.

534, 541 (1986) (“When the lower federal court lacks

jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction on appeal, not of the merits

but merely for the purpose of correcting the error of the lower

court in entertaining the suit.” (brackets omitted) (quoting

United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 440 (1936))).

20
 2.

Because the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain

Consumer Groups’ motion to intervene, we next must address

whether Consumer Groups, as nonparties, may appeal the district

court’s sealing and pseudonymity orders. Consumer Groups

maintain they are entitled to pursue this appeal in the

Commission’s absence because they satisfy the requirements for

nonparty appellate standing announced in Kenny v. Quigg, 820

F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1987).

The rule that only original parties and intervenors to the

action before the district court may appeal an adverse judgment

is not absolute. We have recognized an exception to the general

rule that permits a nonparty to appeal a district court’s order

or judgment when the appellant (1) possessed “an interest in the

cause litigated” before the district court and (2) “participated

in the proceedings actively enough to make him privy to the

record.” Kenny, 820 F.2d at 668. To satisfy the requirements

for nonparty appellate standing, the appellant must have some

cognizable interest that is affected by the district court’s

judgment or order. See Davis v. Scott, 176 F.3d 805, 807-08

(4th Cir. 1999). By restricting nonparty appeals to only those

individuals who sufficiently participate in the proceedings

before the district court and have some concrete interest that

is adversely affected by the trial court’s judgment or ruling,

21
we address the prudential standing concerns that arise when a

nonparty seeks to appeal from a district court’s judgment. See

Castillo v. Cameron Cnty., 238 F.3d 339, 349 & n.16 (5th Cir.

2001); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)

(prudential standing requirements include “the general

prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal

rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances

more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and

the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the

zone of interests protected by the law invoked”).

This Court first addressed and applied the standard for

nonparty appellate standing in Kenny. There, the Secretary of

Labor filed suit against an employee stock-ownership plan,

alleging the sale of stock to the plan’s trustees violated the

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. 820 F.2d at

666-67. Kenny, who was a participant in the plan but not a

named party to the proceedings before the district court, filed

objections to the plan’s motion to approve the sale of stock.

Id. at 667-68. When the district court overruled her objections

and approved the proposed sale, only Kenny appealed. Id. at

668. We permitted Kenny to appeal in the Department of Labor’s

absence, noting that she “participated significantly in the

proceedings below” by filing “her own memorandum opposing

approval of the sale,” which the district court fully considered

22
and rejected. Id. We also found that Kenny’s financial stake

in the plan gave her an interest in the proceedings sufficient

to confer nonparty appellate standing. Id.

Consumer Groups’ involvement in the underlying proceedings

is no different. They participated in the case below by

objecting, under the district court’s local rules, to Company

Doe’s motions to seal and to proceed pseudonymously and by

filing their own motion to unseal. Although Consumer Groups had

not sought formal intervention to challenge the sealing and

pseudonymity requests prior to entry of summary judgment, the

district court fully considered, and overruled, Consumer Groups’

objections when addressing the merits of Company Doe’s motion to

seal and to proceed under a pseudonym. As in Kenny, Consumer

Groups’ participation before the district court—as it pertains

to the issues of sealing and pseudonymity—was akin to party

participation.

Company Doe suggests that Consumer Groups’ involvement in

the proceedings below falls short of the participation necessary

to establish nonparty appellate standing because they failed to

substantially participate in the underlying litigation on the

merits. Consumer Groups, however, do not challenge the district

court’s entry of judgment in favor of Company Doe. Instead,

they appeal only the district court’s rulings on sealing and

pseudonymity, which are the very issues they contested below and

23
were affected by. Consumer Groups participated in the

proceedings before the district court to the greatest extent

possible given that the litigation proceeded in secret.

Numerous courts have found participation similar to that of

Consumer Groups adequate to permit a nonparty to appeal. See,

e.g., Kaplan v. Rand, 192 F.3d 60, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1999)

(permitting nonparty shareholder to appeal award of legal fees

to counsel for stockholder’s derivative action because

shareholder objected to the fee award before the district

court); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Topworth Int’l,

Ltd., 205 F.3d 1107, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding sufficient

participation based upon nonparty’s formal objection to

receiver’s proposed distribution plan); Binker v. Pennsylvania,

977 F.2d 738, 745 (3d Cir. 1992) (concluding that nonparty

appellants sufficiently participated in proceedings below by

asserting objections to settlement agreement). We conclude

that, by lodging objections to Company Doe’s motions to seal and

to proceed under a pseudonym, and by filing their own motion to

unseal, Consumer Groups sufficiently participated in the

proceedings before the district court to appeal the court’s

orders dismissing their objections and permitting the case to be

litigated under seal and pseudonymously.

Having determined that Consumer Groups satisfy the first

Kenny prong, we turn next to the second requirement for nonparty

24
appellate standing, asking whether a nonparty who claims a right

of access to judicial documents and objects to a sealing motion

and request to proceed under a pseudonym possesses an interest

in the underlying proceedings sufficient to appeal a district

court’s order overruling the nonparty’s objections and sealing

portions of the record.

We conclude that the presumptive right of access to

judicial documents and materials under the First Amendment and

common law gives Consumer Groups an interest in the underlying

litigation such that they may appeal the district court’s orders

disregarding their objections and depriving them of access to

the information they claim a right to obtain. The district

court’s rejection of Consumer Groups’ proffered objections to

the sealing motion and pseudonymity request is tantamount to an

adjudication of their rights of access. See United States v.

Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1363 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he district judge

appears not to have recognized that maintaining the transcripts

under seal, though a passive act, was an active decision

requiring justification under the First Amendment.”).

Significantly, Consumer Groups are bound by the district court’s

denial of access and concomitant determination of their rights.

