NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MAY 12 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
MICHAEL L. TAYLOR, DILAWAR No. 12-15378 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
KHAN, VOLENA GLOVER-HALE AND
MANUEL MONTOYA, on behalf of D.C. Nos. 3:10-cv-08125-FJM &
themselves and other persons similarly 3:10-cv-01828-PHX-FJM
situated, (consolidated cases)
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
AUTOZONE, INC. AND
AUTOZONERS, LLC,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Frederick J. Martone, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 8, 2013
San Francisco, California
Before: NOONAN and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and LYNN, District Judge.**
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Barbara M. G. Lynn, District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
Michael L. Taylor, Dilawar Khan, Volena Glover-Hale, and Manuel
Montoya (collectively “Appellants”), on behalf of themselves and other persons
similarly situated, appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Appellants’ former employer, AutoZoners, LLC, and its parent company,
AutoZone, Inc. (collectively “AutoZone”, or “Appellees”), on Appellants’ claim
that AutoZone’s store managers (“SMs”) were improperly classified as “bona fide
executives”, thereby exempting them from the overtime provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (the “FLSA”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 389 (9th Cir. 2011) aff’d,
132 S. Ct. 2156, 183 L. Ed. 2d 153 (2012). Having done so, we reverse the ruling
of the lower court, and remand for further determination.
To qualify under the “bona fide executive” exemption to the FLSA, an
employee’s “primary duty” must be performing exempt activities–i.e., activities
related to the “management of the enterprise . . . or of a customarily recognized
department or subdivision thereof . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a)(2). As the district
court noted, AutoZone does not dispute that the SMs spend less than fifty percent
of their time performing exempt work. However, the SMs might nevertheless be
primarily involved in management activities if other pertinent factors support such
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a conclusion, such as: (1) the relative importance of SMs’ managerial duties as
compared with other types of duties; (2) whether the SMs have relative freedom
from supervision; and (3) the relationship between the SMs’ salaries and the wages
paid to other employees for the same kind of non-managerial work performed by
those employees. 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a); Baldwin v. Trailer Inns, Inc., 266 F.3d
1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2001). We find that, in light of conflicting evidence
concerning the importance of SMs’ management duties as compared to their
nonexempt duties, the extent to which SMs are supervised, and the difference in
pay between SMs and nonexempt employees, there are genuine issues of material
fact as to whether the primary duty of AutoZone SMs is management.
Additionally, to qualify for the executive exemption from the overtime
requirements under the FLSA, an employee must have “the authority to hire or fire
other employees or [their] suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring,
firing, advancement, promotion or any other change of status of other employees
[must be] given particular weight.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a)(4). We find that, in
light of conflicting evidence as to the frequency with which SMs make hiring,
firing, and promotion-related recommendations, and the extent to which their
supervisors rely upon these recommendations, there are genuine issues of material
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fact as to whether such suggestions and recommendations are given particular
weight.
Given that factual disputes remain as to whether the primary duty of SMs is
management, and whether their employment recommendations are given particular
weight, we reverse the ruling of the lower court and remand for further
determination of these issues.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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