NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MAY 21 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
AMANDEEP KAUR, et al. No. 10-71853
Petitioners, Agency Nos. A098-837-737
A098-837-738
v. A098-837-739
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
MEMORANDUM*
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 14, 2014**
San Francisco, California
Before: GRABER, W. FLETCHER, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Amandeep Kaur, along with her husband and son as derivative
applicants, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)
decision affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their application for
asylum and withholding of removal, and their request for relief under Article 3 of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
the United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Because substantial evidence supports the BIA and
IJ’s adverse credibility determination, we deny the petition. See Jie Cui v. Holder,
712 F.3d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 2013).
1. The BIA permissibly relied on the IJ’s findings related to Kaur’s demeanor
as a basis for the adverse credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (establishing that an IJ may “base a credibility determination on
the demeanor . . . of the applicant”); Kin v. Holder, 595 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir.
2010) (explaining that where the BIA defers “to the IJ’s demeanor determination,
we . . . look to the IJ’s decision as a guide to what lay behind the BIA’s
conclusion” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). A credibility
determination based on demeanor deserves “special deference” because the “IJ has
an opportunity to make a first-person evaluation of all of the subtly conveyed
factors that, together, can be evidence of a petitioner’s credibility.” Jibril v.
Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1137 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, the IJ explained that she
doubted Kaur’s testimony, in part, “because of her demeanor that was not
evidencing conviction in her own statement.” The IJ also stated that, when
confronted with a particular discrepancy in her story, Kaur became “evasive and
defensive.” These statements illustrate that, as required, the IJ “specifically and
-2-
cogently refer[red]” to the aspects of Kaur’s demeanor that undermined her
credibility. See Arulampalam v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 679, 686 (9th Cir. 2003).
2. The BIA also permissibly relied upon inconsistencies and irregularities
surrounding a letter of support from the president of the Gur Aasra Trust, the Sikh
organization with which Kaur was purportedly associated. When confronted with
the discrepancies in the letter, neither Kaur nor her counsel offered an explanation.
Instead, Kaur steadfastly disavowed the letter and denied having knowledge of
how it entered the record. Although the discrepancy in spelling of the president’s
name may be, without more, an “utterly trivial inconsistency” attributable to
difficulties in Punjabi-to-English translation, the “total circumstances” surrounding
the letter allowed the IJ to draw an adverse inference as to Kaur’s veracity. See
Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2010).
PETITION DENIED.
-3-