To deprive Consumer Groups of the right to appeal the district

court’s adverse ruling on their objections would leave no

possible avenue for them to vindicate their asserted First

25
Amendment and common-law rights of access, which are interests

that diverge from those of the named parties who had access to

the documents filed in the litigation as well as the identity of

Company Doe. Cf. United States v. Hickey, 185 F.3d 1064, 1066

(9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the proposition that a named party

has standing to vindicate the public’s right of access). Thus,

appealing the district court’s sealing and pseudonymity

determinations is the only way Consumer Groups can protect

themselves from being bound by the adjudication of their rights

of access that they believe were violated. Because the orders

from which Consumer Groups appeal deprive Consumer Groups of the

very information they claim a right to inspect, their appeal

falls squarely within the exception allowing nonparties to seek

appellate review when necessary to preserve their rights. See

Davis, 176 F.3d at 808.

Company Doe argues that Consumer Groups lack the requisite

interest to appeal the district court’s sealing order because

the local rule under which Consumer Groups submitted objections

serves only as a public notice provision and does not confer

party status that would permit a third party to appeal a

district court’s rejection of its objections. True enough, but

a nonparty’s right to seek appellate review of an order that

disposes of his rights and by which he is bound does not depend

upon some explicit authorization to appeal. In Delvin v.

26
Scardelletti, for example, the Supreme Court held that an

unnamed class member who timely objects to a proposed class

action settlement may appeal the district court’s approval of

the settlement without seeking formal intervention in the

underlying proceedings. 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002). In doing so,

the Court concluded that the petitioner was able to seek

appellate review of the district court’s order disregarding his

objections because he (1) participated in the district court

proceedings, (2) was bound by the court’s order overruling his

submitted objections, and (3) possessed interests that would not

be adequately represented on appeal by the named parties. See

id. at 7-9. Although “no federal statute or procedural rule

directly addresses who may appeal from approval of class action

settlements,” the Court observed, “the right to appeal from an

action that finally disposes of one’s rights has a statutory

basis.” Id. at 13 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“The courts of

appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final

decisions of the district courts of the United States

. . . .”)). As in Delvin, the district court’s order overruling

Consumer Groups’ objections and granting Company Doe’s motions

to seal and to proceed pseudonymously constitutes a final

decision with respect to Consumer Groups’ rights of access

sufficient to trigger their right to appeal. We therefore hold

that, because they objected to Company Doe’s motion to seal and

27
to proceed under a pseudonym, Consumer Groups may appeal the

district court’s adverse sealing and pseudonymity rulings

without first intervening in the underlying proceedings.

B.

We turn now to the final threshold issue presented by

Company Doe’s motion to dismiss. Company Doe contends that

Consumer Groups lack standing under Article III to pursue

appellate review of the district court’s sealing and

pseudonymity orders. Specifically, Company Doe argues that

Consumer Groups lack a concrete and particular injury necessary

to confer Article III standing. Because the Commission

abandoned its appeal of the district court’s judgment and

Consumer Groups have no judicially cognizable injury of their

own, Company Doe asserts that no justiciable case or controversy

exists.

To satisfy the requirements for constitutional standing,

the party invoking federal court jurisdiction must demonstrate

“that the conduct of which he complains has caused him to suffer

an ‘injury in fact’ that a favorable judgment will address.”

Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004)

(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61

(1992)). Article III standing “must be met by persons seeking

appellate review, just as it must be met by persons appearing in

28
courts of first instance.” Arizonans for Official English, 520

U.S. at 64. Accordingly, an intervenor may not pursue an appeal

in the absence of an original party on whose side intervention

was permitted unless the intervenor independently satisfies the

requirements for constitutional standing. Id. at 65.

This Court has previously permitted news organizations to

intervene in actions in which they were not otherwise parties to

challenge a district court’s sealing order. See Stone v. Univ.

of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 1988);

Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 252-54 (4th

Cir. 1988). In those cases, the news organizations had an

interest in the sealed judicial documents and materials

sufficient to satisfy the constitutional standing requirements

of injury, causation, and redressability. They were bound by

the district court’s sealing orders, and insofar as they were

denied access to judicial documents that they claimed a right to

obtain, they were aggrieved by the district court’s sealing

determination. A favorable decision on appeal would ameliorate

their injuries by providing them access to the records that they

sought. In sum, it was the news organizations’ failure to

obtain information—information, which in their view, they had a

right to access under the common law or the Constitution—that

supplied the case or controversy necessary for the intervenors

to secure appellate review of a district court’s sealing orders.

29
 Company Doe attempts to distinguish the above cases on the

ground that they involved media parties that had a First

Amendment right to inform public discourse. We see no reason

why the standing of news media to seek appellate review of a

district court’s sealing order should differ from that of a

member of the general public. The public right of access has

two dimensions. First, the right protects the public’s ability

to oversee and monitor the workings of the Judicial Branch. See

Columbus-Am. Discovery Grp. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 291,

303 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Publicity of such records, of course, is

necessary in the long run so that the public can judge the

product of the courts in a given case.”); see also Pepsico, Inc.

v. Redmond, 46 F.3d 29, 31 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J., in

chambers) (“Opinions are not the litigants’ property. They

belong to the public, which underwrites the judicial system that

produces them.”). Second, public access to the courts promotes

the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch. See United

States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 851 (3d Cir. 1978) (“Public

confidence [in the judiciary] cannot long be maintained where

important judicial decisions are made behind closed doors and

then announced in conclusive terms to the public, with the

record supporting the court’s decision sealed from public

view.”). In light of the interests served by the public right

of access, we have recognized that “the rights of the news media

30
. . . are coextensive with and do not exceed those rights of

members of the public in general.” In re Greensboro News Co.,

727 F.2d 1320, 1322 (4th Cir. 1984); see also Branzburg v.

Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (“[T]he First Amendment does not

guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to

information not available to the public generally.”). Instead,

the right of access is widely shared among the press and the

general public alike, such that anyone who seeks and is denied

access to judicial records sustains an injury.

Article III standing demands that a litigant demonstrate

“an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete

and particularized” and “‘actual or imminent.’” Lujan, 504 U.S.

at 560 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).

