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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-14022
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
Agency No. A073-225-800
EDILBERTO RODRIGUEZ-ROJAS,
a.k.a. Edilberto Rodriguez,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
________________________
(May 5, 2014)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Edilberto Rodriguez-Rojas, a native and citizen of Cuba, seeks review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) decision affirming the Immigration
Judge’s (“IJ”) order of removal and denial of cancellation of removal. On appeal,
Rodriguez-Rojas, who was found removable for attempting to help smuggle aliens
into the United States, argues that: (1) the IJ violated his due process rights by
allowing the government’s only witness as to removability to testify telephonically
instead of via televideo or in person; (2) the government failed to establish by clear
and convincing evidence that he was removable based on the alien smuggling
charge; and (3) the IJ’s denial of his cancellation of removal application as a matter
of discretion violated his due process rights by discussing and relying on his Cuban
nationality in considering his application. After thorough review, we dismiss the
petition in part, and deny it in part.
When the BIA issues a decision, we review only that decision, except to the
extent that the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s decision. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257
F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001). Here, because the BIA did not expressly adopt
the IJ’s decision, we review the BIA’s decision. See id.
We review constitutional challenges de novo. Lonyem v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
352 F.3d 1338, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003). We review findings of fact, including
findings of removability, for substantial evidence. Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d
1022, 1026-27 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Under the substantial evidence test, we
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draw every reasonable inference from the evidence in favor of the decision, and
reverse a finding of fact only if the record compels a reversal. Id. at 1027. We
must affirm if the BIA’s decision is “supported by reasonable, substantial, and
probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The fact that the record may support a contrary conclusion is insufficient to
reverse. Id. Finally, we review de novo our own subject matter jurisdiction.
Gonzalez-Oropeza v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 321 F.3d 1331, 1332 (11th Cir. 2003).
First, we are unpersuaded by Rodriguez-Rojas’s claim that the IJ violated his
due process rights by allowing a government witness to testify telephonically. We
recognize that aliens are entitled to due process of law in deportation hearings,
which is satisfied only by a full and fair hearing. Ibrahim v. INS, 821 F.2d 1547,
1550 (11th Cir. 1987). To establish due process violations in removal proceedings,
an alien must show that he was deprived of liberty without due process of law, and
that the asserted errors caused him substantial prejudice. Lonyem, 352 F.3d at
1341-42. “To show substantial prejudice, an alien must demonstrate that, in the
absence of the alleged violations, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different.” Lapaix v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 1138, 1143 (11th Cir. 2010).
Here, even assuming that Rodriguez-Rojas adequately objected to the
telephonic testimony, the IJ did not violate Rodriguez-Rojas’s right to due process
by allowing a witness to testify telephonically. For starters, the IJ did not violate
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his prior ruling when he allowed the witness to testify via the telephone. The IJ
never definitively ruled that the unavailable Coast Guardsmen had to testify via
televideo, but instead stated that they could testify via televideo if they were at a
televideo facility.
More importantly, Rodriguez-Rojas cannot show that the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different had the witness testified in person or via
televideo. Despite the witness appearing telephonically, Rodriguez-Rojas
extensively cross-examined him and raised numerous concerns that the IJ
specifically acknowledged in his oral decision, such as the fact that Rodriguez-
Rojas’s vessel stopped immediately, Rodriguez-Rojas was used to translate for the
other person on the vessel, and the videotape of the boarding process was not
admitted into evidence. Additionally, Rodriguez-Rojas offers nothing more than
his own speculation that, had the witness testified in person or via televideo, he
would not have been able to identify Rodriguez-Rojas as being on the vessel.
To the contrary, there is sufficient evidence identifying Rodriguez-Rojas as
being on the vessel. To begin with, the witness testified that Rodriguez-Rojas
provided him with his Florida driver’s license and the copy of the license in the
law enforcement case package was the license provided to him on the night in
question. Moreover, Rodriguez-Rojas’s own testimony establishes that he was on
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the vessel that was stopped that night. Accordingly, we deny Rodriguez-Rojas’s
petition for review as to this issue.
We also find no merit to Rodriguez-Rojas’s claim that the agency’s
determination that the DHS met its burden of showing that Rodriguez-Rojas was
removable for alien smuggling was not supported by substantial evidence. As the
record shows, the government’s witness provided detailed testimony about how the
Coast Guard intercepted Rodriguez-Rojas’s vessel and a second vessel transporting
20 Cuban migrants. A Coast Guard officer’s testimony established that the two
vessels were in close proximity to one another and traveling at the same speed in
the same direction. The officer further testified that Rodriguez-Rojas initially told
him that he and the other person on the boat with him were fishing with their
friends in the other vessel. However, Rodriguez-Rojas denied knowing the people
in the other vessel once the Coast Guard discovered that it was being used to
transport migrants. Additionally, the officer testified that, despite the claim that
they were fishing, the fishing rods in the vessel were brand new, only one was
actually rigged for fishing, and the fishing rods were stowed. He also explained
why smugglers commonly used two vessels when smuggling aliens. Moreover, the
statements from the other Coast Guardsmen corroborated the testimony that the
two vessels were operating in tandem.
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The fact that the DHS did not submit the Coast Guard video of the boarding
of Rodriguez-Rojas’s vessel does not compel the conclusion that he was not
removable for alien smuggling. Rodriguez-Rojas’s offers nothing more than his
own speculation that it may contradict the government witness’s testimony and be
exculpatory. Additionally, the inconsistency between the witness’s testimony and
the incident report with regard to whether the witness initially saw one or two
vessels on the radar does not compel the conclusion that Rodriguez-Rojas was not
removable, as this issue is irrelevant. The witness’s testimony and the statements
contained in the incident report consistently reflect that Rodriguez-Rojas’s vessel
was operating in tandem with the vessel transporting migrants. Accordingly, we
deny Rodriguez-Rojas’s petition for review as to this issue.
Finally, we lack jurisdiction over Rodriguez-Rojas’s claim that the IJ’s
denial of his cancellation of removal application as a matter of discretion violated
his due process rights. It is well-established that we lack jurisdiction to review
discretionary judgments with regard to applications for cancellation of removal. 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Despite this jurisdictional bar, we retain jurisdiction
over constitutional claims or questions of law raised in a petition for review. 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). We retain jurisdiction over constitutional claims only
when a petitioner alleges “at least a colorable constitutional violation,” which
means that the “claim must have some possible validity.” Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
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482 F.3d 1281, 1284 & n.2 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). A petitioner
cannot create jurisdiction “by cloaking an abuse of discretion argument in
constitutional garb.” Id. at 1284 (quotation omitted).
Here, we lack jurisdiction to consider the claim because Rodriguez-Rojas is
challenging a discretionary denial of cancellation of removal and his claim is an
abuse-of-discretion argument cloaked in constitutional language. Although
Rodriguez-Rojas couches his challenge in due process terms, he is ultimately only
challenging the IJ’s determination that his negative factors outweigh his positive
equities. See id. (concluding that a due process claim that the IJ was intemperate
and abusive in denying discretionary relief was really just a challenge to the
weighing of the discretionary factors and that we lacked jurisdiction to review it).
Accordingly, we dismiss Rodriguez-Rojas’s petition for review as to this issue.
PETITION DENIED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART.
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