12-2538
Weng v. Holder
BIA
Straus, IJ
A087 448 055/056/057
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 9th day of May, two thousand fourteen.
PRESENT:
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
Chief Judge,
RALPH K. WINTER,
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
HENGQING WENG, QUNJU JIANG,
JUNCHAO WENG,
Petitioners,
v. 12-2538
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONERS: Paulus H. Chan, North Haven, CT.
FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney
General; Christina Bechak
Parascandola, Trial Attorney, Office
of Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Hengqing Weng, Qunju Jiang, and Junchao Weng, natives
and citizens of the People’s Republic of China, seek review
of a May 25, 2012, decision of the BIA dismissing an appeal
from the April 29, 2010, decision of Immigration Judge
(“IJ”) Michael W. Straus, which denied Hengqing Weng’s
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We assume the
parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
procedural history of this case.
Where the BIA does not expressly adopt the IJ’s
decision but closely tracks its reasoning, we have reviewed
both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions. See Zaman v. Mukasey,
514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 2008). The applicable standards
of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d
510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). Because the agency did not make an
explicit credibility determination, we assume Weng’s
credibility. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271-72
(2d Cir. 2005).
2
To establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of
removal, an applicant must show persecution, or fear of
persecution, on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42); 1231(b)(3). In
certain cases, opposition to government corruption may
constitute a political opinion, and retaliation for
expressing that opinion may amount to political persecution.
See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 547-48 (2d Cir.
2005). In considering whether opposition to corruption
constitutes a political opinion, we consider (1) “whether
the applicant’s actions were directed toward a governing
institution, or only against individuals whose corruption
was aberrational,” and (2) “whether the persecutor was
attempting to suppress a challenge to the governing
institution, as opposed to isolated, aberrational acts of
greed or malfeasance.” Rodas Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93,
101 (2d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and alterations
omitted). To be sure, “[a]nswering these questions
necessarily involves a complex and contextual factual
inquiry into the nature of the asylum applicant’s activities
in relation to the political context in which the dispute
took place.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
3
In this case, substantial evidence supports the
agency’s conclusion that Weng’s fear of harm does not amount
to a fear of retaliation based on his political opinion.
The record shows that Weng co-signed, with three other
people, one of whom was Weng’s friend, a single letter to
the district attorney objecting to corrupt actions by the
city’s vice-mayor. Weng’s friend sent the letter to the
city department that dealt with allegations of corruption,
in the hopes that the vice-mayor would be arrested. Neither
Weng nor the other co-signers told anyone else that they had
written and sent the letter. This single action, against a
single government official, more closely resembles a
challenge to “isolated, aberrational acts” of malfeasance by
an individual, rather than a challenge to a governing
institution, even within the context of evidence of
widespread corruption by government officials in China,
particularly since there is also evidence that the
government does in some cases prosecute corrupt officials.
See Rodas Castro, 597 F.3d at 101. The agency also
reasonably concluded that the evidence presented to the IJ
was insufficient to show that the government imputed a
political opinion to Weng. See id.
4
Because Weng did not demonstrate that he suffered past
persecution or that any future harm he might encounter would
be on account of a protected ground, the agency did not err
in denying his application for asylum and withholding of
removal. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), 1231(b)(3);
Kone v. Holder, 596 F.3d 141, 152 (2d Cir. 2010). To the
extent that Weng raises a CAT claim, he did not raise that
category of relief before the BIA and we thus lack
jurisdiction to consider it. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1);
Karaj v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion
for a stay of removal is DISMISSED as moot.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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