FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH April 25, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 13-8069
v.
MIGUEL CASTRO-PEREZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING
(D.C. No. 1:10-CR-00326-ABJ-1)
Deborah Roden of Woodhouse, Roden, Nethercott, L.L.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming,
for Defendant - Appellant.
L. Robert Murray, Assistant United States Attorney, (and Christopher A. Crofts,
United States Attorney, on the brief), Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Plaintiff -
Appellee.
Before KELLY, MURPHY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
Defendant-Appellant Miguel Castro-Perez appeals from a judgment of the
district court sentencing him to sixty-three months’ imprisonment and three years’
supervised release, arguing the court improperly applied a two-level sentencing
enhancement for possession of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking
offense. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a),
and we remand for resentencing.
Background
The facts relevant to this appeal are not disputed. Mr. Castro-Perez was
part of a cocaine trafficking operation in Jackson, Wyoming that was under
investigation by state and federal law enforcement beginning in March 2009. 2 R.
23. On March 31, 2010, Mr. Castro-Perez sold two ounces of cocaine to an
undercover agent. 2 R. 28; 3 R. 28-29. During the sale, the agent asked if Mr.
Castro-Perez could sell him a gun. 2 R. 28; 3 R. 67. Later that day, after the
drug transaction was completed, Mr. Castro-Perez obtained and sold a pistol to
the agent. 2 R. 28; 3 R. 67.
Mr. Castro-Perez later pled guilty to one count of distribution of cocaine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and one count of being an
illegal alien in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5)(A)
and 924(a)(2). 2 R. 9. In the presentence report, the probation office
recommended a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)
because Mr. Castro-Perez sold a gun to the undercover agent on the same day he
sold cocaine to the agent. 2 R. 31. Mr. Castro-Perez objected, asserting that the
agent initiated the gun sale and that it and the drug sale were separate and
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distinct. Id. at 37.
At sentencing, Mr. Castro-Perez again objected to the firearm enhancement,
arguing that there was no evidence he possessed the gun in relation to the drug
conspiracy. 3 R. 56-57. The government responded that the sale of the firearm
was negotiated during the drug transaction, and that the gun was sold during the
course of an ongoing drug conspiracy. 3 R. 60.
The district court ultimately found the firearm enhancement appropriate. 3
R. 69. The court noted that while there was no evidence the weapon was carried
during the drug transaction, the sale of the gun was temporally close to the drug
transaction, the gun was sold to a known drug user, and the gun was of a type
more likely to be used for personal protection than for hunting. 3 R. 68-69.
“Reading the rule broadly,” the court applied the enhancement. 3 R. 69. The
court ultimately sentenced Mr. Castro-Perez to sixty-three months’ imprisonment
and three years’ supervised release. 3 R. 84. He timely appealed. 1 R. 103.
Discussion
There is only one issue before us: whether the undisputed facts of this case
warrant a sentencing enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1). We review that issue de
novo. United States v. Alexander, 292 F.3d 1226, 1229 (10th Cir. 2002).
The Guidelines call for a two-level sentencing enhancement for drug crimes
“[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed.” U.S.S.G. §
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2D1.1(b)(1). The application note to § 2D1.1(b)(1) states that the enhancement
“reflects the increased danger of violence when drug traffickers possess weapons.
The enhancement should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly
improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1
cmt. app. n.11(A). The government bears the initial burden of proving the
enhancement appropriate by a preponderance of the evidence, and can meet that
burden by showing “that a temporal and spatial relation existed between the
weapon, the drug trafficking activity, and the defendant.” United States v.
Zavalza-Rodriguez, 379 F.3d 1182, 1185 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States
v. Pompey, 264 F.3d 1176, 1180 (10th Cir. 2001)). This nexus “may be
established by showing that the weapon was located nearby the general location
where drugs or drug paraphernalia are stored or where part of the transaction
occurred.” Alexander, 292 F.3d at 1231 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, there was no physical relation between the weapon and the
drug trafficking activity. The government acknowledged at sentencing that the
gun was delivered “after the actual controlled purchase [was] completed,” 3 R.
60, and the court found that there was no evidence the gun was carried during the
drug transaction, 3 R. 68-69. Yet it appears from the sentencing transcript that
the district court believed the gun was “present” for purposes of the enhancement.
3 R. 67. That conclusion might have been based on the court’s finding that the
gun purchase was discussed during the drug transaction, 3 R. 68, or that the gun
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was delivered to someone Mr. Castro-Perez knew to be a “drug customer,” 3 R.
69. But neither fact establishes that the gun was physically located near drugs or
a drug transaction. See Alexander, 292 F.3d at 1231.
The government points out that relevant conduct other than that of the
charged offense may be considered in applying sentencing enhancements. Aplee.
Br. 12 (citing, e.g., United States v. Roederer, 11 F.3d 973, 982 (10th Cir. 1993)).
It posits that since Mr. Castro-Perez delivered the gun during an ongoing drug
trafficking conspiracy the enhancement is appropriate. Id. at 13, 15. Even
assuming the government’s premise, its conclusion does not follow. There is still
no evidence of a spatial connection between the gun and drug trafficking activity.
The record does not support an inference that because Mr. Castro-Perez sold
drugs before and after the gun sale, there must have been drugs present during it.
As much as the government would like to avoid it, physical proximity is a
touchstone of the § 2D1.1(b)(1) firearm enhancement, even if established through
relevant conduct or that of a coconspirator. See, e.g., United States v. Foy, 641
F.3d 455, 470 (10th Cir. 2011) (firearm found in coconspirator’s vehicle when
coconspirator attempted to purchase cocaine); United States v. Roederer, 11 F.3d
973, 982-83 (10th Cir. 1993) (dismissed counts and testimony reflected defendant
dealt drugs from his apartment where he kept a firearm, though the charged
offense did not occur in the apartment). When a firearm is not physically near
drugs or trafficking activities, the “increased danger” of mixing drugs and guns
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contemplated by the Guidelines is not present. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 app. cmt.
n.11(A); United States v. Flores, 149 F.3d 1272, 1280 (10th Cir. 1998). Because
the government failed to establish that Mr. Castro-Perez possessed a firearm in
the vicinity of drug trafficking activity, the two-level enhancement under §
2D1.1(b)(1) was inappropriate.
The government asserts that even if the enhancement was improperly
applied, the error was harmless. Aplee. Br. 16. It contends that because the
district court granted a two-level downward variance, the enhancement had no
effect on the sentence. Id. The record does not “clearly indicate[] the district
court would have imposed the same sentence had it not relied on the procedural
miscue(s).” United States v. Kieffer, 681 F.3d 1143, 1165 (10th Cir. 2012).
There is no indication that the variance was related to the firearm enhancement;
instead, the record suggests the district court would have granted the variance
even had the enhancement not applied. 3 R. 82-84.
For these reasons, we REMAND for the district court to vacate the sentence
and resentence consistent with this opinion.
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