UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4180
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LAVON RICHARD CALDWELL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:12-cr-00248-RDB-1)
Submitted: April 17, 2014 Decided: April 29, 2014
Before KING, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Steven H. Levin, LEVIN & CURLETT LLC, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Paul E.
Budlow, P. Michael Cunningham, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
On what would have been the fourth day of a jury
trial, Lavon Richard Caldwell pled guilty to bank fraud, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012), and four counts of
aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(a)(1) (2012). The district court sentenced Caldwell to
ninety-six months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Caldwell contends
that the district court impermissibly engaged in plea
negotiations by insisting that he relinquish his right to file a
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request as a condition to
the court accepting his guilty plea. Finding no reversible
error, we affirm.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1) prohibits
the district court from participating in plea negotiations.
This prohibition “serv[es] three principal interests: it
diminishes the possibility of judicial coercion of a guilty
plea; it protects against unfairness and partiality in the
judicial process; and it eliminates the misleading impression
that the judge is an advocate for the agreement rather than a
neutral arbiter.” United States v. Bradley, 455 F.3d 453, 460
(4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because Caldwell did not make this objection in the
district court or attempt to withdraw his guilty plea, we review
for plain error. Id. at 462. To prevail on his claim that the
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district court improperly participated in plea negotiations,
Caldwell must demonstrate that the court’s participation was
error, that the error was plain, that the error affected his
substantial rights, and “that a refusal to notice the error
would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.; see Henderson v.
United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126 (2013) (discussing plain
error standard).
Assuming, without deciding, that the district court
impermissibly participated in plea negotiations by conditioning
its acceptance of Caldwell’s guilty plea on his waiver of his
FOIA rights and, thus, committed plain error, we conclude that
Caldwell has failed to demonstrate that the court’s error
affected his substantial rights. A defendant’s substantial
rights are affected if we determine that the error “influenced
[his] decision to plead guilty and impaired his ability to
evaluate with eyes open the direct attendant risks of accepting
criminal responsibility.” United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400,
402-03 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
the context of a guilty plea, the defendant must demonstrate
that he would not have pled guilty but for the district court’s
error. United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir.
2009).
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Here, Caldwell asserts only that his substantial
rights were affected by the district court’s error because, but
for the court’s insistence that he waive his FOIA rights, he
“would have been permitted to file such a request.” He does
not, however, assert on appeal that he would not have entered
his guilty plea but for the error, nor is there any indication
in the district court’s record that he would not have pled
guilty but for the error. Thus, Caldwell is not entitled to
relief.
Accordingly, we deny Caldwell’s motion to file a pro
se supplemental brief and affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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