Standing, the Supreme Court has instructed, “is not to be placed

in the hands of ‘concerned bystanders,’ who will use it simply

as a ‘vehicle of the vindication of value interests.’” Diamond

v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986) (quoting United States v.

SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)). Thus, a mere generalized

grievance shared by the public at large is insufficient to

establish a justiciable case or controversy. See Lujan, 504

U.S. at 573-74.

That an injury may be widely shared, however, does not

automatically render it unsuitable for Article III standing.

Even a widely shared interest, “where sufficiently concrete, may

31
count as an ‘injury in fact.’” FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24

(1998). The Supreme Court consistently has held that a

plaintiff suffers an Article III injury when he is denied

information that must be disclosed pursuant to a statute,

notwithstanding “[t]he fact that other citizens or groups of

citizens might make the same complaint after unsuccessfully

demanding disclosure.” Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

491 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1989); see also Akins, 524 U.S. at 21-25

(holding that a group of voters had a concrete injury based upon

their inability to receive certain donor and campaign-related

information from an organization); Havens Realty Corp. v.

Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-74 (1982) (concluding that

deprivation of information about housing availability was

sufficient to constitute an Article III injury). What each of

these cases has in common is that the plaintiffs (1) alleged a

right of disclosure; (2) petitioned for access to the concealed

information; and (3) were denied the material that they claimed

a right to obtain. Their informational interests, though shared

by a large segment of the citizenry, became sufficiently

concrete to confer Article III standing when they sought and

were denied access to the information that they claimed a right

to inspect.

Although Consumer Groups’ right of access stems not from a

statute but from the Constitution and common law, the nature of

32
their alleged injury is indistinguishable from the informational

harm suffered by the plaintiffs in the above cases. Consumer

Groups’ injury is formed by their inability to access judicial

documents and materials filed in the proceedings below,

information that they contend they have a right to obtain and

inspect under the law. Because the public right of access under

the First Amendment and common law protects individuals from the

very harm suffered by Consumer Groups, their injury transcends a

mere abstract injury such as a “common concern for obedience to

law.” L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 311 U.S. 295,

303 (1940). Consumer Groups are public interest organizations

that advocate directly on the issues to which the underlying

litigation and the sealed materials relate. By seeking, and

having been denied access to, documents they allege a right to

inspect, Consumer Groups have a direct stake in having a

concrete injury redressed.

One final point merits our attention. Company Doe argues

that, because it prevailed on its claims before the district

court and secured an injunction barring the Commission from

publishing the challenged report of harm, Consumer Groups cannot

stand in the Commission’s shoes and seek appellate review of the

district court’s sealing order, which was necessary to

effectuate the district court’s judgment. In support of this

contention, Company Doe directs us to Diamond v. Charles, 476

33
U.S. 54 (1986), and Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652

(2013).

In Diamond, a pediatrician who was licensed to practice

medicine in Illinois, and who was a “conscientious object[or] to

abortions,” sought to defend the constitutionality of a state

statute governing abortions after the state elected not to

appeal an injunction enjoining enforcement of certain provisions

of the statute. 476 U.S. at 57-58. The state Attorney General

filed a letter with the Supreme Court stating that his interest

in the continued proceedings was “essentially co-terminous with

the position on the issues set forth by the [petitioner].” Id.

at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court, however,

held that the petitioner lacked constitutional standing to

appeal the lower court’s decision because only the state

possessed a direct stake in defending the constitutionality of

its statute. Id. at 65. Because the petitioner had no

judicially cognizable interest of his own in the challenged

statute, he had no standing to appeal the judgment below in the

absence of the state. Id. at 71.

In Hollingsworth, the proponents of a ballot initiative

that amended the California constitution to define marriage as

between one man and one woman sought to defend the law’s

constitutionality after the named defendants—a group of state

and local officials responsible for enforcing California’s

34
marriage laws—refused to defend the law. 133 S. Ct. at 2660.

The Supreme Court held that the proponents lacked standing

because they had no personal stake in defending the law’s

enforcement that was distinct from the general interest of every

California citizen. Id. at 2663. Because the proponents did

not represent the State, they could not assert the State’s

interests. Id. at 2664-66.

Diamond and Hollingsworth illustrate that an intervenor’s

right to continue a suit on appeal in the absence of the

original party on whose side intervention was sought is

dependent upon the intervenor having an independent interest in

the proceedings sufficient to satisfy the requirements for

Article III standing. In both cases, the requisite injury in

fact was lacking because the intervening parties did not have a

direct stake in defending the constitutionality of a state

statute when state officials declined to do so. Consumer

Groups, by contrast, do not appeal the merits of the district

court’s decision to enjoin the Commission from publishing the

report of harm in its online database, nor do they attempt to

assert an interest that belongs only to the Commission. Their

interest in the litigation is that of a third party seeking

access to documents filed with the court, which is an interest

entirely independent of the injury that supplied the requisite

case or controversy between Company Doe and the Commission.

35
Consumer Groups have a redressable, actual injury and a personal

stake sufficient to make their claims justiciable.

We conclude that Consumer Groups’ participation before the

district court on the issues of sealing and pseudonymity,

coupled with their redressable injuries, create an ongoing,

adversarial case or controversy vis-à-vis Company Doe, whose

interests in maintaining the documents under seal are adverse to

those of Consumer Groups. Thus, having determined that Consumer

Groups have nonparty appellate standing and independent Article

III standing to seek appellate review of the district court’s

sealing and pseudonymity orders, we deny Company Doe’s motion to

dismiss this appeal and turn next to the merits of Consumer

Groups’ arguments.

III.

