UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1711
JOAQUIN OVIDIO PEREZ-PEREZ; MIGUEL ALEXANDER ORELLANA-
PEREZ,
Petitioners,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: January 27, 2014 Decided: May 9, 2014
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
Jeremy L. McKinney, MCKINNEY PERRY & COALTER, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Petitioners. Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney
General, Linda S. Wernery, Assistant Director, Theodore C. Hirt,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for
Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Joaquin Ovidio Perez-Perez and his nephew, Miguel
Alexander Orellana-Perez (“Petitioners”), are natives and
citizens of El Salvador. They petition for review of the Board
of Immigration Appeals’ (“Board”) order dismissing their appeal
from the immigration judge’s denial of their applications for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture. For the reasons that follow, we
deny the petition for review in part and dismiss it in part.
Petitioners first challenge the immigration judge’s
factual finding that they were ineligible for asylum and
withholding of removal because they failed to establish a nexus
between one of the five statutorily enumerated protected grounds
and their past mistreatment — death threats levied by gang
members — and their fear of future harm by the same gang. On
appeal, the Board discerned no clear error in this finding. We
review this factual determination for substantial evidence.
I.N.S. v. Elias–Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992); Hui Pan v.
Holder, 737 F.3d 921, 926 (4th Cir. 2013).
“Persecution occurs ‘on account of’ a protected ground
if that ground serves as ‘at least one central reason for’ the
feared persecution.” Crespin–Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d
117, 127 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)
(2012)). A central reason is one that is more than
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“‘incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another
reason for harm.’” Quinteros–Mendoza v. Holder, 556 F.3d 159,
164 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting In re J–B–N–, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208,
214 (BIA 2007)).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that
substantial evidence supports the finding that Petitioners
failed to show that the advanced protected ground, their
membership in the particular social group of their family, was
“one central reason” for the gang’s death threats or the future
harm they feared would befall them if they returned to El
Salvador. Rather, the record evidence supports the immigration
judge’s determination, adopted and affirmed by the Board, that
the central reason for the death threats was to ensure that
Petitioners did not inform the police of the gang murder that
they had witnessed. We therefore uphold the denial of asylum
and withholding of removal. Accord Vasquez v. I.N.S., 177 F.3d
62, 65 (1st Cir. 1999) (upholding ruling that petitioners did
not establish nexus between well-founded fear of future
persecution and an imputed anti-guerilla, pro-government
political opinion, because substantial evidence supported
determination that threats and assault were motivated by desire
to prevent lead petitioner from giving the police information
regarding the guerillas’ assassination).
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Petitioners also seek review of the denial of relief
under the Convention Against Torture. In their administrative
appeal to the Board, though, Petitioners did not assert any
arguments related to the immigration judge’s reasons for denying
this form of relief. We thus conclude that the claims raised in
Petitioners’ appeal brief have not been exhausted, as they must
be, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (2012), which precludes us from
reviewing these issues. See Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 448
(4th Cir. 2011) (“A petitioner’s failure to raise his CAT claim
on appeal to the [Board] ‘constitutes a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies that bars judicial review.’” (quoting
Massis v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir. 2008))); Kporlor
v. Holder, 597 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2010) (“It is well
established that an alien must raise each argument to the
[Board] before we have jurisdiction to consider it.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review in part
and dismiss it in part for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART
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