FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 23, 2014
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSElisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
PAUL RICHARD PAYNE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 12-4213
(D.C. No. 2:10-CV-00422-DB)
STEVEN TURLEY; FNU FELAND, (D. Utah)
Chaplain; BILLIE CASPER; A.C.
BIGELOW,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
TOM ANDERSON; EDWARD
KINGSFORD,
Defendants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before LUCERO, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This case is therefore ordered
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Paul Payne, a state prisoner incarcerated in Utah, filed this pro se civil
rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his complaint, he alleged prison officials
violated his civil rights by denying him visits from religious staff or volunteers and by
restricting his right to file inmate grievances. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and
Plaintiff opposed the motion. Both the motion to dismiss and Plaintiff’s response relied
upon materials outside the pleadings. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for summary
judgment, accompanied by various exhibits.
The district court then issued its memorandum decision and order. The district
court held that because Defendants’ motion to dismiss relied on materials outside the
pleadings and because Plaintiff had had a reasonable opportunity to respond, the motion
should be treated as one for summary judgment in accordance with Rule 12(d) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court then granted summary judgment in
favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s first claim for relief and dismissed the remaining
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim on which relief could
be granted.
Plaintiff did not file a notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the district
court’s order dismissing his claims and closing the case. Rather, he filed only a motion
for an extension of time in which to file a motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff later filed
two motions for reconsideration in which he argued that (1) the district court erred in
converting Defendants’ motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment without
-2-
first providing Plaintiff notice; (2) the court should not have dismissed any claims under §
1915(e) at this stage of the proceedings; (3) the court erred in failing to rule on Plaintiff’s
motions for summary judgment and for access to a law library or standby counsel; and (4)
there were various errors in the district court’s treatment of his claims on the merits. The
district court treated Plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration jointly and denied them in an
order issued on November 19, 2012. Plaintiff’s notice of appeal to this court was filed on
December 20, 2012, but the postmark on the envelope shows that it was mailed from the
prison on December 19, 2012. In response to this court’s show-cause order, Plaintiff
submitted an affidavit attesting that he placed his notice of appeal in the mailbox at the
Utah State Prison, first-class postage pre-paid, on December 15, 2012.
The first matter we must address in this case is the question of our appellate
jurisdiction. In order to appeal the district court’s dismissal of his complaint, Plaintiff
was required to file a notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the district court’s
decision. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). If Plaintiff had filed a timely motion for post-
judgment relief under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the time for him to
file a notice of appeal would have been tolled. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). However,
such a motion, to be timely, “must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of
judgment,” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi)59(b), and a district court is not permitted to
extend this deadline, Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). A motion for post-judgment relief under
Rule 60 must likewise be filed within twenty-eight days in order to toll the time for filing
a notice of appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi). In this case, Plaintiff filed neither a
-3-
notice of appeal nor a motion for post-judgment relief within the applicable filing
deadlines, and his motion for an impermissible extension of time in which to file a motion
for post-judgment relief did not toll the deadline for him to file a notice of appeal. We
accordingly conclude that we lack appellate jurisdiction to consider the merits of the
district court’s underlying judgment.
This does not end the matter, however, since we have jurisdiction to review the
district court’s denial of a post-judgment motion if the appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal from the denial of post-judgment relief, even where the lack of an earlier notice of
appeal deprives us of jurisdiction to review the merits of the underlying judgment. See
Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1009 (10th Cir. 2000). Thus, we may
review the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s requests for post-judgment relief if we
conclude that Plaintiff’s notice of appeal was filed within thirty days following the district
court’s order denying post-judgment relief. Ordinarily, a notice of appeal is deemed filed
upon receipt by the court, Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 273 (1988), and Plaintiff’s
notice of appeal would be untimely under this reckoning. However, a prisoner who meets
certain procedural requirements is entitled to avail himself of the prison mailbox rule,
which permits the date of filing to be based upon the date that a notice of appeal is
deposited in the institution’s internal mail system. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1). We conclude
Plaintiff is entitled to avail himself of the prison mailbox rule in this case based on his
affidavit and the postmark on his envelope, which makes it clear that Plaintiff deposited
his notice of appeal in the prison mail system before the filing deadline. See Love v.
-4-
Daniels, 549 F. App’x 801, 803-04 (10th Cir. 2013). We therefore have appellate
jurisdiction to consider the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s post-judgment motions for
relief.
Because Plaintiff filed his post-judgment motions for reconsideration more than 28
days after the district court’s judgment, we construe them as motions for relief pursuant to
Rule 60(b), see Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991), and
we review the denial of relief only for an abuse of discretion, Servants of Paraclete, 204
F.3d at 1009. Applying this deferential standard of review, we affirm the district court’s
denial of post-judgment relief. Under the circumstances of this case,
we are not persuaded the district court abused its discretion in rejecting Plaintiff’s
argument that he was entitled to post-judgment relief based upon the court’s failure to
provide notice of its intent to convert Defendants’ motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment. Nor do we see any error, much less an abuse of discretion, in the
district court’s legal conclusion that it was required under § 1915(e) to dismiss Plaintiff’s
claims at any time if the court determined that he had failed to state a claim on which
relief could be granted. We further conclude that the district court’s failure to explicitly
rule on Plaintiff’s pending motions for summary judgment and for access to a law library
or standby counsel did not entitle him to discretionary post-judgment relief. Finally, we
hold that Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the merits of his claims did not justify relief
from the district court’s judgment under Rule 60(b). See Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at 1244.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of post-
-5-
judgment relief and hold that we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of the underlying
judgment. Plaintiff’s motion to compel access to a law library is DENIED. We GRANT
Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal and remind him of his
obligation to continue making partial payments until the entire filing fee has been paid in
full.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
-6-