It is well settled that the public and press have a

qualified right of access to judicial documents and records

filed in civil and criminal proceedings. See Richmond

Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980);

Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597; Media Gen. Operations, Inc. v. Buchanan,

417 F.3d 424, 428 (4th Cir. 2005). The right of public access

springs from the First Amendment and the common-law tradition

that court proceedings are presumptively open to public

scrutiny. Va. Dep’t of State Police v. Wash. Post, 386 F.3d

36
567, 575 (4th Cir. 2004). “The distinction between the rights

of access afforded by the common law and the First Amendment is

significant, because the common law does not afford as much

substantive protection to the interests of the press and the

public as does the First Amendment.” In re United States for an

Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703, 707 F.3d 283, 290 (4th

Cir. 2013) (quoting Va. Dep’t of State Police, 386 F.3d at 575)

(internal quotation marks omitted). The common-law presumptive

right of access extends to all judicial documents and records,

and the presumption can be rebutted only by showing that

“countervailing interests heavily outweigh the public interests

in access.” Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253. By contrast, the First

Amendment secures a right of access “only to particular judicial

records and documents,” Stone, 855 F.2d at 180, and, when it

applies, access may be restricted only if closure is

“necessitated by a compelling government interest” and the

denial of access is “narrowly tailored to serve that interest,”

In re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting

Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

We have cautioned district courts that the right of public

access, whether arising under the First Amendment or the common

law, “may be abrogated only in unusual circumstances.” Stone,

855 F.2d at 182. As explained above, public access promotes not

37
only the public’s interest in monitoring the functioning of the

courts but also the integrity of the judiciary. See Columbus-

Am. Discovery Grp., 203 F.3d at 303. “Public access serves to

promote trustworthiness of the judicial process, to curb

judicial abuses, and to provide the public with a more complete

understanding of the judicial system, including a better

perception of fairness.” Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673,

682 (3d Cir. 1988). As Judge Easterbrook, writing for the

Seventh Circuit, stated: “The political branches of government

claim legitimacy by election, judges by reason. Any step that

withdraws an element of the judicial process from public view

makes the ensuing decision look more like a fiat and requires

rigorous justification.” Hicklin Eng’g, L.C. v. Bartell, 439

F.3d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 2006).

With these principles in mind, we turn to Consumer Groups’

arguments on appeal.

A.

Consumer Groups argue that the First Amendment right of

access applies to all of the documents sealed by the district

court and that the court erred in determining that Company Doe

demonstrated a compelling interest that justified sealing the

materials. Company Doe counters that the First Amendment is

inapplicable to the materials filed before the district court

38
and, even if it does extend to some of the documents, Company

Doe has a compelling interest sufficient to defeat the First

Amendment presumptive right of access.

When presented with a sealing request, our right-of-access

jurisprudence requires that a district court first “determine

the source of the right of access with respect to each document,

because only then can it accurately weigh the competing

interests at stake.” Va. Dep’t of State Police, 386 F.3d at 576

(brackets omitted) (quoting Stone, 855 F.2d at 181 (internal

quotation marks omitted)). Although the district court ordered

that some of the materials be unsealed after Consumer Groups

noted their appeal, our review of the record reveals that the

following categories of documents remain sealed in their

entireties: (1) the pleadings and attachments thereto; (2) the

motions, related briefing, and exhibits supporting (i) Company

Doe’s motion for a preliminary injunction, (ii) the Commission’s

motion to dismiss, (iii) Company Doe’s motion to amend its

complaint, and (iv) the parties’ cross-motions for summary

judgment; and (3) the amended pleadings as well as numerous

other residual matters. None of these sealed documents appear

on the public docket. Further, in addition to these materials,

the district court released its memorandum opinion on the public

docket with redactions to virtually all of the facts, the

court’s analysis, and the evidence supporting its decision.

39
 1.

We begin with the district court’s redactions to its

memorandum opinion as well as its wholesale sealing of the

parties’ summary judgment motions and accompanying materials.

We have squarely held that the First Amendment right of access

attaches to materials filed in connection with a summary

judgment motion. See Rushford, 846 F.2d at 252-53. Although we

have not addressed whether the First Amendment right of access

extends to a judicial opinion ruling on a summary judgment

motion, we have little difficulty in concluding that it does.

In In re Washington Post Co., we held that the right of

access under the First Amendment applied to documents filed in

connection with plea and sentencing hearings in criminal cases,

reasoning that the First Amendment right of access extends to

materials submitted in conjunction with judicial proceedings

that themselves would trigger the right to access. 807 F.2d at

390 (“Because we conclude that the more rigorous First Amendment

standard should apply in this context, we hold that the First

Amendment right of access applies to documents filed in

connection with plea hearings and sentencing hearings in

criminal cases, as well as to the hearings themselves.”). Our

decision in In re Washington Post Co. recognized the right of

access to documents as “a necessary corollary of the capacity to

attend the relevant proceedings.” Hartford Courant Co. v.

40
Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2004). We reaffirmed our

commitment to this analytical approach in Rushford, by observing

that summary judgment is an adjudication that “serves as a

substitute for trial,” 846 F.2d at 252, and therefore, the First

Amendment right of access attaches to documents and materials

filed in connection with a summary judgment motion, see id. at

253.

The same logic dictates that the First Amendment right of

access extends to a judicial opinion ruling on a summary

judgment motion. The public has an interest in learning not

only the evidence and records filed in connection with summary

judgment proceedings but also the district court’s decision

ruling on a summary judgment motion and the grounds supporting

its decision. Without access to judicial opinions, public

oversight of the courts, including the processes and the

outcomes they produce, would be impossible. See Cox Broad.

Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) (“[O]fficial records and

documents open to the public are the basic data of governmental

operations.”); Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128, 1135-36 (7th

Cir. 2014) (“Secrecy makes it difficult for the public

(including the bar) to understand the grounds and motivations of

a decision, why the case was brought (and fought), and what

exactly was at stake in it.”); United States v. Mentzos, 462

F.3d 830, 843 n.4 (8th Cir. 2006) (denying motion to file

41
opinion under seal because “decisions of the court are a matter

of public record”); Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d

562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[I]t should go without saying that

the judge’s opinions and orders belong in the public domain.”);

United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995)

(observing that public monitoring of the courts “is not possible

without access to . . . documents that are used in the

performance of Article III functions”). Indeed, it would be

anomalous to conclude that the First Amendment right of access

applies to materials that formed the basis of the district

court’s decision ruling on a summary judgment motion but not the

court’s opinion itself. We therefore hold that the First

Amendment right of access extends not only to the parties’

summary judgment motions and accompanying materials but also to

a judicial decision adjudicating a summary judgment motion.

