FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 27, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
STEVE N. BURTON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 13-1373
(D.C. No. 1:12-CV-02002-WJM-CBS)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, (D. Colo.)
Defendant - Appellee.
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CHARLES SCHOEPHOERSTER, P.A.;
KEITH BAKER, M.D.; CALVIN
POLLAND, D.O.,
Defendants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before LUCERO and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Plaintiff Steve N. Burton appeals from the district court’s order dismissing his
complaint without prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.1 We affirm.
I. Background
Mr. Burton sued the United States for wrongful death under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that his wife died from untreated influenza due to the
negligence of health care providers at Peterson Air Force Base. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(b), 2671-80.2 The FTCA allows claims against the government for
“personal injury or death . . . under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.” Id. § 1346(b)(1). Because the FTCA
provides a limited waiver of the government’s sovereign immunity, however, “the
notice requirements established by the FTCA must be strictly construed.” Bradley v.
United States ex rel. Veterans Admin., 951 F.2d 268, 270 (10th Cir. 1991). To
provide adequate notice, the plaintiff’s administrative claim must “specify[] a ‘sum
1
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (“Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a
dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this rule–except one
for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19–
operates as an adjudication on the merits.”).
2
Mr. Burton also named three federal employees as defendants, but they were
dismissed with prejudice in the district court by stipulation of the parties. “The
United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA action.” Oxendine v. Kaplan,
241 F.3d 1272, 1275 n.4 (10th Cir. 2001).
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certain’ amount of recovery sought.” Id. at 270 n.2 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b),
2675; 28 C.F.R. § 14.2).
Mr. Burton, through his counsel, had filed his administrative claim on a
standard form. Where the form asked for the amount of the wrongful death claim,
“In Excess of $1.5 Million” was written in by hand, and where the form asked for the
total amount of the claim, “0.00” was typed. Aplt. App. at 36. The government
moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing that Mr. Burton’s
failure to specify “a sum certain amount of money damages” in his administrative
claim, Aplt. App. at 25, deprived the district court of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2675(a) and (b) and 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a), Aplt. App. at 30-31. The district court
granted the government’s motion, citing Tenth Circuit decisions holding that amounts
expressed in the terms “in excess of” do not state a sum certain, as required for an
FTCA administrative claim. Id. at 61-63 (citing Bradley, 951 F.2d at 271, and
Gladden v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 18 F. App’x 756, 758 (10th Cir. 2001)).
Mr. Burton appeals.
II. Discussion
“We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and review findings of jurisdictional facts for clear error.”
Butler v. Kempthorne, 532 F.3d 1108, 1110 (10th Cir. 2008). However, “[b]ecause
the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited, there is a presumption against our
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jurisdiction, and the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proof.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Burton does not dispute that his administrative claim specified damages
for wrongful death “in excess of” $1.5 million. Rather, he asserts, relying on
decisions from other circuits, that by requesting damages “in excess of” $1.5 million,
his claim provided sufficient notice for the government to investigate and evaluate
his claim for damages for the alleged wrongful death of his wife. He also argues for
the first time on appeal that our 1991 holding in Bradley should be reevaluated in
light of our more recent statement that the notice requirements of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2675(a) should be assessed pragmatically. See Estate of Trentadue ex rel. Aguilar
v. United States, 397 F.3d 840, 852 (10th Cir. 2005). We ordinarily do not consider
issues raised for the first time on appeal, although we have discretion to do so.
Braswell v. Cincinnati Inc., 731 F.3d 1081, 1092-93 (10th Cir. 2013). Even
considering Mr. Burton’s new argument, however, we disagree that Bradley is not
controlling precedent as to the sum certain requirement for an FTCA claim.
Our rule is that “[a] published decision of one panel of this court constitutes
binding circuit precedent constraining subsequent panels absent en banc
reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision by the Supreme Court.” Haynes v.
Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 900 n.4 (10th Cir. 1996). In Bradley, we “recognize[d] the
harsh result” of a strict construction of the FTCA notice requirements, but we
“decline[d] to hold that [a p]laintiff’s valuation of his claim as ‘in excess of’
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[a specific dollar amount was] sufficient to satisfy the sum certain requirement”
because the amount had “no ceiling.” 951 F.2d at 271 (emphasis added).
In contrast, the notice requirement we discussed in Trentadue was whether the
plaintiff’s written claim “sufficiently describ[ed] the injury” for which damages were
sought. 397 F.3d at 852 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this regard, we noted
the First Circuit’s description of “the test under § 2675(a) as ‘an eminently pragmatic
one: as long as the language of an administrative claim serves due notice that the
agency should investigate the possibility of particular (potentially tortious) conduct
and includes a specification of the damages sought, it fulfills the notice-of-claim
requirement.’” Id. (quoting Dynamic Image Tech., Inc. v. United States, 221 F.3d 34,
40 (1st Cir. 2000)). In Trentadue, however, the plaintiff’s administrative claim
“specified the damages sought.” Id. As a result, we had no occasion to address the
sum certain requirement in that case, except to note that “a sum certain damages
claim” was required and had been made. Id. And even if we had addressed the sum
certain requirement in Trentadue differently than in Bradley, (i.e., pragmatically), our
rule is that “when faced with an intra-circuit conflict, a panel should follow earlier,
settled precedent over a subsequent deviation therefrom.” Haynes, 88 F.3d at 900
n.4. Thus, Bradley would still control the outcome in this case.3
3
Because Gladden v. United States Department of Justice, 18 F. App’x 756,
758 (10th Cir. 2001), is an unpublished panel decision, it does not constitute binding
precedent. In any event, that decision followed the rule for the “sum certain”
(continued)
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The district court thoroughly and correctly discussed Mr. Burton’s other
arguments under the applicable law, and we need not repeat that discussion here.
Mr. Burton has failed to identify any error.
Affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Senior Circuit Judge
requirement established in Bradley v. United States ex rel. Veterans Administration,
951 F.2d 268, 271 (10th Cir. 1991).
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