UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4969
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LESHANTA SULLIVAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (6:05-cr-00705-GRA-1)
Submitted: May 8, 2014 Decided: May 14, 2014
Before SHEDD and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David W. Plowden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Jamie L. Schoen, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Leshanta Sullivan appeals from the ten-month sentence
imposed upon the district court’s revocation of his supervised
release. On appeal, Sullivan’s attorney has filed a brief in
accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in
which he asserts that there are no meritorious grounds for
appeal but questions whether Sullivan’s sentence is plainly
unreasonable. Although advised of his right to file a
supplemental pro se brief, Sullivan has not done so. We affirm.
A sentence imposed after revocation of supervised
release should be affirmed “if it is within the statutory
maximum and is not ‘plainly unreasonable.’” United States v.
Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006)). “In
making this determination, we first consider whether the
sentence imposed is procedurally or substantively unreasonable.”
Id. A sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the
Chapter 7 policy statements in the Guidelines and the applicable
sentencing factors, see id. at 641 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a),
3583(e) (2012)), and adequately explained the sentence imposed,
though the “court need not be as detailed or specific when
imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a
post-conviction sentence,” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d
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544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). A sentence imposed upon revocation of
supervised release is substantively reasonable if the district
court stated a proper basis for concluding that the defendant
should receive the sentence imposed, within the statutory
maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. We affirm if the sentence is
not unreasonable. Id. at 439.
We conclude that Sullivan’s sentence is both
procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district court
considered the Chapter 7 policy statements and relevant
statutory factors. The court emphasized Sullivan’s repeated
failure to comply with the terms of supervised release, as well
as the need to deter Sullivan from engaging in future criminal
conduct. Finally, the district court properly imposed a
sentence within the policy statement range and below the
statutory maximum.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and have found no meritorious grounds for appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. This
court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of
his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If the client requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
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a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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