2.

During the pendency of the underlying litigation, the

district court allowed the entire docket sheet to remain sealed

with the exception of Company Doe’s motion to seal. Although

the district court ultimately unsealed portions of the docket

sheet, numerous entries remain hidden from public view.

This Court has, in the criminal context, reversed the

sealing of docket sheets as overbroad and incompatible with the

42
First Amendment presumptive right of access. See In re State-

Record Co., 917 F.2d 124, 129 (4th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). In

doing so, we observed:

There are probably many motions and responses thereto
that contain no information prejudicial to defendant,
and we can not understand how the docket entry sheet
could be prejudicial. However, under the terms of the
orders entered in these cases, this information,
harmless as it may be, has also been withheld from the
public.

Id. Our skepticism toward wholesale sealing of docket sheets

was grounded in the commonsensical observation that most of the

information contained on a docket sheet is material that is

presumptively open to public inspection. The Eleventh Circuit

has squarely held that a district court’s maintenance of a

sealed docket sheet violates the public and press’s First

Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings, United States

v. Valenti, 987 F.2d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 1993), and the Second

Circuit has extended the First Amendment right of public access

to docket sheets for civil proceedings, Hartford Courant Co.,

380 F.3d at 96; see also United States v. Mendoza, 698 F.3d

1303, 1307 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that “dockets are generally

public documents” and collecting cases). We join the Second

Circuit and hold that the public and press’s First Amendment

qualified right of access to civil proceedings extends to docket

sheets.

43
 The ability of the public and press to inspect docket

sheets is a critical component to providing meaningful access to

civil proceedings. The docket sheet provides onlookers an

overview of the court proceedings and allows them to ascertain

the parties to the case, the materials that have been filed, and

the trial judge’s decisions. See United States v. Ochoa-

Vasquez, 428 F.3d 1015, 1029 n.15 (11th Cir. 2005). Access to

docket sheets therefore enhances the appearance of fairness and

enlightens the public both to the procedures the district court

utilized to adjudicate the claims before it and to the materials

it relied upon in reaching its determinations. In this respect,

“docket sheets provide a kind of index to judicial proceedings

and documents, and endow the public and press with the capacity

to exercise their rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.”

Hartford Courant Co., 380 F.3d at 93.

By sealing the entire docket sheet during the pendency of

the litigation, as the district court permitted in this case,

courts effectively shut out the public and the press from

exercising their constitutional and common-law right of access

to civil proceedings. But there is a more repugnant aspect to

depriving the public and press access to docket sheets: no one

can challenge closure of a document or proceeding that is itself

a secret. Indeed, in this case Consumer Groups were able to

challenge the sealing of only those categories of documents they

44
were able to glean from the district court’s heavily redacted

memorandum opinion. Because access to docket sheets is integral

to providing meaningful access to civil proceedings, we hold

that the public and press enjoy a presumptive right to inspect

docket sheets in civil cases under the First Amendment.

B.

Having concluded that the public enjoys a qualified right

of access under the First Amendment to the district court’s

memorandum opinion ruling on the parties’ cross-motions for

summary judgment, the materials the district court relied upon

in adjudicating the summary judgment motions, and the docket

sheet, we next must determine whether a compelling governmental

interest negates the public’s presumptive right of access to

these documents. Because the First Amendment guarantees the

right of access to these documents, our review of the district

court’s sealing decision is de novo. ACLU v. Holder, 673 F.3d

245, 251 (4th Cir. 2011).

The district court identified three interests that it found

sufficiently compelling to defeat the First Amendment right of

access: (1) Company Doe’s interest in “preserving its

reputational and fiscal health”; (2) Company Doe’s interest in

ensuring the efficacy of the injunctive relief awarded by the

45
district court; and (3) Company Doe’s First Amendment right to

petition the courts. We address each in turn.

1.

The district court surmised that disclosure of the

materially inaccurate report of harm and any facts that would

allow the public to link the report to Company Doe would risk

injury to Company Doe’s economic and reputational interests.

The court then concluded that Company Doe’s interest in

“preserving its reputational and fiscal health” outweighed the

public’s First Amendment right of access.

A corporation very well may desire that the allegations

lodged against it in the course of litigation be kept from

public view to protect its corporate image, but the First

Amendment right of access does not yield to such an interest.

The interests that courts have found sufficiently compelling to

justify closure under the First Amendment include a defendant’s

right to a fair trial before an impartial jury, Press-Enter.,

Co., 464 U.S. at 510; protecting the privacy rights of trial

participants such as victims or witnesses, Globe Newspaper Co.

v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1982); and risks to

national security, United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 83 (2d

Cir. 2008); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 705

(6th Cir. 2002). Adjudicating claims that carry the potential

46
for embarrassing or injurious revelations about a corporation’s

image, by contrast, are part of the day-to-day operations of

federal courts. But whether in the context of products

liability claims, securities litigation, employment matters, or

consumer fraud cases, the public and press enjoy a presumptive

right of access to civil proceedings and documents filed

therein, notwithstanding the negative publicity those documents

may shower upon a company. A corporation may possess a strong

interest in preserving the confidentiality of its proprietary

and trade-secret information, which in turn may justify partial

sealing of court records. See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598. We are

unaware, however, of any case in which a court has found a

company’s bare allegation of reputational harm to be a

compelling interest sufficient to defeat the public’s First

Amendment right of access. Conversely, every case we have

located has reached the opposite result under the less demanding

common-law standard. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers

Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 1996) (“commercial self-

interest” does not to qualify as a legitimate ground for keeping

documents under seal); Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse

Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 663 (3d Cir. 1991) (harm to a

“company’s public image” alone cannot rebut the common-law

presumption of access); Cent. Nat’l Bank of Mattoon v. U.S.

