UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CYRENA CHANG PAULIN,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 12-86 (GK)
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE
AND HEALTH SCIENCES
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Cyrena Chang Paulin ("Paulin" or "Plaintiff") filed this
action against The George Washington University School of
Medicine and Health Sciences ("the University" or "Defendant")
for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. On September 26, 2013, after an
eight-day trial, a seven-member jury returned a verdict in favor
of Defendant on both counts.
On October 23, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion for New Trial
[Dkt. No. 97]. Upon consideration of the Motion, Opposition
[Dkt. No. 98], Reply [Dkt. No. 99], and the entire record
herein, and for the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's Motion for
New Trial shall be denied.
1
I . BACKGROUND
Paulin enrolled in the Physician Assistant degree program
(" PA program") at the University in August 2007. The
relationship between Paulin and the University was governed by
the School of Medicine and Health Sciences Bulletin
("Bulletin") . Jt. Ex. 1. The parties agree that a valid
contractual relationship existed between them and was governed
by the contents of the Bulletin.
Paulin's course of study included Evidence Based Medicine
("EBM") I, a course designed to teach students how to access and
analyze current medical research and literature in order to stay
up to date with developing treatments. Paulin also received
credit for EBM II and III, which were one-credit courses
designed to be taken online during the students' clinical year.
However, EBM II and III were never actually taught, although all
the students, including Paulin, were given "A"s on their
transcripts for those two courses.
By August of 2 010, Paulin had completed every requirement
for graduation from the PA program except the final clinical
rotation and the program's final cumulative exam. She was
removed from her final clinical rotation because of insufficient
1
Unless otherwise noted, the facts set forth herein are drawn
from the evidence presented by the parties at trial.
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medical knowledge and interpersonal problems with her
supervisors. Paulin received a failing grade in that course and
was subsequently dismissed from the PA program.
On January 19, 2012, Paulin filed a Complaint against the
University. In Count One, she claimed that the University had
breached its contract with her in five different ways. Compl. ~
85 [Dkt. No. 1]. Plaintiff did not, however, allege that the
failure to teach EBM II and III was itself a breach of contract.
In Count Two, Paulin alleged that the University breached
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in
all contracts in the District of Columbia by "making it
impossible for the Plaintiff to realize the benefit of her
contract and by permitting its agents to act in bad faith and in
a manner which interfered with the Plaintiff's contractual
expectations." Id. ~ 92. She did not seek a return of her
tuition, but instead sought reinstatement in the program and
damages for lost earning capacity. Id.
On September 16, 2013, the case went to trial. The Court
bifurcated the trial into a liability phase and a damages phase.
Minute Order of Sept. 16, 2013. Plaintiff called only four
witnesses in her case-in-chief: Paulin, Dr. Jacqueline Barnett,
Dr. Venetia Orcutt (whose de bene esse deposition testimony was
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played for the jury), and Dr. Elizabeth Blomenberg (same). 2 On
September 26, 2013, after completion of the eight-day trial on
the issue of liability, the jury returned a verdict for
Defendant on both Counts [Dkt. No. 90].
On October 23, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion for New Trial
[Dkt. No. 97] . On November 6, 2013, Defendant filed an
Opposition [Dkt. No. 98], and on November 15, 2013, Plaintiff
filed a Reply [Dkt. No. 99]. The matter is now ripe for review.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 permits a court to
"grant a new trial on all or some of the issues after a
jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore
been granted in an action at law in federal court." Fed. R. Civ.
P. 59 (a) (1) (A). Such reason exists where "substantial errors
occurred in . the giving or refusal of instructions . "
Nyman v. F.D.I.C., 967 F. Supp. 1562, 1569 (D.D.C. 1997).
The decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial "lies
within the sound discretion of the court." Armenian Assembly of
Am., Inc. v. Cafesjian, 783 F. Supp. 2d 78, 85 (D. D.C. 2011)
(quotation omitted) . "Generally, a new trial may only be granted
when a manifest error of law or fact is presented." In re
2
For scheduling reasons, the parties consented to present
several of Defendant's witnesses before the close of Plaintiff's
case in chief.
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Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 74, 87
(D.D.C. 2006).
Moreover, "[i]t is well established that challenges to jury
instructions are subject to the harmless error rule." Joy v.
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 559 (D.C. Cir.
1993). This means that "to warrant reversal, the error must have
been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the
district court proceedings." Czekalski v. LaHood, 589 F.3d 449,
453 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
Paulin raises a single issue in her Motion for New Trial:
that the Court erred when it instructed the jury on her claim
that the University had breached the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff objects to the following
portion of the Court's instruction:
To establish that the defendant breached or broke the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Ms.
Paulin must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant's decision to dismiss her was made
in bad faith and was arbitrary or capricious rather
than reasonable, with the purpose of depriving her of
the rights and benefits of its educational contract
with her. 3
3
Defendant requested that the Court add this language from Alden
v. Georgetown Univ., 734 A.2d 1103, 1108 (D.C. 1999), to the
instruction. Trial Tr. Sept. 25, 2013, A.M. Session at 3:5-6:12.
Plaintiff objected to the addition of the Alden language on the
record. Id. at 6:24-8:10, 10:10-11:8. The objection was made
when the Court gave the parties "an opportunity to object on the
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Trial Tr. Sept. 25, 2013, A.M Session at 27:8-28:4.
Paulin argues that the language focusing the jury's
decision on her dismissal prevented the jury from finding that
the University's failure to teach EBM II and III was, standing
alone, a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Paulin's argument misconstrues the case law, her own
Complaint, and the evidence presented at trial.
As this Court has noted, an extensive body of case law
governs "the contractual relationship between a student and an
educational institution." Paulin v. George Washington Univ. Sch.
of Med & Health Sci., 878 F. Supp. 2d 241, 246 (D.D.C. 2012)
(discussing Alden, 734 A.2d at 1108 and other cases). In the
academic context, the "concepts of academic freedom and academic
judgment are so important that courts generally give deference
to the discretion exercised by university officials." All worth
v. Howard Univ., 890 A.2d 194, 202 (D.C. 2006).
This deferential standard directs courts to not overturn an
institution's decision to dismiss a student unless the student
record and out of the jury's hearing before the instructions and
arguments are delivered," and was therefore timely under Rule
51. Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(b) (2); id. 51(c) (2) (A) (noting that
objection is timely if "party objects at the opportunity
provided under Rule 51 (b) (2) "). Consequently, Defendant's
argument that Plaintiff failed to preserve her objection lacks
merit.
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can establish that the decision "is such a substantial departure
from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person
or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional
judgment." Alden, 734 A.2d at 1109 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982)). This standard applies to all "cases
involving academic dismissal," Alden, 734 A. 2d at 1109,
regardless of whether the Plaintiff has brought a breach of
contract claim or a claim for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing or both. Allworth, 890 A.2d at 202
(applying deferential Alden standard to claim for breach of
covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
Paulin argues that her claim about the EBM courses is
distinct from her claim about inappropriate dismissal, and thus
should not be subject to the deferential Alden standard.
However, the Court rejected Plaintiff's "theory" as inconsistent
with the governing case law and her Complaint. Trial Tr. Sept.
25, 2013, A.M. Session at 11:9-11 ("That may have been your
theory all along, but that theory doesn't really fit into what
the D.C. Court of Appeals has stated the law is.").
The basis of Plaintiff's claims was, indisputably, the
University's academic decision to dismiss her from the PA
program. Compl. «Jr 92 (seeking reinstatement and lost wages). The
Complaint did not allege that the failure to teach the EBM
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courses was in and of itself either a breach of contract or a
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id.