UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-2237
LAWRENCE HAWTHORNE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
VIRGINIA STATE UNIVERSITY; THOMAS LAROSE, Individually and
in his official capacity as Chairperson of the Arts
Department of Virginia State University,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:12-cv-00620-JAG-MHL)
Submitted: April 17, 2014 Decided: April 23, 2014
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Josephine S. Miller, LAW OFFICE OF JOSEPHINE SMALLS MILLER, East
Hartford, Connecticut; Samuel H. Woodson, III, LAW OFFICE OF
S.H. WOODSON, III, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Mark R.
Herring, Attorney General of Virginia, Rhodes B. Ritenour,
Deputy Attorney General, Peter R. Messitt, Ronald N. Regnery,
Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lawrence Hawthorne appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to the Defendants on Hawthorne’s
remaining claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006). * On appeal, he
contends that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment to the Defendants based on the evidence. We affirm.
We review whether a district court erred in granting
summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards as
the district court and viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Martin v. Lloyd, 700 F.3d
132, 135 (4th Cir. 2012). A court must enter summary judgment
“against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there
is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation and
internal quotations omitted). “The nonmoving party cannot
create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation
*
The district court previously dismissed Hawthorne’s claims
against Virginia State University based on sovereign immunity.
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or the building of one inference upon another,” Othentec Ltd. v.
Phelan, 526 F.3d 135, 140 (4th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal
quotations omitted), and he cannot defeat summary judgment with
merely a scintilla of evidence, Am. Arms Int’l v. Herbert, 563
F.3d 78, 82 (4th Cir. 2009). Rather, he “must produce some
evidence (more than a scintilla) upon which a jury could
properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it,
upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Othentec Ltd., 526
F.3d at 140 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
“Section 1981 guarantees to all persons in the United
States ‘the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . .
as is enjoyed by white citizens.’” Spriggs v. Diamond Auto.
Glass, 165 F.3d 1015, 1017 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981(a)). Section 1981 “can be violated only by purposeful
discrimination,” Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania,
458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982), and “must be founded on purposeful,
racially discriminatory actions,” Spriggs, 165 F.3d at 1018.
“[T]o make out a claim for individual liability under § 1981, a
plaintiff must demonstrate some affirmative link to causally
connect the actor with the discriminatory action,” and the claim
“must be predicated on the actor’s personal involvement.”
Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 75
(2d Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
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We have reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs,
and we conclude that the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment to the Defendants. Accordingly, we affirm for
the reasons stated by the district court. See Hawthorne v. Va.
State Univ., No. 3:12-cv-00620-JAG-MHL (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2013).
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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