Dep’t of Treasury, 912 F.2d 897, 900 (7th Cir. 1990)

47
(information that “may impair [a corporation’s] standing with

its customers” insufficient to justify closure); Littlejohn, 851

F.2d at 685 (a corporation’s “desire to preserve corporate

reputation” is insufficient overcome common-law right of

access); Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1570-71

(11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (“harm [to] the company’s

reputation” is insufficient to outweigh common-law right of

access).

In any event, it is unclear from the district court’s

memorandum opinion what, if any, evidence the district court

relied upon to conclude that dissemination of the report of harm

would injure Company Doe’s reputational and pecuniary interests.

The district court made no specific findings explaining how the

information sealed in this case would harm Company Doe’s

reputation, and Company Doe does not point us to any evidence

that buttresses the district court’s conclusion. After scouring

the record on appeal, we find no credible evidence to support

Company Doe’s fear that disclosure of the challenged report of

harm and the facts of this case would subject it to reputational

or economic injury, particularly in light of the fact that the

district court’s entry of judgment in favor of Company Doe

vindicated the company and its product. This Court has never

permitted wholesale sealing of documents based upon

unsubstantiated or speculative claims of harm, let alone harm to

48
a company’s reputation. Cf. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 894 (2d

Cir. 1982) (“[A] naked conclusory statement that publication of

the Report will injure the bank in the industry and local

community falls woefully short of the kind of showing which

raises even an arguable issue as to whether it may be kept under

seal.”). An unsupported claim of reputational harm falls short

of a compelling interest sufficient to overcome the strong First

Amendment presumptive right of public access. The district

court erred by concluding otherwise.

2.

We also must reject the district court’s conclusion that

sealing was justified to safeguard the statutory right Company

Doe sought to vindicate by bringing the underlying action. The

district court believed that blanket sealing of the summary

judgment materials and sweeping redactions to its opinion were

warranted so that Company Doe would not forfeit the statutory

relief it obtained after successfully showing that the report of

harm was materially inaccurate and should not, under the CPSIA,

be published.

The relief Company Doe secured by prevailing on its claims

was the right to keep the challenged report of harm removed from

the online database. That remedy is distinct from the right to

litigate its claims in secret and to keep all meaningful facts

49
about the litigation forever concealed from public view.

Neither the CPSIA nor the Administrative Procedure Act confers

upon district courts carte blanche to conduct secret

proceedings, and, more importantly, the Constitution forbids it.

The district court’s sealing determination seems to be

rooted in a concern that the public would be unable to

appreciate the court’s determination that the information

contained in the challenged report of harm was materially

inaccurate and failed to relate to Company Doe’s product. The

court’s apprehension over the ramifications of disclosing the

facts germane to this case cannot be squared with the principles

of public discourse that underlie the First Amendment. As the

Supreme Court long ago recognized, “erroneous statement is

inevitable in free debate, and . . . it must be protected if the

freedoms of expression are to . . . survive.” N.Y. Times Co. v.

Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964).

We are not blind to the fact that a corporation’s image or

reputation may diminish by being embroiled in litigation against

the government over the safety of one of its products. That is

the nature of public litigation. When parties “call on the

courts, they must accept the openness that goes with subsidized

dispute resolution by public (and publicly accountable)

officials.” Union Oil Co. of Cal., 220 F.3d at 568. The

district court therefore erred in concluding that sealing was

50
justified to protect the rights that Company Doe sought to

vindicate by bringing its suit.

3.

For reasons substantially similar to those we have

identified above, we cannot accept the district court’s

contention that allowing public access to a manufacturer’s legal

challenge to the inclusion of a report of harm in the

Commission’s database would impermissibly impinge upon the

manufacturer’s First Amendment right to petition the courts.

Company Doe posits that, if pre-publication challenges to the

Commission’s online database could not be litigated without

disclosing the very information the Commission seeks to publish,

no manufacturer would challenge the inclusion of a report of

harm in the database and risk more exposure to the challenged

report through litigation.

Company Doe’s argument contorts the First Amendment right

to petition federal courts for redress of grievances and, if

embraced, would allow any company that challenged the inclusion

of a report in the Commission’s database to litigate its claims

behind closed doors. The First Amendment right to petition the

government secures meaningful access to federal courts. See

Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983).

It does not provide for a right to petition the courts in

51
secret. In this case, Company Doe was not denied meaningful

access to the courts: it litigated its claims and obtained the

relief it was entitled to under the Administrative Procedure

Act.

C.

The sealed documents in this case implicate public concerns

that are at the core of the interests protected by the right of

access: “the citizen’s desire to keep a watchful eye on the

workings of public agencies . . . [and] the operation of the

government.” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598. The interest of the

public and press in access to civil proceedings is at its apex

when the government is a party to the litigation. Indeed, the

public has a strong interest in monitoring not only functions of

the courts but also the positions that its elected officials and

government agencies take in litigation. See Fed. Trade Comm’n

v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 410 (1st Cir. 1987)

(“The appropriateness of making court files accessible is

accentuated in cases where the government is a party: in such

circumstances, the public’s right to know what the executive

branch is about coalesces with the concomitant right of the

citizenry to appraise the judicial branch.”). In this case, the

heightened public interest in disclosure is underscored by the

fact that this legal action marked the first challenge to the

52
accuracy of material sought to be posted on the Commission’s

database.

The burden rested with Company Doe to articulate a

compelling interest that outweighs the strong presumption of

public access. Measured against the heightened public interests

presented in this case, Company Doe has failed to demonstrate

any interest sufficient to defeat the public’s First Amendment

right of access and to justify continued sealing. The district

court’s sealing order therefore must be reversed. Our

determination to unseal the district court’s memorandum opinion

and the materials related to the parties’ motions for summary

judgment will bring to light the underlying facts, the

information contained in the report of harm, and the evidence

the district court relied upon in its adjudication of the

claims. It follows that Company Doe would have no

countervailing interest that would justify continuing to keep

the remaining documents sealed. Accordingly, we instruct the

district court to unseal the case in its entirety on remand.

