Cyrena Chang Paulin v. George Washington University School of Medicine and Health Sciences

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CYRENA CHANG PAULIN,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 12-86 (GK)

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE
AND HEALTH SCIENCES

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Cyrena Chang Paulin ("Paulin" or "Plaintiff") filed this

action against The George Washington University School of

Medicine and Health Sciences ("the University" or "Defendant")

for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing. On September 26, 2013, after an

eight-day trial, a seven-member jury returned a verdict in favor

of Defendant on both counts.

On October 23, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion for New Trial

[Dkt. No. 97]. Upon consideration of the Motion, Opposition

[Dkt. No. 98], Reply [Dkt. No. 99], and the entire record

herein, and for the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's Motion for

New Trial shall be denied.
 1
I . BACKGROUND

Paulin enrolled in the Physician Assistant degree program

(" PA program") at the University in August 2007. The

relationship between Paulin and the University was governed by

the School of Medicine and Health Sciences Bulletin

("Bulletin") . Jt. Ex. 1. The parties agree that a valid

contractual relationship existed between them and was governed

by the contents of the Bulletin.

Paulin's course of study included Evidence Based Medicine

("EBM") I, a course designed to teach students how to access and

analyze current medical research and literature in order to stay

up to date with developing treatments. Paulin also received

credit for EBM II and III, which were one-credit courses

designed to be taken online during the students' clinical year.

However, EBM II and III were never actually taught, although all

the students, including Paulin, were given "A"s on their

transcripts for those two courses.

By August of 2 010, Paulin had completed every requirement

for graduation from the PA program except the final clinical

rotation and the program's final cumulative exam. She was

removed from her final clinical rotation because of insufficient

1
Unless otherwise noted, the facts set forth herein are drawn
from the evidence presented by the parties at trial.
-2-
medical knowledge and interpersonal problems with her

supervisors. Paulin received a failing grade in that course and

was subsequently dismissed from the PA program.

On January 19, 2012, Paulin filed a Complaint against the

University. In Count One, she claimed that the University had

breached its contract with her in five different ways. Compl. ~

85 [Dkt. No. 1]. Plaintiff did not, however, allege that the

failure to teach EBM II and III was itself a breach of contract.

In Count Two, Paulin alleged that the University breached

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in

all contracts in the District of Columbia by "making it

impossible for the Plaintiff to realize the benefit of her

contract and by permitting its agents to act in bad faith and in

a manner which interfered with the Plaintiff's contractual

expectations." Id. ~ 92. She did not seek a return of her

tuition, but instead sought reinstatement in the program and

damages for lost earning capacity. Id.

On September 16, 2013, the case went to trial. The Court

bifurcated the trial into a liability phase and a damages phase.

Minute Order of Sept. 16, 2013. Plaintiff called only four

witnesses in her case-in-chief: Paulin, Dr. Jacqueline Barnett,

Dr. Venetia Orcutt (whose de bene esse deposition testimony was

-3-
played for the jury), and Dr. Elizabeth Blomenberg (same). 2 On

September 26, 2013, after completion of the eight-day trial on

the issue of liability, the jury returned a verdict for

Defendant on both Counts [Dkt. No. 90].

On October 23, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion for New Trial

[Dkt. No. 97] . On November 6, 2013, Defendant filed an

Opposition [Dkt. No. 98], and on November 15, 2013, Plaintiff

filed a Reply [Dkt. No. 99]. The matter is now ripe for review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 permits a court to

"grant a new trial on all or some of the issues after a

jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore

been granted in an action at law in federal court." Fed. R. Civ.

P. 59 (a) (1) (A). Such reason exists where "substantial errors

occurred in . the giving or refusal of instructions . "

Nyman v. F.D.I.C., 967 F. Supp. 1562, 1569 (D.D.C. 1997).

The decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial "lies

within the sound discretion of the court." Armenian Assembly of

Am., Inc. v. Cafesjian, 783 F. Supp. 2d 78, 85 (D. D.C. 2011)

(quotation omitted) . "Generally, a new trial may only be granted

when a manifest error of law or fact is presented." In re

2
For scheduling reasons, the parties consented to present
several of Defendant's witnesses before the close of Plaintiff's
case in chief.
-4-
Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 74, 87

(D.D.C. 2006).

Moreover, "[i]t is well established that challenges to jury

instructions are subject to the harmless error rule." Joy v.

Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 559 (D.C. Cir.

1993). This means that "to warrant reversal, the error must have

been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the

district court proceedings." Czekalski v. LaHood, 589 F.3d 449,

453 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

Paulin raises a single issue in her Motion for New Trial:

that the Court erred when it instructed the jury on her claim

that the University had breached the implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff objects to the following

portion of the Court's instruction:

To establish that the defendant breached or broke the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Ms.
Paulin must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant's decision to dismiss her was made
in bad faith and was arbitrary or capricious rather
than reasonable, with the purpose of depriving her of
the rights and benefits of its educational contract
with her. 3

3
Defendant requested that the Court add this language from Alden
v. Georgetown Univ., 734 A.2d 1103, 1108 (D.C. 1999), to the
instruction. Trial Tr. Sept. 25, 2013, A.M. Session at 3:5-6:12.
Plaintiff objected to the addition of the Alden language on the
record. Id. at 6:24-8:10, 10:10-11:8. The objection was made
when the Court gave the parties "an opportunity to object on the
-5-
Trial Tr. Sept. 25, 2013, A.M Session at 27:8-28:4.

Paulin argues that the language focusing the jury's

decision on her dismissal prevented the jury from finding that

the University's failure to teach EBM II and III was, standing

alone, a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing. Paulin's argument misconstrues the case law, her own

Complaint, and the evidence presented at trial.

As this Court has noted, an extensive body of case law

governs "the contractual relationship between a student and an

educational institution." Paulin v. George Washington Univ. Sch.

of Med & Health Sci., 878 F. Supp. 2d 241, 246 (D.D.C. 2012)

(discussing Alden, 734 A.2d at 1108 and other cases). In the

academic context, the "concepts of academic freedom and academic

judgment are so important that courts generally give deference

to the discretion exercised by university officials." All worth

v. Howard Univ., 890 A.2d 194, 202 (D.C. 2006).

This deferential standard directs courts to not overturn an

institution's decision to dismiss a student unless the student

record and out of the jury's hearing before the instructions and
arguments are delivered," and was therefore timely under Rule
51. Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(b) (2); id. 51(c) (2) (A) (noting that
objection is timely if "party objects at the opportunity
provided under Rule 51 (b) (2) "). Consequently, Defendant's
argument that Plaintiff failed to preserve her objection lacks
merit.
-6-
can establish that the decision "is such a substantial departure

from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person

or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional

judgment." Alden, 734 A.2d at 1109 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo,

457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982)). This standard applies to all "cases

involving academic dismissal," Alden, 734 A. 2d at 1109,

regardless of whether the Plaintiff has brought a breach of

contract claim or a claim for breach of the implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing or both. Allworth, 890 A.2d at 202

(applying deferential Alden standard to claim for breach of

covenant of good faith and fair dealing).

Paulin argues that her claim about the EBM courses is

distinct from her claim about inappropriate dismissal, and thus

should not be subject to the deferential Alden standard.

However, the Court rejected Plaintiff's "theory" as inconsistent

with the governing case law and her Complaint. Trial Tr. Sept.

25, 2013, A.M. Session at 11:9-11 ("That may have been your

theory all along, but that theory doesn't really fit into what

the D.C. Court of Appeals has stated the law is.").

The basis of Plaintiff's claims was, indisputably, the

University's academic decision to dismiss her from the PA

program. Compl. «Jr 92 (seeking reinstatement and lost wages). The

Complaint did not allege that the failure to teach the EBM
-7-
courses was in and of itself either a breach of contract or a

breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id.