UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4434
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
STEPHEN MICHAEL HOPKINS,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver,
Jr., District Judge. (2:11-cr-00178-1)
Submitted: January 7, 2014 Decided: April 23, 2014
Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
A. Courtenay Craig, CRAIG LAW OFFICE, Huntington, West Virginia,
for Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin II, United States Attorney,
Monica D. Coleman, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A grand jury charged Stephen Michael Hopkins with aiding
and abetting the possession of heroin with intent to distribute,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
Hopkins pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 151 months’
imprisonment. He now appeals from a district court order
denying his motion to suppress the heroin and related
contraband, which police found in a car driven by Hopkins.
The district court concluded that the evidence should not
be suppressed because the officers had reasonable suspicion to
perform a Terry * stop of the car. The district court also
determined that Hopkins was precluded from seeking to suppress
the evidence because he abandoned the car. We agree and affirm
the judgment of the district court.
I.
On appeal from a criminal conviction, we recite the
relevant facts in the light most favorable to the government.
United States v. Smith, 701 F.3d 1002, 1004 (4th Cir. 2012).
A.
At approximately 9:14 p.m. on March 16, 2011, Charleston,
West Virginia police officers were dispatched to a possible
*
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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burglary in progress. Officer Daniel Goffreda arrived first on
the scene and noticed a car parked in front of the residence
with the engine still running. Goffreda observed that there
were two people in the car, one in the driver’s seat, and the
other in the back seat behind the driver. The configuration
struck Goffreda as “questionable,” J.A. 95, so he decided to
speak with the men.
Goffreda spoke primarily with Hopkins, the driver. In
response to Goffreda’s request for identification, Hopkins
provided an identification card bearing the name of Tyrone
Kimbrough. Goffreda informed the men of the possible burglary.
Hopkins claimed that he and his passenger were in the area
because they were “girl watching.” J.A. 83. Goffreda thought
this response was unusual considering it was nearly 9:30 p.m. in
a quiet residential area.
Officer Charles Whittington also responded to the burglary
call. Whittington heard Goffreda ask Hopkins to turn off the
engine and step out of the car. Hopkins turned off the engine,
but then quickly restarted the car. At this point, Whittington
directed Hopkins to step out of the car. Hopkins instead
reached for the car’s gear shift, which prompted Whittington to
reach inside the car in an unsuccessful attempt to disable it.
Moments later, Hopkins sped away.
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The officers pursued Hopkins for less than a mile before
Hopkins lost control of the car, crashed into a tree, and fled
on foot. As he ran from the car, Hopkins left the key in the
ignition and the doors open. Two officers chased and eventually
apprehended Hopkins.
A subsequent search of the car uncovered two cell phones,
an empty gun holster, and a plastic grocery bag containing
money, marijuana, and heroin.
B.
Hopkins moved to suppress the evidence found inside the
car. The district court denied Hopkins’ motion to suppress,
concluding that the “routine encounter . . . ripen[ed] into one
that gave rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary for a Terry
stop.” J.A. 194. As a result, the officers were permitted to
take the necessary steps to effectuate a stop.
The district court also reasoned that Hopkins was precluded
from seeking to suppress the evidence seized because he
forfeited his reasonable expectation of privacy in the car and
its contents when he voluntarily abandoned it.
II.
In reviewing the district court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress, we review its factual findings for clear error and its
legal conclusions de novo. United States v. McGee, 736 F.3d
263, 269 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 2014 WL 713333 (2014).
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After carefully reviewing the briefs, record, and legal
authorities, we conclude that the district court’s analysis was
substantially correct. See United States v. Hopkins, No. 2:11-
00178, 2013 WL 125666 (S.D.W. Va. Jan. 9, 2013). As did the
district court, we conclude that the officers had reasonable
suspicion to initiate a Terry stop. Moreover, when Hopkins fled
from the police, he abandoned the car, thereby forfeiting any
privacy interest in the car or its contents. See United States
v. Kirlew, 291 F. App'x 536, 538-39 (4th Cir. 2008)
(unpublished) (holding that the defendant abandoned the car he
was driving, thus relinquishing any reasonable expectation of
privacy to the contents of the car, when he jumped out of the
still-moving car and fled on foot during a high speed chase with
police).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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