D.

Before proceeding to Consumer Groups’ challenge of the

district court’s pseudonymity ruling, we pause to address a

final issue relating to the district court’s sealing order.

When presented with a motion to seal, the law in this Circuit

53
requires a judicial officer to comply with the following

procedural requirements: (1) provide public notice of the

sealing request and a reasonable opportunity for the public to

voice objections to the motion; (2) consider less drastic

alternatives to closure; and (3) if it determines that full

access is not necessary, it must state its reasons—with specific

findings—supporting closure and its rejections of less drastic

alternatives. In re Knight Pub. Co., 743 F.2d at 234-35.

Consumer Groups do not quarrel with the district court’s

adherence to the procedures mandated by In re Knight Publishing

Co. However, Consumer Groups and their supporting amici

complain that the district court erred by failing to rule on the

sealing motion for nine months, thereby allowing the case to

remain under temporary seal pursuant to the district court’s

local rules.

The public’s interest in monitoring the work of the courts

is subverted when a court delays making a determination on a

sealing request while allowing litigation to proceed to judgment

in secret. Indeed, this Court has rejected pleas by litigants

that the public right of access can be accommodated “by

releasing the information after [the] trial has concluded, when

all danger of prejudice will be past,” reasoning that “the value

of openness . . . is threatened whenever immediate access to

ongoing proceedings is denied, whatever provision is made for

54
later public disclosure.” In re Application & Affidavit for a

Search Warrant, 923 F.2d 324, 331 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting In re

Charlotte Observer, 882 F.2d 850, 856 (4th Cir. 1989)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Because the public benefits attendant

with open proceedings are compromised by delayed disclosure of

documents, we take this opportunity to underscore the caution of

our precedent and emphasize that the public and press generally

have a contemporaneous right of access to court documents and

proceedings when the right applies. “Each passing day may

constitute a separate and cognizable infringement of the First

Amendment.” Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co.,

24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1994) (brackets omitted) (quoting

Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1327, 1329 (Blackmun,

Circuit Justice, 1975)). A district court therefore must make

on-the-record findings required by In re Knight Publishing and

act on a sealing request as expeditiously as possible.

Because the district court allowed Company Doe’s motion to

seal to remain pending for nine months while it adjudicated the

merits of Company Doe’s claims, neither the public nor the press

was able to monitor the progress of the litigation as it

unfolded. The district court’s nine-month delay in ruling on

the sealing motion ostensibly was based upon its belief that the

merits of Company Doe’s claims were “inextricably intertwined”

with the issues of sealing. But the public right of access

55
under the First Amendment and common law is not conditioned upon

whether a litigant wins or loses. The district court erred by

failing to act expeditiously on the sealing motion.

IV.

Last, Consumer Groups challenge the district court’s

decision permitting Company Doe to litigate under a pseudonym.

We review a district court’s pseudonymity decision under an

abuse-of-discretion standard. James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233,

239 (4th Cir. 1993).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that the

identities of the parties to a case be disclosed. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 10(a) (“The title of the complaint must name all the

parties . . . .”). This Court has recognized that in

exceptional circumstances, compelling concerns relating to

personal privacy or confidentiality may warrant some degree of

anonymity in judicial proceedings, including use of a pseudonym.

See Jacobson, 6 F.3d at 238. In Jacobson, we identified the

following nonexclusive factors for district courts to consider

when determining whether a party should be permitted to litigate

pseudonymously:

Whether the justification asserted by the requesting
party is merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism
that may attend any litigation or is to preserve
privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal
nature; whether identification poses a risk of

56
 retaliatory physical or mental harm to the requesting
party or even more critically, to innocent non-
parties; the ages of the person whose privacy
interests are sought to be protected; whether the
action is against a governmental or private party;
and, relatedly, the risk of unfairness to the opposing
party from allowing an action against it to proceed
anonymously.

Id. We emphasized, however, that proceeding by pseudonym is a

“rare dispensation.” Id.

The district court’s pseudonymity determination rested upon

two of the Jacobson factors: (1) the prejudice that precluding

Company Doe from proceeding pseudonymously likely would produce

and (2) the risk of unfairness to the Commission in allowing the

action to proceed anonymously. It found that both factors

weighed in favor of allowing Company Doe to litigate its claims

under a pseudonym, explaining that Company Doe initiated the

underlying suit to prevent disclosure of its identity;

disclosing Company Doe’s identity would cause harm to the

company; and the Commission would not be prejudiced by allowing

Company Doe to litigate its claims pseudonymously.

Pseudonymous litigation undermines the public’s right of

access to judicial proceedings. The public has an interest in

knowing the names of the litigants, see Coe v. Cnty. of Cook,

162 F.3d 491, 498 (7th Cir. 1998), and disclosing the parties’

identities furthers openness of judicial proceedings, see

Jacobson, 6 F.3d at 238. It is unsurprising, then, that many of

57
our sister circuits have adopted an approach for pseudonymity

requests that balances a litigant’s stated need for anonymity

against the public’s countervailing interests in full disclosure

and openness. See, e.g., Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant,

537 F.3d 185, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that “the plaintiff’s

interest in anonymity must be balanced against both the public

interest in disclosure and any prejudice to the defendant”); Doe

v. Porter, 370 F.3d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 2004) (framing pseudonym

issue by asking “whether a plaintiff’s privacy interests

substantially outweigh the presumption of open judicial

proceedings”); Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253

F.3d 678, 685 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the “ultimate

test for permitting a plaintiff to proceed anonymously is

whether the plaintiff has a substantial privacy right which

outweighs the customary and constitutionally-embedded

presumption of openness in judicial proceedings”); Does I Thru

XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir.

2000) (holding that “a party may preserve his or her anonymity

in judicial proceedings in special circumstances when the

party’s need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing

party and the public’s interest in knowing the party’s

identity”); M.M. v. Zavaras, 139 F.3d 798, 803 (10th Cir. 1998)

(adopting a test that “weigh[s] the plaintiff’s claimed right to

privacy against the countervailing public interest in [open

58
proceedings]”). We agree that the public’s interest in open

proceedings must inform a district court’s pseudonymity

calculus. We therefore hold that, when a party seeks to

litigate under a pseudonym, a district court has an independent

obligation to ensure that extraordinary circumstances support

such a request by balancing the party’s stated interest in

anonymity against the public’s interest in openness and any

prejudice that anonymity would pose to the opposing party.

With due respect for the discretion we afford to the

district court’s ability to balance the relevant Jacobson

factors in weighing the competing interests at stake, we

conclude that the court abused its discretion in permitting

Company Doe to litigate under a pseudonym. In allowing Company

Doe to proceed anonymously, the district court gave no explicit

consideration to the public’s interest in open judicial

proceedings. As we have explained, the public interest in the

underlying litigation is especially compelling given that

Company Doe sued a federal agency. See Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d

404, 411 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that public’s interest in

disclosure of plaintiff’s identity was “heightened” because

defendants were “public officials and government bodies”

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Femedeer

v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that “the

public has an important interest in access to legal proceedings,

59
particularly those attacking . . . properly enacted

legislation”). Further, unlike cases in which courts granted

pseudonymity to protect “privacy or confidentiality concerns,”

Jacobson, 6 F.3d at 238, courts consistently have rejected

anonymity requests to prevent speculative and unsubstantiated

claims of harm to a company’s reputational or economic

interests, see, e.g., Nat’l Commodity & Barter Ass’n v. Gibbs,

886 F.2d 1240, 1245 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (explaining

that pseudonymity “has not been permitted when only the

plaintiff’s economic or professional concerns are involved” and

collecting cases). Although the use of a fictitious name has

been permitted in cases involving the disclosure of confidential

information, Company Doe has made no showing that such interests

were implicated in this case. Instead, Company Doe commenced

this action to challenge the Commission’s decision to publish a

report pertaining to one of Company Doe’s products in the

Commission’s online database. We have explained that use of a

pseudonym “merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may

attend . . . litigation” is impermissible. Jacobson, 6 F.3d at

238. Because Company Doe has failed to identify any exceptional

circumstances that justify the use of a pseudonym in these

proceedings, we hold that the district court abused its

discretion in allowing Company Doe to litigate pseudonymously.

60
 V.

To recapitulate, we hold that Consumer Groups’ notice of

appeal deprived the district court of jurisdiction to entertain

Consumer Groups’ motion to intervene. Accordingly, we vacate

the district court’s order denying intervention on the merits.

We further conclude that Consumer Groups meet the requirements

for nonparty appellate standing and have Article III standing to

seek appellate review of the district court’s sealing and

pseudonymity orders. Thus, we deny Company Doe’s motion to

dismiss Consumer Groups’ appeal. Finally, we hold that the

district court’s sealing order violated the public’s right of

access under the First Amendment and that the court abused its

discretion in allowing Company Doe to proceed under a pseudonym.

We therefore reverse the district court’s sealing and

pseudonymity orders and remand the case with instructions for

the district court to unseal the record in its entirety.

VACATED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,
AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

61
HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:

To seal the court record below, as the district court did,

the relevant First Amendment jurisprudence required Company Doe

to establish, at a minimum, that a compelling governmental

interest would be furthered by granting the motion to seal.

Stone v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 178, 180 (4th

Cir. 1988). Regrettably, Company Doe simply failed to meet this

burden, and, for this reason, I am constrained, with

reservations, to concur in the judgment. I also vote to deny

Company Doe’s motion to dismiss this appeal.

The able and conscientious district judge in this case

faced a difficult task: deciding whether Company Doe’s interest

in sealing the bulk of the court record overcame the First

Amendment interests of the Consumer Product Safety Commission

(the Commission), its then chairwoman Inez Tenenbaum in her

official capacity (Chairwoman Tenenbaum), and three consumer

advocacy groups--Public Citizen, Consumer Federation of America,

and Consumers’ Union (collectively the Consumer Groups). The

district court believed that sealing the bulk of the record in

this case from public consumption preserved, in large measure,

the efficacy of the injunctive relief the district court granted

Company Doe on the merits of its action against the Commission

and Chairwoman Tenenbaum. The district court also understood

Company Doe’s interest in preserving its sound reputation and

62
fiscal health as well as its interest in availing itself of its

First Amendment right to petition the courts for redress.

The district court’s reasoning founders for the simple

reason that it misunderstood the quantum of evidence necessary

to trump the First Amendment rights of, for example, the

Consumer Groups. Had Company Doe supported its motion to seal

with expert testimony establishing a high likelihood that

denying its motion to seal would cause it to suffer substantial

and irreparable economic harm, the disposition of the present

appeal, in my view, would be completely different.

To be sure, the equities here lie with Company Doe. Common

sense tells us that some harm will befall Company Doe by the

publication of the false and misleading reports at issue in this

case. In the electronically viral world that we live in today,

one can easily imagine how such publications could be

catastrophic to Company Doe’s fiscal health, allowing it never

to recover. In such a world, to say that the free flow of ideas

will save Company Doe is naive--the game often will be over

before it begins. Understandably, the district court was very

concerned about the impact these publications would have on

Company Doe, both from an economic and overall survival

standpoint. However, the First Amendment jurisprudence requires

more than a common sense feeling about what harm may befall

Company Doe. It requires concrete proof of a high likelihood of

63
substantial and irreparable economic harm. Because Company Doe

failed to present such concrete proof to the district court, we

are left only with a common sense feeling of what may occur,

which simply is not enough to support the sealing of a record.

Without a doubt, the district court’s heart was in the right

place, and it is regrettable that the majority opinion

acknowledges neither the difficult task confronted by the

district court, nor the care and genuine concern displayed by

such court in ruling on the motion to seal.

64